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ABSTRACT 
This thesis is about higher education reforms - with special reference to the 
institutions of the non-university· sector of higher education - in Greece, in 
comparison to apparently similar reforms in France and Germany. Overall, the 
thesis attempts to analyse and explain the similarities and differences in these 
reforms (starting from the late 1960s) through an interpretation of Greece as a 
'semi-peripheral' society within Europe. 
Chapter One presents an overview of the thesis, and thus introduces the 
background of the research problem, the comparative framing, the purpose, the 
theoretical orientation, the main argument and the organisation of the thesis. 
Then, the thesis has two parts. The first Part is both descriptive and analytical 
and sets out to show the apparent similarities in the reforms of higher 
education in the three countries. Chapter Two outlines the higher education 
reforms in Greece. Chapter Three analyses the reforms in France and Chapter 
Four analyses the reforms in Germany. Chapter Five summarises the 
similarities and the differences. 
The second Part of the thesis is both theoretical and descriptive. It interprets 
the Greek case. Chapter Six works on two theoretical approaches to 'semi-
peripheral' societies. Chapter Seven presents, in detail, the case of Greece as a 
'semi-peripheral' society within Europe. Chapter Eight offers a re-
interpretation and an analysis of the similarities and differences in higher 
education reforms identified earlier, in terms of the 'semi-peripherality' of 
Greece. This Chapter is also the conclusion of the thesis. 
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This chapter identifies the purpose, the main argument, and the structure of the 
thesis. 
This thesis is about higher education reforms in Greece, with special reference 
to the non-university sector. This sector in Greece is relatively new and 
concentrates on vocational! technical education. It is a crucial issue in Greece 
now. Thus, the purpose of the thesis is to offer an interpretation of when, why 
and how the non-university sector of higher education emerged and how it has 
been shaped in Greece. 
However, although the final emphasis of the thesis is on Greece, the thesis 
begins with a description and analysis of reforms of the non-university higher 
education sector in France and Germany as well as Greece. In other words, the 
thesis is a comparative thesis but one which developed in an unusual way. 
The thesis took shape gradually. I spent a year reading in university libraries, 
trying to understand higher education reform patterns in Europe and especially 
reforms to the non-university sector. According to my initial reading, 
approximately the same things were being reformed for more or less the same 
reasons: these three countries appeared to be alike in the reform patterns of 
their non-university sectors. In that sense, the first Part of the thesis was 
created inductively. My initial view of the problem was arrived at in a way that 
is like the methodological proposals of G. Z. F. Bereday and his insistence that 
comparative education begins with pedagogic description.! 
Retrospectively, it may of course be suggested that the choice of France and 
Germany as places of comparison with Greece was reinforced by the influences 
which the higher education systems of these two countries have exerted across 
Europe, and their influence on the Greek higher education system.2 In reality, 
the choice of France and Germany for comparison was based on this early 
10 
perception from my wide reading and on one narrow criterion: their reforms of 
this sector of higher education were like the reform patterns in Greece. 
Approximately the same things were being reformed for approximately the 
same reasons, according to my initial reading: these three countries appeared to 
be dramatically alike in the reform patterns of their non-university sectors. 
Thus, the first Part of the thesis - in methodological terms - is inductive. It is 
inductive in that it required a lot of reading. It is inductive in its choice of 
countries. It is inductive in that it follows by and large the first step in 
Bereday's methodology which he calls 'browsing'. The 'browsing' was serious 
and sustained but nevertheless, methodologically, the first step in the thesis is 
understandable in Bereday's terms. 
It was only after identifying such similarities (and some differences) that I 
began to shape the whole thesis, the thesis idea itself. I began to think that 
these similarities, on close investigation, would turn out to be non-similarities. 
I decided first to show in detail these patterns of 'similarities', and then to see if 
I could re-analyse or re-interpret them. This decision gave the shape of the 
thesis: Part I is a demonstration of apparent 'similarities'; Part II is an effort to 
show how the particulars of the Greek situation mean that the 'similarities' of 
policy (with France and Germany) need re-interpretation in the Greek socio-
economic context. It was only after these research and reflection processes that 
I was able to express in fairly formal language the purpose and argument of the 
thesis. 
The descriptive purpose of the thesis is to establish dearly the patterns of 
similarities (and differences) in the reform in the non-university sector of higher 
education in Greece, France and Germany. In the first Part of the thesis, this 
description covers the period from the late 1960s up to the 1990s. The analysiS 
of the non-university sector of higher education refers, in Greece, to the 
Technological Educational Institutions [TcxvoAoYllax E,arau)cVTlKo. Ibpv/la:ro. (TED], 
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in France, to the Instituts Universitaires de Technologie (JUT) and, in Germany, to 
the Fachhochschulen (FHS). 
Central to the higher education reforms, in practice, in all these three countries 
was the role of the State and the intentions behind State policies. Overall, in 
these three countries, the State was an important actor influencing and shaping 
higher education systems.3 
However, it is not the State that is the focus of the thesis, especially within the 
first Part. The first Part of the thesis identifies the State as an actor but 
concentrates on identifying the similarities in reform patterns in higher 
education between Greece and the other two European countries on this narrow 
dimension. It is important to notice that this description does not offer a full 
and equal comparison of the sociat historical and political contexts of these 
three countries, though the operational categories of description are the same in 
the three chapters. 
This description was informed by the potential comparative categories that 
seemed most likely to permit sensitivity to similarities and differences in higher 
education reforms, and similarities and differences in state action. The 
categories were: the politics, the aims and purposes of the state, the laws passed 
and the major higher education reforms, the major debates, and the 
differentiation between the non-university sector and the universities. The 
description within these categories was assembled in two time periods (the 
1960s-1970s, and the 1980s-1990s). 
Initially, on the basis of this description, the major similarities clustered around 
the notions of 'equity' and' effiCiency'. 'Equity' was about the introduction of 
the non-university sector within higher education as part of the expansion of 
the higher education system. It looked, on the basis of initial reading, as if this 
expansion was necessary because there was a powerful social demand for 
higher education and because the economy needed more graduates. The non-
university sector was also to provide social mobility. 'Efficiency', it seemed on 
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initial reading, was about the need for a better response of the higher education 
system to the needs of the economy. The advantage expected of this new type 
of higher education was that it was vocationally and practically orientated. 
However, the non-university sector also had another mission: to relieve the 
overcrowded universities from the increasing numbers of students wishing to 
enter higher education. In this way, the non-university sector would contribute 
to the rationalisation of the higher education system and for this reason the 
unity of the higher education system was emphasised. 
On the basis of these kinds of insight, the first part of the main argument of the 
thesis began to take shape: 
• There are major similarities (and some differences) between the Greek and 
the French and German patterns of higher education reforms. 
• These similarities can be grouped in terms of the policy concepts (and the 
analytic categories) of 'equity' and 'efficiency'. 
In the thesis, this first part of the main argument will be tested and there will be 
a conventional statement of similarities at the end of the first Part of the thesis 
(Chapter Five). In this sense, the final chapter of the first Part of the thesis is not 
an ending; it is also a beginning. The ending of the first Part is crucial for the 
construction of a new interpretation, which is the work of the second Part of the 
thesis. 
Within the second Part of the thesis, the main argument - which is relevant to 
the proposition that comparative education should begin outside education, in 
a reading of the cultures, histories and sociologies of social formations, against 
which educational patterns are understood4 - continues. The argument is that: 
• the similarities (and some of the differences) - listed at the end of Chapter 
Five - between the Greek, and the French and the German patterns of higher 
education reforms can be deconstructed, re-analysed and thus re-interpreted 
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by taking into consideration the 'semi-peripherality' of Greece within 
Europe. 
This part of the overall argument of the thesis will be tested within the second 
Part of the thesis, and within the framework of a theoretical approach drawn 
from world systems analysis. Greece will be viewed as a 'semi-peripheral' 
society within Europe. 
Thus, in the comparative work of this thesis, the model of comparison and the 
choice of the theoretical framework for analysis is not the three countries as 
such. The starting point of the problematic of the thesis is the similarities (and 
some of the differences) between Greece and the other two European countries 
in their higher education reform patterns. These 'similarities' take a summary 
statement in Chapter Five - which is the new problematic for the rest of the 
thesis. The thesis will deconstruct, re-analyse and thus re-interpret the 
similarities (and the differences) identified in Chapter Five. 
It is this conceptualisation that creates the structure of the thesis. The 
methodological and theoretical framework of the thesis is a double one: 
induction and Bereday's first step of pedagogical description in the first Part, 
and world systems analysis in the second Part of the thesis. 
For the deconstruction of the similarities and the differences in the second Part 
of the thesis, a definition of Greece as a European 'semi-periphery' will be 
provided. Two theoretical perspectives taken from the literature of 
comparative and historical SOciology will be explored. Both perspectives 
elaborate a theory of the 'semi-periphery' but emphasise different aspects of 
societies. In the end, a synthesis of both of these two theoretical perspectives 
will be suggested for analysing the case of Greece. The suggested synthesiS will 
then be applied on a full analysis of Greece, as a 'semi-peripheral' society 
within Europe. 
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More precisely, the theoretical perspective of the second Part of the thesis is 
'world systems analysis', which belongs to historically oriented Marxism5. The 
choice for a Marxist paradigm was because the Marxist political economy 
approach views development as an overall societal transformation, and thus 
sets out to discover how contradictions and struggles within the economy are 
systematically related to changes in the political and cultural spheres.6 
Furthermore, within the 'world systems' approach, there is a considerable 
amount of work on the case of the Southern European 'semi-peripheral' zone, 
to which Greece belongs. Also, 'world systems analysis' uses the concept of the 
'semi-periphery'. The use of this concept differentiates 'world systems' theory 
from neo-Marxist dependency theory, which uses the terms of 'core' and 
'periphery' only? 
The concept of the 'semi-periphery' can be described in very broad terms as 
follows. World systems analysis explains that 'corel-type and 'peripheral'-type 
activities are unequally distributed across the world-system. The position of a 
state in the world-system is usually defined by a mixture of 'core' and 
'peripheral' activities. If the vast majority of activities within a state are 'core', 
then this state is a 'core' state. If the vast majority of activities within a state are 
'peripheral', then this state is a 'peripheral' state. If there is an even balance of 
'core'-type and 'peripheral'-type activities within a state, then this is a 'semi-
peripheral' state. 
The neo-Marxist origin of 'world-system analysis' permits the study of Greece 
in its historical transformation as a 'semi-peripheral' society within Europe and 
points to economic and international relations. However, world systems 
analysis neglects, or does not sufficiently explain the special nature of the State 
in 'semi-peripheral' societies. 
The second theoretical perspective, which comes from the domain of historical 
sociology, supplements the perspective of 'world-system analysis' in that it 
views the State as an important actor within semi-peripheral societies. In this 
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way, the thesis points to the economic reductionism of Marxism and places a 
special emphasis on the role of the 'polity', that is the State, in peripheral 
capitalism. The State is considered to be an important actor, within semi-
peripheral societies: it most often hinders their developmental process. 
Thus, at the heart of the problematic of the second Part of the thesis is the 
nature of the Greek State and how it can be an obstacle to development. 
However, it is equally important to mention that the authoritarian structure of 
the Greek State also means that the State tends to introduce education reforms 
without involving the actors who are immediately concerned with the reforms 
being introduced. This attitude of the State is assisted by the fact that Greece 
has a highly centralised education system. 
Thus, this thesis aims at offering an interpretation, from a historical perspective, 
of the choices of the State and ends with a critique through the analysiS for 
Greece that it offers. This thesis is thus empathetic to the critical model of the 
social science.8 
The critical model of social science attempts to integrate theory and practice in 
social theory. This model is 'critical' in that it sees theories as analyses of a 
social situation which can be altered to eliminate frustrations which people in 
their social situation are experiencing.9 The translation of a critical social 
science into practice requires the partiCipation and active involvement of the 
social actors themselves in this process.10 Finally, the 'critical model' 
emphasises 'history', in that the critical social scientist seeks to reveal how the 
historical process made the social order, which he/ she is examining, incapable 
of satisfying some of the wants and needs which it engendered. The effort is to 
account for structural conflict and accompanying social discontent. ll 
Overall, this thesis follows only part of the critical theory research paradigm, in 
that a) it aims at the interpretation, clarification and analysis of the issue under 
investigation, and b) it is historical. However, the thesis does not involve the 
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actors who are immediately confronting the situation under investigation (e.g. 
the students) and thus it is not aiming at policy formulation and 
implementation. 
After the current chapter (Chapter One: the Introduction), the structure of the 
thesis is as follows. As has already been indicated, the thesis has two Parts. 
Part I is basically descriptive and includes Chapters Two, Three and Four which 
refer to the higher education reforms - with special reference to the non-
university sector - in Greece, France and Germany. This Part ends with Chapter 
Five, which offers an initial account of the similarities and differences between 
Greece and the other two European countries. Chapter Five is the linking 
Chapter of the two Parts of the thesis. 
Part II of the thesis is more theoretical. In Chapter Six, the thesis elaborates a 
theory of the 'semi-periphery', following the ideas of Immanuel Wallerstein, 
and Nicos Mouzelis. Chapter Seven presents the case of Greece as a 'semi-
peripheral' society within Europe, and within the Southern European 'semi-
peripheral' zone. Then, in Chapter Eight, in the context of the 'semi-
peripherality' of Greece, the thesis re-analyses the similarities and differences 
that were identified in Part 1. This Chapter is also the conclusion of the thesis. 
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THE GREEK REFORMS 
2.1 INTRODUCTION: PURPOSE AND ARGUMENT 
In this chapter, the higher education reforms in Greece - with special reference 
to the non-university sector - are interpreted, from the late 1960s up to the 
1990s. The role of the state and its rationale for its policies is identified in the 
laws, aims and purposes stated by the state, and in contemporaneous political 
debates. The major debates among academics are also described, since they 
illuminate the political, social, economic and international context of the 
reforms. 
The analysis is broken up into two periods: the 1960s-1970s and the 1980s-1990s. 
The differentiation between the TEl [Tc:;cvoAoYl1aX E1CJrazt5c:VTllal. I6pv/lo:ra 
(Technological Educational Institutions)] and the universities is placed within 
the second period, since it was then that the TEl were created within higher 
education. 
Overall, the line of argument in this chapter is that during the 1960s-1970s, 
there were two major tensions. The first tension was about 'efficiency': the 
education system had to contribute to 'modernisation' and 'economic 
development', and be itself modernised. Therefore, higher technical education 
was emphasised, within a human capital theory approach.1 The introduction of 
the earlier technical institutions, under the influence of international 
organisations, was to serve those major priorities. 
The second tension was 'equity': the whole education system had to be 
expanded and contribute to 'democratisation'. Equality of educational 
opportunity was mainly oriented towards the 'input' aspect of education. 
However, the reforms of this period were characterised by a manpower 
approach2 to educational planning. 
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During the 1980s-1990s, the tensions over 'equity' and 'efficiency' were still 
important, but changed their balance. These tensions also dominated the 
reforms in the universities {AEl [Avwrara EK7rau)C:V7:l1aJ. Ibpvj1ara (Highest 
Educational Institutions)]}. 
For the TEl in particular, the issue of 'efficiency' was identified in the creation of 
the TEl as part of the modernisation of the higher education system to 
contribute to economic development, increasingly understood as self-reliant 
development. However, efficiency also meant relieving the already 
overcrowded universities: to be more successful, the TEl would belong to 
higher education, unlike the earlier institutions. International experience - the 
experience of other countries - was emphasised. 
The issue of 'equity' was defined in terms of increasing access to higher 
education (particularly to the TEl) to respond to the strong demand for higher 
education. Thus, the social demand approach to educational planning was 
dominant and the equality of educational opportunity argument was intensely 
used. 
Accordingly, the narrative that follows and which covers the 1960s-1970s will 
illustrate the tension between economic and modernisation concerns and 
democratic and domestic political concerns. Education policy shifted in and 
out of focus and changed emphasis around these issues. 
2.2 THE 19605-19705: POLITICS, AIMS AND PURPOSES OF THE STATE, 
AND MAJOR EDUCATION REFORMS AND LAWS 
The purpose of this section is to present the 1960s and the 1970s reforms. In 
both of these reforms: 
• The first tension was over 'equity', which was expressed in the themes of the 
expansion and democratisation of the education system. 
• The second tension was over 'efficiency', identified in the stated aims and 
political debates by the importance placed on technical education for 
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modernisation and economic development, within a human capital theory 
approach. 
• The third tension concerned the intervention of international organisations, 
which stressed I efficiency'. 
The 1958 education reform, that preceded the 1960s reforms, addressed the 
theme of efficiency. This reform attempted for the first time, to link education 
with production through the establishment of the first technical schools by the 
State.3 This took place in a political context: since the mid-twentieth century, 
there had been a tendency toward the over-development of the tertiary sector. 
The consequence was that Athens had attracted people from the countryside 
who preferred to have a badly paid but secure job in the public services, rather 
than remaining in the agricultural sector.4 
From the beginning of the 1960s, and especially since GNŒÕŊĜŊŨŸĚ Kf:vrpov (the 
centrist liberal regime of George Papandreou) took power, educational matters 
were given primary consideration and educational expenditure was increased.s 
A spirit of enthusiasm for education drove the reform of 1964, and a systematic 
effort was made to remove the obstacles and barriers to access in education. 
The outcome was educational expansion. E. Papanoutsos (the Minister of 
Education during that period) emphasised that among all expenses, education 
provided the greatest and the most secure return.6 Thus, from 1960 until 1966, 
public educational expenditure continuously increased, and in 1966 it reached a 
maximum of 16.2% of Gross Domestic Product. Having started from a 
minimum of 3.4% in 1948 and 4.8% in 1950, in 1955, public educational 
expenditure became 10.6%. For the whole 1960-1984 period, it averaged 
between 13% and 15%.7 
The principles of the democratisation of education and of equality of 
educational opportunities were expressed through a number of measures. 
These included the abolition of entrance examinations to the Gymnasium, the 
creation of gymnasiums in agricultural and highland areas, and the foundation 
of new universities in big urban centres.s 
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There were also international agencies influencing Greek educational politics. 
At the beginning of the 1960s, OECD was subsidised by the Ford Institute to 
work on the IIMediterranean Regional Project", aimed at the development and 
modernisation of the educational systems of six countries: Greece, Italy, Spain, 
Portugal, Yugoslavia and Turkey.9 
The general philosophy of the plan was summarised at a conference held in 
Washington in 1961. In this conference, it was stated that education was of vital 
importance for productivity and economic growth and was thus considered to 
be an important investment. It was also suggested that educational goals 
should be oriented especially towards secondary and higher technical and 
vocational education, in the context of economic plans and of the economy as a 
whole.1° Moreover, within the report, it was argued that: 
Rapid industrialisation depends upon the efficient utilization of all the 
economic resources of the country - natural, physical, capital, and human 
resources. There is a growing conviction that the last of these is the key to 
economic growth. In the case of Greece, in particular, the relative scarcity of 
natural resources reinforces the emphasis that must be placed on investment 
in modem capital equipment and, above all, in human resources. The five-
year plan fully acknowledges the importance of developing the knowledge, 
skill and initiative of the people, and the Government is pledged to support 
education as one of the most important elements of the entire economic 
development effort.ll 
The main object of the OECD Report was the specification, in quantitative 
terms, of the educational changes needed to meet changes in population 
growth, in income, in the social demand for education and in the structural 
transformation of the Greek economy. The claims on resources associated with 
rising standards in education and the reduction of inequalities in facilities 
between the various regions of the country were also evaluated. Estimates of 
costs and the programming of expenditures on education in accordance with 
needs and the availability of resources were also undertaken.12 However, the 
'Mediterranean Regional Project' was not the only form of multilateral technical 
assistance. 
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The World Bank also intervened in Greek education by funding the first higher 
technical educational institutions, known as KATEE [Ktvrpa Avwrc:py/<; TC:XVllCft<; 
KlXl E7rayyC:Ap,aTlKft<; EK7rai6c:v(Jy/<; (Centres of Higher Technical and Vocational 
Education)].13 The first intervention took place during the dictatorship. The 
government of the dictatorship - apart from reversing the policy change of 
1964-6514 - signed contracts with the World Bank according to which the latter 
would finance educational programmes. 
So, in 1970, five KATEE were created and in 1975 another contract was signed 
for a third educational programme, which provided for the creation of three 
more KATEE.15 The establishment of KATEE continued up to 1982.16 The basic 
aim was the production of middle level cadres to carry out specialised jobs for 
big enterprisesP According to Law 652/70, KATEE had as their mission the 
education of higher level technicians, which would constitute a middle level 
between scientists and technicians.18 The highest educational institutions 
(universities and polytechnea) were self-governing independent institutions, 
while Higher Technical Institutions (KATEE) were neither self-governing nor 
independent. Their task was to train, quickly and efficiently, the required 
skilled personnel, thus contributing to economic 'efficiency'.19 
Overall, the educational programmes funded by the World Bank took shape 
within the elaboration of a fifteen - year plan for 'economic development', the 
/lPlan for the model Long-term Development of Greece, 1972-1987". According 
to this Plan, until 1987, the workforce of the primary sector of the economy 
would gradually have to be decreased from 1,400.000 to 800,000 persons. By 
1987, 1,250.000 persons should be entering the secondary and tertiary levels of 
the economy (470,000, the secondary, and 780,000, the tertiary level). At the 
same time, it was estimated that the graduates of technical and vocational 
education should increase from 335,000 persons in 1971, to 1,600.000 persons in 
1987.20 
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In 1974, the dictatorship fell. Political elections took place and the liberal 
political party (New Democracy), came to power. Then, a new period of 
educational reform started,21 which led to the 1976-77 reforms. 
Again there was a tension between the democratisation and economic motifs. 
Greece had emerged from a 7-year period of ruthless dictatorship. There were 
also prospects of the country joining the European Economic Community: 
The first reality generated a new political spirit and a determination to create 
the conditions, which would make a repetition of such a tragic experience 
impossible. As a result, there has been an emphatic pursuit of 
democratization in education as an instrument for democratizing society. The 
second reality has made it necessary to modernize education in order to 
contribute to the modernization of the social, economic, and political 
institutions of the country.22 
The issue of democratisation that dominated the 1976-77 reform was more 
political than social. After the fall of the dictatorship (1974), political liberties 
and representative parliamentary institutions were restored, and therefore, 
'democratisation' became a political demand and an instrument for the 
restoration of political freedom. The educational reform was thus seen as part 
of the restoration of democratic institutions and was almost universally 
welcomed.23 
The values underlining the 1976-77 reform, as Persianis argues, were however 
those of 'democratisation' and 'modernisation'. These values24 were embodied 
in Law 576/77 "On the Organisation and Administration of Secondary and 
Higher Vocational and Technical Education"25, although this was not passed 
with unanimity.26 
However in practice, one of the most important provisions of the educational 
reform of this period was an economic motif - the reorganisation and expansion 
of technical and vocational education. The reforms included new subjects 
giving information about technology and vocational life, and they reorganised 
and expanded technical and vocational educationP 
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Both the left wing and the conservative parties supported the drive towards 
technical and vocational education but within a different model of socio-
economic development.28 For instance, the leader of the Communist Party of 
Greece of Interior (Koppovvurmco Kopp,a EM6.bar; E(JwrcprKov) stated: 
We agree with the provision regarding the structure of the educational 
system, but we have some reservations and objections to it. It is correct to 
establish technical and vocational schools to serve economic and social 
development, and the defence of the country. However, they must not 
operate in the interests of monopoly or create social barriers to higher 
education ... We are against any elitist education which destroys the unity of 
the population and introduces a moral, social and national separation 
between scientists and skilled workers, a 'Chinese Wall' for the preservation 
of the ruling class.29 
The law on technical and vocational education (Law No. 576/77) was criticised 
on the grounds that it did not provide sufficient incentives to attract students, 
and that it favoured the interests of large industrial enterprises.30 
Overall, the belief in education as a highly profitable public investment was 
stressed in the educational reform.31 The government wanted to adopt and 
implement an internationally accepted principle: education as an investment of 
capital that would be able to produce the manpower required for the economic, 
social and cultural development of the country. Thus, the government stressed 
the economic benefits of technical and vocational education.32 
The government intended to regulate the flow of students into the different 
types and levels of education according to the targets of the state development 
plan, to ensure the greater employability of those from technical and vocational 
schools. Within this logic, the binary system of post-secondary education, that 
is, the distinction between "higher" and "highest" education, and the different 
legal status of the two, also aimed at economic 'efficiency'.33 Apart from the 
binary system of higher education, other provisions aiming at efficiency were 
the entrance examinations into the lyceums; planning; and special allowances 
for the most talented students.34 
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Thus, in both the political context and in the contradictions between the rhetoric 
of the government and in its actual reforms of higher education a considerable 
tension can be seen. What was stressed politically was' democratisation' of the 
system - equity. The major reform was however the creation of technical and 
vocational institutions - which stressed an economic motif and modernisation. 
The above tensions were also reflected in the contemporary academic debates. 
2.2.1 Major Debates 
The purpose of this sub-section is to describe some of these major debates 
among the academics.35 
• Some of the debates concerned efficiency: the modernisation of the 
education system was emphasised, albeit in the context of industrial 
underdevelopment. 
• Some debates were critical of the international influences, which were 
associated with the 'modernisation' school of development. Other debates 
held that post-secondary technical/vocational education was promoted in 
the context of dependence. 
• Some debates concerned equity: it was argued that the concept of equality of 
educational opportunity was weak. 
• Finally, the failure of the KATEE was attributed partly to traditional views 
about the importance of University education, and to the establishment of 
these institutions during the dictatorship. 
In many ways, the academic debates were quite sophisticated and some of them 
concerned more than one of the above major themes. 
For instance, Pyrgiotakis argued that" abnormal"36 economic development had 
led to an over-developed tertiary sector and to an under-developed secondary 
sector of the economy. Therefore, all the efforts for modernisation without 
industrial development, which continued for many years after the 1958 reform, 
had had negative effects on the development of educational institutions.37 
Furthermore, Pyrgiotakis argued that the 1964 reform had placed emphasis on 
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equality of educational opportunities, but had confined itself to the removal of 
the economic barriers and obstacles that the absence of schools created, without 
taking into consideration social barriers.38 
The interventions of international organisations were criticised by 
Pesmazoglou. He argued that the OEeD's "Mediterranean Regional Project" 
was accepted by the Greek governments due to the lack of integrated and local 
educational and research policies.39 Pesmazoglou also claimed that the 
"Mediterranean Regional Project" (MRP) was not aiming at strengthening the 
coherence and quality of domestic educational institutions, and that it was not 
oriented towards creating self-reliance.4o 
He suggested that the MRP was "a typical example of the professional 
economist's application of the neoclassical modernizing model to the 
educational sphere" .41 Most expert missions emphatically recommended 
technical and vocational training in general, at the expense of all other types of 
education. "This entailed an explicit plan regarding the integration of Greece in 
the international division of education and research activities." At the same 
time, these expert missions ignored or concealed the role of education in the 
social division of labour as well as the broader cultural significance of 
education.42 Finally, despite the effort by reports to present foreign aid or 
technical assistance as unique for each country, the rationale was uniform: 
• educational systems geared exclusively to economic growth and long term 
economic development; 
• full adaptation of higher education to priority economic needs; 
• combatting all forms of traditional education in a modernizing direction; 
[sic] 
• in practice this meant that every country has: a) a shortage of engineers, 
mathematicians, trained scientists, intermediate technicians, and teachers; 
and b) an abundance of lawyers, "men of letters," political science 
graduates; 
• the equation is linear: criteria for all sorts of aid, technical assistance, loans, 
educational exchanges, scholarships lead necessarily to technical and 
vocational education, agricultural institutes[sic).43 
Like Pesmazoglou, Vergidis stressed the domestic distortions of dependent 
development. He argued that the way the creation of KATEE had been carried 
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out was dictated by the dependent and distorted economic development of the 
country, displayed in the "Plan for the model Long-term Development of 
Greece, 1972-1987". The KATEE institutions would produce a surplus of 
specialised labour which, in combination with other factors such as internal 
markets, geographical location, and political stability, would attract foreign 
capital. In addition, the graduates of higher technical vocational education 
would look for jobs in the urban centres of the country, compounding the 
problems of the agricultural sector and the tendencies to over-urbanisation.44 
Other scholars were critical of the interpretations, in practice, of equality. For 
example, Persianis argued that the most important social value underpinning 
the 1976-77 reform was indeed equality, but a weak concept of equality as 
'equal opportunities' - to be achieved by educational rather than social 
measures, and mainly as equality of inputs (common schools, common 
curriculum, equal equipment, equally qualified and trained staff). Persianis 
argued that the concept of equality was seen neither in its socio-economic form 
(public aid for housing, health, social security and legal aid for the poor), nor in 
its educational form (compensatory education for the socially deprived).45 
Similarly, Eliou judged the reforms to be an attempt to respond to practical 
problems such as: "low educational standards, the need for a technically trained 
labour force, and the rationalised channelling of the particularly pressing 
demand for higher education. "46 However, she argued that the social 
dimension was underestimated: the 1976 reform would raise the educational 
level of the country, but it would also magnify existing inequalities. Properly 
implemented, the reform would harness the products of the educational system 
more effectively to the country's economy, but at the expense of the 
democratisation of educational opportunities.47 
In the end, after 1983, the KATEE failed to remain in operation and 
Kalamatianou et al clarify the reasons why. First, although the KATEE were 
established to serve particular economic development objectives, in effect, they 
were used as a "breakwater" against the continuously increasing demand for 
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university education. Second, since the history of tertiary technical education 
was very short in Greece, the secondary education graduates knew very little 
about the KATEE, while their parents seemed to appreciate only university 
education. Third, politically, the KATEE were established in Greece during the 
dictatorship, a very difficult period for the country. Finally, the failure was due 
to the disproportionate growth of enrolments in comparison to material and 
human resources. Therefore, it was clear that the KATEE had serious problems 
and that something drastic should be done about tertiary technical education.48 
The academic commentary thus picked up on the tensions between' equity' and 
'efficiency'. The international influences were criticised for offering a narrow 
view of 'efficiency' and the concept of equality was, it was argued, weakly 
defined. In practice, the failure of the earlier institutions was followed by a 
more radical reform in higher education. 
2.3 THE 1980s-1990s: POLITICS, AIMS AND PURPOSES OF THE STATE, 
AND MAJOR HIGHER EDUCATION REFORMS AND LAWS 
The arguments of this sub-section are: 
• that with the introduction of the TEl, Greece adopted the international 
model of higher education suggested by UNESCO, within a 'social demand' 
approach. The TEl would contribute to modernisation and 'self-reliant' 
economic development. The belief was expressed that education was 
capable of reinforcing wider socio-economic changes. 
• that most laws on higher education, which had introduced several 
innovations at the beginning of the period, remained unchanged for the rest 
of this period. Whatever changes occurred concerned the differential 
distribution of power. Issues such as 'quality' did not appear in the case of 
Greece but 'equity' was dominant in the stated aims of the state though 
modernisation and 'efficiency' were themes of the early 1990s debate, given 
the prospect of Greece's participating on equal terms in the European 
Union. 
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• that there was increasing unemployment, particularly for TEl graduates. 
However, the TEl were promoted also during the 1990s mostly for the 
satisfaction of social demand and for reducing the number of Greek students 
studying abroad. 
These themes worked themselves out in a political context in which at the 
beginning of the 1980s the Panhellenic Socialist Movement took power and 
declared a 'democratic and self-governing socialism', distinct from social-
democracy and state socialism.49 Within this new political framework, a 
number of education reforms took place. 
Firstly, Law 1268/1982 provided for the reorganisation of the structure and 
function of the AEl [Avwmm EK7mlbeVTlKa I6pvp,o:m (Highest Educational 
Institutions)], as well as for the introduction of Pedagogical Departments of 
Education. Secondly, the KATEE were abolished and the TEl [TcXVoAoYIKa 
EK7rmbeVTlKa I6pvp,am (Technological Educational Institutions)] were created by 
Law 1404/1983.50 
Thus, Greece adopted a model for higher education suggested by UNESCO -
two main types of learning institutions for tertiary education: the universities 
and university type institutions; and non-university institutions. Universities 
and polytechnic schools (AEI) belonged to the first group and offered the 
highest level of education and related degrees and diplomas. The second group 
of institutions was mainly the Technological Educational Institutions (TEI).51 
(See, for more detail of the Greek higher education system, Appendix One.) 
The reforms continued with the 1983-87 'Five-Year Plan', which had as its main 
objective to create structures which could admit more students. At the 
undergraduate level, a much broader range of programmes in the arts and 
sciences would be developed and, at postgraduate level, more opportunities for 
graduate studies and for research.52 Apart from the increase of entrants to 
higher education, other democratisation steps taken by the government were 
the creation of the post-lyceum preparatory centres for entrance to higher 
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education53 and from the beginning of the 1980s, the regional universities 
already in operation would be further expanded. Three new universities would 
also be founded in the Aegean, the Ionian and the Thessalian regions. 54 
The government emphasised that the introduction of the TEl would help 
towards the efforts for the 'self-reliant' development of the country and the 
reduction in inequalities of educational opportunity. The acquisition of a social 
identity, of consciousness for critical thought and the conception of collective 
effort were emphasised. The emphasis given to social justice was also 
associated with efforts for the establishment of the welfare state. 55 Education 
was considered to be a basic area of activity for the welfare state, aiming at 
compensating for the unequal distribution of educational goods. Thus, the 
approach adopted was that of 'social' rather than 'manpower' demand.56 
Nevertheless, the factor of economic efficiency was prominent in the reform 
movements of the 1980s. Great importance was attached to 
technical/vocational education, which was expected to overcome stagnation 
and inflation and to revive and modernise the economy. It was noted that 
Greece needed a new and original model of self-governing overall 
development, which would guarantee that Greece could join the advanced 
nationsP 
Socialism was stressed. The educational system was, therefore, expected to 
undergo a parallel transformation,58 compounded by the importance that Greek 
society attaches to education.59 As pointed out by the OEeD's Examiners' 
Report: 
Any observer of the Greek educational scene will be struck by an initial and 
startling paradox. There is the great esteem in which education is held 
among all sections of the community as the defining factor both in shaping 
the Greek identity throughout its historic vicissitudes and in advancing the 
life-chances of individuals, fully reflected in the sacrifices which families are 
prepared to make for the education of thejr children. Yet, there is a quasi-
universally held view of the existing system as incapable of responding to 
this popular demand or meeting the aspirations of a highly motivated and 
gifted clientele.60 
33 
Thus, during the first period of the socialist government (1981-1985), there was 
an attempt at the creation of a democratic educational reform. The Panhellenic 
Socialist Movement had gained a social and political consensus that led it to 
proceed to changes without serious opposition. So, there was a positive 
environment for a number of institutional changes to take shape, such as the 
Laws (1268/1982 and 1404/1983), mentioned above, and the establishment of 
University Education Departments.61 
The loss of social consensus, and the general conservative turn at the beginning 
of the second period (1985-1989), had direct effects on educational reform. 
During the second period, social tension and conflict and teachers' and 
students' movements reversed the social consensus of the first period (1981-
1985). The government slowed education reform - e.g. there were a number of 
corrections to the Law for Higher Education, and Law 1566/1985 was not put 
into practice.62 
Reforms had begun: Law 1268/82 had drastically changed the operation of 
universities. The old faculties were divided into departments and the Chair 
system was replaced by the disciplinary sector ĜŲŬŊÍÙŠŸĞĦĚ Policy decisions would 
be taken by General Assemblies, consisting of all members of the teaching staff 
and a considerable number of students. Undergraduates would have the same 
representation, as the members of the academic staff, on the electoral bodies for 
selecting the administrative heads of the University. The teaching staff would 
form a single body with four levels: lecturer, assistant professor, associate 
professor and professor.63 
However, the situation remained almost unchanged during the 1990s. In 1992, 
Law 2083/92 on the AEI was passed, which repeated Law 1268/82.64 Law 
1268/82 was amended by Law 2083/92, by the Conservative Party.65 Among 
the modifications were the reduction of the participation of students to 50% of 
the faculty, and the election of the Vice-Rectors in a separate procedure from 
that of Rectors. However, Law 2083/92 was amended again by Law 2188/94, 
with the coming back to power of the socialist government.66 
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Overall, what was striking was that the rationale of Law 1268/82 set the agenda 
of an ongoing debate that lasted throughout the 1980s - the theme of power and 
control. As Pesmazoglou pointed out: 
in examining the hundreds of articles published by the academics in 
newspapers and journals, the questionnaire distributed by the Ministry of 
Education in 1991, the replies of collective bodies and of individual 
academics, and the opposition party proposals, one is struck by the 
persistence of one theme: the percentage distribution of power.67 
Both the organisation and the functioning of the TEl went on being based on 
Law 1404/1983, and Presidential and Ministerial decisions were based on this 
law.68 There was no quality assessment procedure at the national level, or 
internally, for both the universities and the TEI.69 
Nevertheless, from the beginning of the 1990s, with the need for the country to 
compete in the European Union, the whole education system was called upon 
to become more efficient, effective and flexible, so that it would generate 
individuals with adequate up-to-date knowledge and key qualifications 
according to the requirements of the labour market. However, there was 
absence in the education system of a mechanism for monitoring developments 
in the labour market.70 
In reality, there was a graduate unemployment which was gradually increasing 
in a context where unemployed youth in 1981 were 29% of all unemployed, 
while in 1989, they were 52.4%. Especially for the TEl graduates, 
unemployment was higher than for their AEl counterparts (9.8% against 6.6%, 
respectively). In addition, about 80% of the university graduates were 
employed in the public sector.71 Furthermore, possession of a university degree 
was associated with the relatively highest rate of return (3-5%), while TEl 
qualifications were associated with returns below 2%.72 
OEeD pointed out that they were told of growing connections with industry 
and business in both the universities and the TEl. There were strong 
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connections between some engineering departments and industrial and 
governmental sponsors which used them for testing and development services. 
"Projects financed by the European Union encourage connections and some 
part-time teachers in universities are recruited from industry. Universities and 
TEl based consultancies are also increasing in number."73 Nevertheless,OEeD 
estimated that the teaching and research agendas were not well matched to the 
pattern of the Greek economy, which was largely dependent on small, often 
family owned farms, and to the overwhelming dependence on the public sector 
for employment.74 
Finally, with effect from 1996, there were committees and working groups 
being set up within the Ministry of Education to elaborate a number of action 
plans in a number of major issues. Among these issues were: the further 
development of all non-university higher education institutions, as well as the 
increase of university places to meet the social demand for such education, thus 
reducing the number of Greek students studying abroad.75 
Although the issue of efficiency was raised but not realised, there was 
expansion of the system. In comparison with the previous periods, particularly 
during the 1980s, tertiary education experienced the highest growth rates of all. 
The total enrolments rose from 121,000 in the academic year 1980/81 to 268,000 
in 1989/90 and 294,000 in 1993/94.76 It was within this context that the 
government decided to increase considerably the number of places for 
technological higher education, and admissions to the TEl rose from 9,300 
students in 1981 to 21,200 in 1986.77 For the academic year 1992/93, there was a 
total of 212,745 students in the AEl (the increase of graduates was 39%, 
compared with the academic year 1981/82), and a total of 85,068 students in the 
TEl (the increase of graduates was 29%, compared with the academic year 
1984/85).78 For the academic year 1992/93, the number of entrants for both AEl 
and TEl was about 300,000, an increase from a total number of about 180,000 in 
the academic year 1984/85. The ratio of the AEl and the TEl entrants was at an 
average of about 70% and 30% respectively, in the years 1984 to 1993.79 
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However, the tension between equity (and the TEl) and the requirement for the 
self-reliant development of the country80 become explicit in the stated aims and 
purposes of the State. 
Aims and Purposes of the State 
The aims and purposes of the reform establishing the TEl become visible 
through the vocabulary the government used. Overalt the Ministry of 
National Education and Religion made explicit the reasons for the foundation 
of the TEl, by using a three-fold agenda: developmental, educational and 
sociat and international: 
• The TEl were part of the modernisation of the higher education system for 
the modernisation and economic development of the country. The TEl 
would contribute to 'self-reliant' and overall development, by promoting an 
indigenous 'science and technology' infrastructure, with an 'applied' 
orientation. The TEl would also contribute to the rationalisation of the 
higher education system in two major ways. First, having the advantage of 
belonging to higher education, the TEl would relieve universities from large 
numbers of students. Second, compared to the universities, the TEl would 
offer more links to production specialisations. The latter would determine 
the career prospects of graduates. Thus, there was an emphasis on the 
distinction between the TEl and the more 'theoretical' universities, and on 
the economic division of labour. The TEl were also expected to hinder the 
exodus of thousands of Greek students, abroad. For all the above reasons, 
the TEl were an expression of the' efficiency' project. 
• The TEl would alleviate inequality in educational opportunity, as well as 
contribute to the social status of technical/vocational education. 
• Finally, there was an emphasis on 'international' experience. 
a) The Developmental Agenda 
The Ministry argued that in Greece, the lack of studies in special branches of 
science and technology, in combination with the lack of the necessary 
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infrastructure and the proper personnel for the development of technology, had 
led to the importation of technology from abroad.81 Moreover, the lack of the 
necessary specialised labour in many fields was estimated to have led to the 
retardation of production, to low work efficiency, to the low productivity of the 
economy and finally, to the production of products, which were non-
competitive in terms of their cost and quality.82 
The Ministry also pOinted out that Greece needed a new pattern of self-reliant 
and overall development. The creation of a modern, self-reliant, and overall 
national economy, was a central strategic aim. The development promoted was 
to be driven by indigenous factors but would draw on the advantages of the 
international division of labour and be in a position to create innovations.83 The 
creation of a technological and modern technical/vocational substructure 
would be the prerequisite for the beginning of the development of dynamic 
new enterprises. In this way, the country would overcome its technological 
marginalisation and would attain economic self-reliance (avrot5vvap,ia).84 
The Ministry defined the role of the TEl within such a developmental 
framework. Their first role would be to contribute to the aim of self-reliant 
development, by developing the evaluation, assimilation and application of 
imported technology, as well as by creating national technology and technical 
knowledge. Their second role would be to create citizens, who as employees, 
would understand the social context of their work. Their third role would be to 
provide specialised labour needed to develop advanced technology, and 
specialised work of high quality. Their fourth role would be to create personnel 
for high level services and the development of technology for the betterment of 
the quality of life. Their fifth role would be to educate personnel for middle-
level and self-governing enterprises. Their final role would be to contribute to 
national research, regional, economic and social development, and rational 
human resource development. 85 
In the contents of studies, emphasis would be given to 'scientific reason' and to 
the ability to manipulate scientific methods and to provide problem solving. 
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So, high-level knowledge would be provided for TEl graduates who would 
develop modern technologies and link theory and practice. S6 The TEl would 
provide general basic knowledge, together with modern and specialised 
knowledge. Moreover, the acquisition of advanced knowledge and abilities 
would be convertible and adaptable to the changing needs of the economy.S7 
In contrast to the AEl, which emphasised the promotion and development of 
science, research and high level theoretical preparation, the TEl would be 
oriented towards the application of knowledge. The TEl graduates would be 
given experience of practical problems. Thus, graduates would be expected to 
transfer scientific and theoretical findings to the solution of particular problems 
in the productive process.ss 
According to the Minister of Education, Antonis Tritsis, the special role of the 
TEl was revolutionary. The TEl, as part of higher education, would stress: 
scientific research; applied research; and productive applications. The strategic 
aim would be the creation of innovations in production aimed at the creation of 
a modern society. The AEl would conduct scientific research with some 
extensions into applied research. The TEl would conduct applied research with 
extensions into productive applications. From this role, the revolutionary 
possibilities of the TEl for the country's productivity would be increased, along 
with the social and political role of science. The role of the TEl would have to 
be understood by the students, from whom productive initiatives were 
expected. Finally, the Minister of Education made it clear that the TEl should 
not be an 1/ antechamber" for the AEl and thus, the TEl should have an 
autonomous existence within higher education.s9 
b) The Educational and Social Agenda 
The Ministry stated that the reform of technical and vocational education would 
stop education being a means for the reproduction of social stratification.9o The 
Prime Minister stressed his belief in the absolute equality of thought and action, 
and of occupations in the offices and factories and laboratories. That is why, as 
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he argued, not only intellectuals should have the right to education - in all the 
three levels of education - but also those who would apply scientific 
achievements to practice. With this belief, the Prime Minister went on, the 
government would proceed to the abolition of the KATEE, which were 
considered neither educationally nor socially worthwhile. In their place, the 
Technological Educational Institutions (TEl) together with the AEI belonged to 
higher education.91 The Ministry argued that the status of the KATEE - as 
centres for technical/vocational studies and as an intermediary level- had had 
negative social results, in addition to the fact that the Greek society considered 
that only a university degree could offer social and professional status.92 In a 
conference of };TE [(};Vf.1!30VAlO TC:XVOAOyuo7C; EK7raibev(jy/C; (Council of 
Technological Education)] (30.5.1984), the Prime Minister argued that with Law 
1404/83, technological education was upgraded. The KATEE had functioned as 
antechambers for the already full AEI. He also argued that the KATEE had 
reinforced prejudice about the social and economic superiority of "white-collar" 
professions over the productive professions.93 
The production of AEI graduates, in certain fields, had exceeded the needs of 
the economy, and had led a great percentage of those graduates to qualitative 
underemployment and therefore, to a completely different role from the one for 
which they had been educated. As a result, they offered work which was 
neither effective nor efficient (at a greater cost and with less return). Overall, 
the high production of AEl graduates - who were led to unemployment, or 
qualitative underemployment - was considered to be inefficient, in terms of 
educational expenditure.94 
In contrast, the reorientation and upgrading of higher technical vocational 
education through the foundation and development of the TEl would promote 
the productive professions and would contribute to the rationalisation of the 
higher educational system.95 
Furthermore, the Ministry used the argument that in the future, 'mass' higher 
education would be reinforced not only by the application of 'science' to 
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production, but also by the ever-increasing social demand for higher education. 
The social demand would exercise pressure on the AEl (in terms of large 
number of students), if the non-university sector did not exist. The other choice 
would be the acceptance of the mass exodus of thousands of young people for 
university education abroad, with all the undesirable effects on these people 
and on the economy of the country.96 
But to play their role, the TEl - as an alternative to university education - would 
have to be an educationally convincing and a socially and professionally 
attractive solution for all those young people who did not want or could not 
study in the AEl, due to the selection processes. Thus, the TEl would have 
shorter and more flexible studies, which would be modern, linked with 
production specialisations, and which would assist in the creation of a modern 
society. At the same time, the AEl, with fewer students, would be given the 
possibility for the production of the high level scientific and technical personnel 
that the country needed.97 
As far as the relationship between AEl - TEl graduates in the labour market is 
concerned, the Ministry stressed that the suitability for the exercise of a certain 
profession should be judged on the basis of the correspondence between the 
professional occupation and the graduate'S studies. In cases of overlapping of 
the cognitive subjects of the specialisations of the AEl and the TEl (e.g. 
mechanical engineering), a qualitative differentiation of the professional work 
that every graduate would exercise should exist. Since in the end, matters of 
conflict would emerge, there should be a continuous effort, from the TEl side, 
for transformation of certain specialisations to others of a more specialised 
cognitive area, (e.g. energy technology, automation, etc.), which would cover 
direct and important needs of production.98 
The Ministry also anticipated that AEl graduates, from the nature of their 
theoretical studies, would be more suitable for work in research, planning, and 
high managerial positions. In contrast, TEl graduates should have as their basic 
orientation the assimilation and transfer of scientific data to practical 
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applications. These general characteristics should determine the fields of 
professional activities of AEI and TEl graduates. The Ministry also admitted 
that it was clear - and was what international experience had proved - that the 
AEI graduates had more possibilities for professional and social development. 
However, the Ministry advocated the co-operation of the various cadres.99 
In some fields (e.g. engineering), conflict between AEI and TEl graduates was 
observed due to unemployment or underemployment. Nevertheless, the 
Ministry considered it was wrong to expect that the occupation of AEI 
graduates in downgraded activities would lead to better results. On the 
contrary, the employment of AEI graduates in places of work, where they 
would be considered over-qualified (e.g. graduates of the School of Social and 
Political Sciences as accountants), would create greater cost and usually less 
return.lOO 
c) The International Influences 
Finally, the Ministry emphasised 'international experience', by stressing that a 
non-university sector had been developed in most Western and Eastern 
European countries, as well as in America, where the promotion of this type of 
higher education had been a considerable educational and economic success. 
Such an international development was reinforcing the Greek choice: it was 
important to catch up with international practice.lOl 
Clearly, then, and central to the Greek problem was the issue of differentiation 
of the TEl and University level establishments - the AEl. How to do this and 
how to maintain the unity of the higher education system was a major problem 
for the Greek State. Much of the political effort of the State went into 
'harmonisation' . 
2.3.1 Structural Inheritance: Differentiation Between the Technological 
Educational Institutions (TED and University Level Establishments (AED 
The purpose of this section is to show that: 
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• The TEl were founded within the framework of the unity of the higher 
education system, realised in issues such as the self-government of 
institutions. Although both TEl-AEl were to co-operate for 'self-reliance', 
this task was mostly stressed in the case of the TEl, which would pursue 
applied technology research. A special emphasis was also placed on the 
contribution of the TEl to regional development. 
• The AEl-TEl differed in that the AEl were more theoretical. Instead, the TEl 
were more practical/applied oriented, as was evident in their mission, 
specialisms, teaching, qualifications of their staff, as well as their admission 
policies. 
Thus, according to Law No. 1404/1983, Chapter First / Article 1 (Kccp61azo 
JIpdJro / Ap8po 1), the Technological Educational Institutions were founded, 
within higher education.102 With this Law, a harmonisation of the internal 
structure and function of the two types of educational institutions (AEl - TEl) 
took place. Harmonisation was realised in the self-government and legal 
foundation of the institutions. With Law 1404/83 the TEl were defined as self-
governing bodies in public law103 and given academic freedom. There was a 
democratic internal structure with the participation of all the TEl educational 
and administrative personnel and students in decision-making. The 
educational personnel was expected to have high academic standards, albeit 
with emphasis on professional experience. There was an effort to co-ordinate 
the purposes of the TEl and the AEl: both would make a common effort for the 
self-reliant economic development of the country, and a research role was given 
to the TEl in the application of technology.104 
Nevertheless, the role and orientation of the TEl were distinguished from the 
AEI. The TEl's main mission was the provision of sufficient theoretical and 
practical education for the application of scientific, technological, artistic and 
other forms of knowledge and skills in a professional occupation. lOS They were, 
according to the same Law, also expected to contribute to the career guidance of 
their students and to maintain a two-way relationship with productive 
enterprises in their regions. They were to co-operate among themselves and 
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with domestic and foreign, educational or technological institutions or 
bodies.106 
For the AEl, within Law No. 1268/1982, it was stated that the State had the 
obligation to provide the "highest education" (avWmTIJ cK7raic5cv6IJ) to every 
Greek citizen wishing to have it, through the processes that were every time 
defined by law. "Highest education" was provided in the "Highest Education 
Institutions" [Avwmm EK7rwc5cvTlKa Ibpvf-lam (AEI)], which had as their mission 
to produce and transmit knowledge through teaching and research, and to 
cultivate the arts. Moreover, the AEl were expected to contribute to the 
development of responsible human beings with scientific, social, cultural and 
political consciousness, and to provide the necessary means to ensure their 
adequate preparation for a scientific and professional career. The AEl were also 
expected to meet the social and developmental needs of the country. Finally, 
the AEl were to meet the need for people's continuing education and 
training)07 
Since emphasis was placed on the practical orientation of the TEl, these differed 
from the AEl also in terms of teaching. Teaching would include theoretical 
teaching of the subjects, practical, academic or laboratory exercises or exercises 
in the places of work. The aim of these exercises would be the strengthening of 
the application of theory, as well as the acquisition of aptitudes for the exercise 
of a profession. It was also stated that there would be seminars, visits in 
productive installations and other relevant activities, as well as writing of 
dissertations)08 
"Specialisms" in the TEl included graphic arts, administration and economics, 
health and caring professions, technological applications, food technology and 
nutrition)09 The above were also the main departments of the Technological 
Educational Institution of Athensl1O, but agricultural specialisms were also 
found in TEl of peripheral areas of Greece, as seen in the Table of Appendix 
One. As far as the admission policies are concerned, 
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For 77% of admissions (i.e. for 77% of the total TE places), admission to the 
first year is under the same conditions as for university candidates, i.e. after 
passing the General Examinations administered by the Ministry of Education 
[8]. The remaining 23% of places are reserved exclusively for technical and 
vocational lyceum graduates who, although they have the right (like all 
Lyceum graduates) to participate in the General Examinations, choose not to 
do so; instead they choose to compete for the reserved places. These 
particular students gain admission on the basis of grades earned in their 
lyceum diplomas.111 
In the AEl, teaching would include the independent teaching of a subject, the 
so-called ŰŊŮŬẂŲẀJŪŸŮŨĜŊĦĚ(halls for academic exercises) and the academic exercises, 
the laboratory, clinical, and practical exercises of students, and finally, the 
supervision of the dissertations and the carrying out of seminars, aiming at 
strengthening the knowledge of students.112 
Thus, both the TEl and the AEl were independent legal entities. They were 
both guaranteed self-government and academic freedom. They derived their 
revenue from the same sources and applied the same management and 
administrative practices. In both types of institutes, students enjoyed the same 
privileges: no payment of tuition or registration fees of any sort, free 
distribution of textbooks, etc.113 The TEl ran programmes which led to a final 
degree called 7ITVXeio (ptychio) after at least six semesters of classroom 
instruction plus one or two additional semesters of practical training. The AEl 
offered programmes which led to a first degree but not necessarily the final one 
since (unlike the TEl) they could establish graduate programmes leading to 
Master's and Ph.D. degrees. The duration of this first degree was normally 
eight semesters, apart from engineering and dentistry (10 semesters) and 
medicine (12 semesters).114 
Overall, then, the struggle for harmonisation was a difficult one. Much of the 
legal and financial basis of the two institutions (the TEl and the AEl) was 
similar. They were both within higher education. But the routes, qualifications, 
knowledge biases and probable subsequent careers of their graduates were 
different. Efforts to establish 'equality' between the two sets of institutions 
were made difficult by traditional Greek assumptions about a 'good' higher 
education and a 'good' career. And the problem was compounded by the 
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radical vision of 'self-reliant' development. The tensions between equity and 
efficiency were heavily political and had to do with the difficulties of 
"modernising" Greece, and the different balances between the social and the 
economic in this vision. The academic debates illustrate these points well. 
2.3.2 Major Debates 
As is usual with academics the debates were complex: 
• Some academics pointed to the political framework to explain the direction 
of the reform, and attributed the failure of the reform to the absence of 
changes in social formation and to the nature of the Greek State. 
• However, most of the debates were about the equity issue. The TEl were 
said to be providing social mobility for working-class students. As far as the 
whole education system is concerned, there were some claims that the 
'equality of educational opportunity' argument was being used to blur the 
issue of 'class'. 
• Finally, it was argued that the logic of modernisation went on governing the 
education reform agenda during this period, but in the context of a 'not in 
need' labour market. Moreover, it was argued that in the universities, a 
number of debates in the European context appeared to be non-issues in 
Greece. 
Bouzakis argued that the education reforms of the 1980s were aiming mostly at 
democratisationp5 a bit like the reforms in the educational systems of western 
countries in the periods when Socialist and Labour parties had taken power .116 
He claimed that in this model, educational reform meant a change in schooling 
aiming at the support of important social processes and the correction of social 
injustice: education was to play an active role in society and not simply follow 
economic developments in a passive way. Education was considered to be "the 
groundwork of change" and its political dimension was of the utmost 
importance.117 
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The failure of the reform was attributed by Bouzakis to the nature of the Greek 
State, the pattern of socio-economic organisation, and the excessive autonomy 
of the educational institutions. After the civil war, the Greek State was under 
the control of conservative regimes (with democratic intervals) and a seven-
year long dictatorship (1967-74). So, it had become authoritarian, centralised, 
inflexible and bureaucratic, controlling educational management, books, 
curriculum, teacher education, and the examination system.118 
Nevertheless, Bouzakis argued that the fact that the Greek State was centralised 
and bureaucratic had not been an obstacle during the first period. On the 
contrary, it was a positive factor for the institutionalisation and adoption of a 
democratic education reform. During the first period (1981-85), the welfare 
state had proceeded to the establishment of institutions - having to do also with 
education - which could have been a "bridge" to society. So, society would in 
theory gradually absorb the State but this did not happen. However, the same 
State functioned in a negative way during the second period (1985-89) due to 
the government's conservative turn. During the second period, the State had 
"absorbed" SOciety and integrated (in a 'top-down' way) the institutions it had 
previously created. This process of change, Bouzakis suggested, could not have 
been different in Greece since the reforms were restricted basically to the legal 
and political institutions (the 'superstructure'). Interventions on the socio-
economic base ('substructure') had been very restricted.119 
The democratisation steps taken during the 1980s to help the access of less 
privileged social groups to higher education, Bouzakis argued, did not actually 
help. The increase of the numbers of entrants to higher education (AEI and TEI) 
permitted children from less privileged groups to enter higher education but 
the majority of them gained access to higher education institutions of low social 
status. On the other hand, the children from less privileged social groups could 
find a job only with difficulty in a market which did not need more University 
graduates. 120 
47 
Psacharopoulos raised the same point. Equity issues could not be defined by 
reference to the number of students in higher education. The question of 
whether applicants from the poorer sectors of the population were given the 
opportunity to pursue higher education was more crucial. In the case of 
Greece, the distribution of opportunity for higher education by occupational 
categories showed how unequally opportunities were distributed. In 
comparing the distribution of students by father's occupation to the distribution 
of the population among the main occupational categories, it appeared that 
young persons, whose fathers were in the professions, were three times as 
likely to attend university as young persons whose fathers were farmers or 
working men. For the year 1986, the children of executives and managers were 
nearly four times more successful in gaining admission to University than the 
children of manual workers were. Nevertheless, the offspring of the latter did 
better in gaining admission to the technological institutions.121 
Tsoukalas theorised the same point, in an analysis of the two issues of 
'democratisation' and 'modernisation' of the Greek education system. 
Tsoukalas argued that the tendency of an 'over-educated' society to develop 
into a 'semi-educated' society was enhanced by the rapid wave of 
democratisation that went back to 1974. 'Mass education' provided an 
important legitimising principle for growing socio-economic inequalities. He 
also pointed to opinion polls, which showed that "Greeks cling to the fallacy of 
their open educational meritocracy even more than to their democratic 
freedoms". The' equality of educational opportunity' argument had been 
useful in blurring the 'class' content of the qualitative difference in those 
studying in the Greek educational system and those studying abroad: 
Thus, the democratisation of Greek education obeys the need to conserve a 
social consensus constantly threatened with erosion. In this sense, the 
educational system is eminently functional, both on the level of individuating 
fantasies and on the level of conserving social equilibria.122 
For the 1980s, Tsoukalas judged that modernisation was the new panacea, and 
within this, educational reform had been of crucial importance. However, as 
Tsoukalas also argued, 
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The growing discrepancies between the alleged 'needs' of a dormant private 
labour market (in conjunction with the inevitable restriction of public 
employment outlets) and the reproduction of given educational practices have 
become generally apparent. But, (surprisingly) modernising educational 
discourse is as functionalist and 'other-directed' as that which it aims to 
supersede. Modernisers preach the need to 'privatise' education, to restrict 
access to educational mechanisms, to 'adapt' educational orientation towards 
marketable branches and to strengthen educational control.123 
Finally, with regard to the universities, Pesmazoglou pointed out that: 
With no effective criteria and modes for evaluating teaching staff, 
undergraduates and academic competence; with no institutionalised 
research, nor really structured postgraduate courses; with many professors 
considering - by necessity or not - their jobs as subsidiary, and a large 
percentage of 'undergraduates' who in certain disciplines are not seen in 
class, it is doubtful if one can really speak of a 'university' at all. To be even 
more precise, within the European context most of the major issues in the 
ongoing debate on higher education, irrespective of their content and 
orientation, are non-issues in Greece.124 
Thus, it becomes evident that most of the academic debate offered a critique of 
the direction of reforms of this period. It was argued that the failure of the 
reform was due to the nature of the Greek State, that the 'democratisation' 
policies were blurring the issue of "class", and that modernisation was 
promoted in the context of a dormant labour market. Not much was said about 
the specific higher education policy that this thesis investigates, with the 
exception of the debate focusing on the kind of social mobility that the TEl were 
offering, and the debate about the absence in Greece of major higher education 
issues that had appeared in other European countries. This is partly due to the 
restricted number of theoretical works on the Greek higher education system. 
2.4 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
To sum up, in Greece during the 1960s-1970s education was seen as a major 
public investment, within a human capital theory approach. From the 1960s 
onwards, educational expenditure increased considerably. Within the two 
priorities of modernisation and economic development, the education system 
itself was expected to be modernised, and a special emphasis was placed on 
post-secondary technical education, not least by the international organisations. 
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The OECD and especially the World Bank urged the foundation of post-
secondary technical educational institutions (the KATEE) in the early 1970s, a 
process that took place during the dictatorship. These institutions were 
criticised for serving the needs of foreign capital and for contributing to 
dependent economic development in Greece. OECD's "Mediterranean 
Regional Project" was associated with the modernisation school of 
development, and was strongly criticised for being against any strengthening of 
domestic educational institutions, or infusing any self-reliance. In the end, the 
failure of the KATEE was attributed, by academics, to social reasons - the 
KATEE were not preferred by students as places to study, since only university 
education was considered to be worthwhile, and to political reasons - the 
KATEE were serving limited economic objectives. The reform of the 1960s-
1970s period was within the context of manpower planning, with a restriction 
on the numbers entering higher education. 
In the 1980s-1990s, the major priorities of modernisation and economic 
development went on dOminating the education agenda. From the early 1980s, 
a number of significant higher education reforms took place. Two major laws 
were passed: one concerning the reorganisation of the universities and another 
providing for the foundation of the TEl. The introduction of the TEl was in 
terms of the two major priorities, and these new institutions were to contribute 
to 'self-reliant' development, aimed at Greece joining the group of 'advanced 
nations'. 
The TEl were partly expressing a version of the modernisation of the higher 
education system, within the 'socialist' government's plans: education should 
reinforce changes in society through its own parallel changes. The pressure for 
modernisation and democratisation of education was also associated with the 
importance education had in Greek society. 
However, there were difficulties in the modernisation of the Greek education 
system, and some argued that the failure of the reform was due to the absence 
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of wider changes in social formation and to the nature of the Greek State. The 
innovations introduced in higher education at the beginning of the 1980s were 
not followed by radical reforms during the rest of the 1980s-1990s period. A 
number of laws for the reorganisation of the universities succeeded each other 
with minor modifications until the early 1990s, but the initial law (1268/82) on 
the AEl seemed to dominate. During the 1990s, debates on the universities in 
the European context appeared to be non-issues in Greece. Furthermore, in the 
whole higher education system, there was no quality assessment procedure at 
the national level. Other debates concerned the modernisation project, which 
was taking place in the framework of a dormant labour market, thus pointing 
towards problems in the wider social formation. Nevertheless, the issue of 
'modernisation' re-entered the discussion within the prospect of Greece's 
joining the European Union on equal terms. 
The issue of 'efficiency' had been prominent from the 1960s and was linked 
with the importance attached to technical education for the modernisation and 
economic development of the country. The 1970s reforms created the KATEE, 
which aimed both at economic efficiency and the creation of a technically 
trained labour force, as well as relieving the admissions pressure on the 
universities. 
The theme of efficiency continued in the 1980s reforms with the TEl, which 
were part of the modernisation of the higher education system to contribute to 
modernisation and economic development. The latter was also expected to be 
'self-reliant'. The TEl were to contribute to 'self-reliant' development (also in 
co-operation with the AEI) by promoting an indigenous 'science and 
technology' infrastructure, with an 'applied' orientation, in a two-way 
relationship with productive enterprises in the respective regions. The 
rationale used by the government included 'international experience': the 
significance of developments in other countries and in fact Greece adopted the 
pattern for higher education suggested by UNESCO. 
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The other version of the meaning of efficiency was the harmonisation of the 
higher education system. The TEl upgraded and expanded and as part of 
higher education would relieve the universities from large numbers of students. 
This was particularly important in the context of a strong demand for higher 
education in Greece. 
The harmonisation of the internal structure and function of the AEl - TEl was 
realised in the self-government of institutions, in rules on academic freedom, in 
democratic decision-making, and through the demand for high academic 
standards of the teaching staff for the TEl. The TEl were expected to contribute 
to the rationalisation of the higher education system, by relieving universities -
which were estimated to be 'inefficient' and 'ineffective' - from large numbers 
of students, and by offering courses linked with production specialisations. The 
division of labour would be in terms of the distinction between the theoretically 
minded university graduates and their more practically oriented TEl 
counterparts. 
Within the logic of efficiency, meaning modernisation and self-reliant economic 
development, the government emphasised the practical orientation of the TEl 
towards productive applications and applied research. The special applied 
orientation of the TEl was evident in their teaching, their staft their specialisms, 
and their mission statements. In contrast, the AEl were more theoretically 
oriented. The admission policies were roughly the same for both TEl and AEl, 
although there were some special regulations for admission to the TEl. 
The concept of equity had different meanings in the two time periods. During 
the first period (the 1960s-1970s), this concept reflected concerns about the 
'input' to education (though not higher education) and 'democratisation'. 
During the 1980s, 'equity' meant expansion of the whole higher education 
system and the upgrading of technological higher education. 
Thus, the issue of equity was visible in the equality of educational opportunity 
argument used during both time periods. In the 1964 reform, 'equity' meant 
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expansion of the education system, and was debated on the grounds that it 
confined itself to the 'input' aspect of education and that it magnified existing 
inequalities. In the 1976-77 reform, the democratisation of education was 
expected to contribute to the democratisation of society, although no particular 
emphasis was placed, in this respect, on post-secondary technical education. 
In the 1980s higher education reforms, the foundation of the TEl was within the 
logic of the reduction of inequality of educational opportunity. The reform of 
this period was characterised by a 'social demand' approach to educational 
planning. Compared to the previous period, a broader range of programmes 
within higher education was offered, and the whole higher education system 
was expanded. The argument of I equality of educational opportunity' took 
shape with the increase of the students entering higher education. Particularly, 
there were increases of places for technological higher education (the TEl). The 
upgrading of higher technical education - accompanied by rhetorical statements 
about the social restoration of technical/vocational education - was part of the 
'equality of educational opportunity' project. 
The above developments were within the framework of statements about the 
purposes of education being for human beings and about the formation of their 
social identity, consciousness, and critical thinking for collective effort. 
Education, as a basic area of activity for the welfare state, was to alleviate 
unequal educational opportunities. Nevertheless, there were debates that the 
'democratisation' steps during this period were legitimising socio-economic 
inequalities. It was argued that the majority of TEl students had a working-
class background. 
In the end, despite the increasing unemployment - particularly for TEl 
graduates - the promotion of the non-university sector went on during the 
1990s. This was partly due to the need for the expansion of the higher 
education system to meet the social demand and to avoid a further increase of 
Greek students studying abroad. 
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Overall, there were tensions over equity and efficiency in the state's agenda 
and, then, in times of political change, an effort was being made to balance 
these goals and to harmonise the pattern of higher education. The attempt at 
harmonisation of the higher education system was increased by the coming to 
power of a 'socialist' government, which stressed the application of science to 
practice and the contribution of technological higher education to equality of 
thought and action, thus strengthening the equity project. 
Also, within the context of this government's plans, although from the 1960s the 
major issues were those of 'modernisation' and 'economic development', 
during the 1980s, one more issue was added: that of 'self-reliant' development. 
The foundation of the non-university sector of higher education (the TEl) in the 
early 1980s was expressing the modernisation of the Greek higher education 
system to contribute to all the above priorities. That was what the issue of 
'efficiency' meant for the case of Greece. The concept of 'the market' had not 
entered the higher education policy agenda, unlike the other two European 
countries (as will be later argued). 
Nevertheless, the other version of the efficiency project seemed to be 
particularly crucial. This meant relieving universities from the burden of large 
numbers of students, since there was exceptionally strong social demand for 
higher education. It was within this logic that higher technological education 
was upgraded and access to it increased conSiderably. However, such efforts 
were taking place within a sociological context: in the cultural context of 
Greece, students and their parents appreciate only university level education. 
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ENDNOTES 
1 Modern development thought was dominated by two major theories, namely, 
"modernisation" and "human capital" theories. Modernisation theory emerged 
in the 1950s and was based "on the notion that there is a direct causal link 
between five sets of variables, namely, modernising institutions, modern 
values, modern behaviour, modern society and economic development." [See 
F.A.GERLIND, I., & SAHA, L., (1989), Education and National Development: a 
Comparative Perspective, Oxford, Pergamon Press, pp. 16-17.] Criticism of this 
theory suggested that: modern attitudes were not necessarily incompatible with 
traditional ones and modern values and behaviour did not always lead to socio-
economic development. Human capital theory saw education as a productive 
investment, which would improve the individual choices available. An 
educated population provided the type of labour force necessary for industrial 
development and economic growth. "Thus the human capital theory postulates 
that the most efficient path to the national development of any society lies in the 
improvement of its population, that is, its human capital." (See ibid, pp. 17-18.) 
2 The "manpower" approach to education aims to provide the work force with 
the abilities required for productive activity. Thus, the system must be 
reasonably well geared to the production requirements of the economy. [See 
PARNES, H. S., (1964), "Manpower Analysis in Educational Planning", in 
BLAUG, M., (ed), (1968), Economics of Education 1: Selected Readings, Middlesex, 
Penguin Books, p. 263.] The 'social demand approach' is a means of 
quantifying social demand for education, and is based on the belief that more 
and better education is both socially and economically desirable. Thus, this 
approach claims that a wide range of courses should be offered. The approach 
is also based on existing social and demographic trends and free public demand 
and is commonly used to mean: "the aggregate 'popular' demand for 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE FRENCH REFORMS 
3.1 INTRODUCTION: PURPOSE AND ARGUMENT 
In this chapter, the higher education reforms - with special reference to the 
non-university sector - in France are described, starting from the late 1960s up 
to the 1990s. The role of the state and its rationale for its policies is identified 
in the successive reforms and laws and these are located within 
contemporaneous politics. The major debates by academics are also 
presented. 
The analysis is broken up into two periods: the 1960s-1970s and the 1980s-
1990s. The differentiation between the IUT (Instituts Universitaires de 
Technologie) and the rest of the University occurs within the first period, when 
the IUT were created as a form of technological education within higher 
education. The arguments in this chapter are that during the 1960s-1970s, the 
interrelated issues of 'equity' and 'efficiency' were dominant in official 
rationales. The creation of the IUT was part of the reconstruction of higher 
education as a response to these two priorities: 
• 'Equity' was in terms of the expansion of the higher education system and 
social mobility and the partial integration of the IUT into the University. 
The social demand approach to educational planning was dominant. 
• 'Efficiency' meant providing the right kind of higher education to respond 
to 'the economy' through practical orientation of the IUT, and relieving 
the overcrowded universities. Thus, the differentiation between the IUT 
and the rest of the University was promoted. 
Overall, during the 1980s-1990s, both themes 'equity' and 'efficiency', were 
prominent: 
• equity was evident in the increase of the student numbers. 
• however, the efficiency project was changed in a major way: there was a 
shift from a concern for 'the economy' to a perception of 'the market'. 
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To expand and test these arguments, the reforms of the first period, the 1960s-
1970s period, are reviewed. 
3.2 THE 19605-19705: POLITICS, AIMS AND PURPOSES OF THE STATE, 
AND MAJOR HIGHER EDUCATION REFORMS AND LAWS 
There were a number of major issues that underlined the rationale for the 
introduction of the JUT. 
• Efficiency was a theme in that JUT, created in 1966, would train graduates 
for the secondary and tertiary sectors of the economy. The JUT were to 
remedy the disadvantages of the earlier institutions and to be more 
attractive to students, as the JUT would now belong to higher education. 
This would relieve the overcrowding of universities and the high drop out 
rate among undergraduates. Thus, the differentiation between the 
universities and the JUT was emphasised. Overall, the JUT would be the 
short cycle form of higher education, with the long form being formed by 
the universities and the top institutions in the higher education hierarchy, 
namely, the Grandes tcoles. In other words, as in Greece, the internal 
'harmonisation' of the university sector was an aspiration, in the name of 
efficiency. 
• The issue of equity became apparent with the 1968 Loi d' Orientation, 
which followed from the events of May 1968. In general, there would be 
open admission to the universities (the UER - Unites d' Enseignement et de 
Recherche), within a social demand approach to educational planning. 
After the 1968 reform, the JUT were within the UER, although their role 
and relationship within the UER had later to be clarified. 
The social and historical location of the JUT within the structure of the higher 
education system was tricky. In France the universities do not represent the 
pinnacle of the educational structure. The pinnacle is occupied by the Grandes 
tcoles for which entrance is competitive and has to be prepared for in classes 
continuing for two to three years after successful completion of the 
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Baeealaureat. The Grandes feoles produce top ranking technologists, engineers, 
administrators and other specialists. According to specialism, some of the 
Grandes feoles are subsidised by the Ministry of Education, or by other 
Ministries, Chambers of Commerce and private organisations.! 
The separation of the two systems (the universities and the Grandes feoles) 
corresponded to the general principles of French education, that is, free 
education for everybody (the legacy of the French Revolution) and selection 
for the political, economic and intellectual elites (the heritage of Napoleonic 
meritocracy).2 Therefore, in the two-tier French higher education system, the 
Grandes feoles had traditionally trained the top-engineers, managers and 
administrators that the economy required. On the other hand, the University 
prepared students for research, teaching and the legal and medical 
professions. A vocational element had always existed in university courses, 
and this was true in the faculties of law, medicine and pharmacy, where 
professionals trained future practitioners. The faculties of arts and sciences 
educated their students to become teachers and researchers.3 
By the 1980s, the structure of the higher education system in France was that 
after the Baeealaureat, higher education courses could be classified as either 
short or long. The long form, leading to a first degree and beyond, took place 
in universities4, higher specialist schools and the Grandes feoles, while the 
Instituts Universitaires de Teehnologie (IUT) were the short form of higher 
education.5 
The creation of the IUT was one of the major innovations of the higher 
education reform that Christian Fouchet, the Minister of Education (1962-67), 
implemented in 1966.6 As defined in the founding decree of January 1966, the 
mission of IUT was to train skilled, middle-level graduates to assume 
"technical functions in production, applied research and the services.//7 Thus, 
in 1966, the French government established the IUT as two-year institutions 
for training upper-level technicians for a variety of industrial, administrative 
and service positions.8 
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The designers of the IUT assumed from the outset that the new institutions 
would have to be autonomous in relation to both the technicallycees and the 
faculties. Moreover, the presence of employers and union representatives 
showed the desire to ensure good relations between the IUT and the business 
world.9 There was also a claim that IUT would attract 25% of university 
enrolments.IO 
The steadily increasing need for qualified personnel of intermediate levelled 
to the creation of the IUT, also as an effort to get over the disadvantages of the 
higher technician sections. Thus, provision was made for a policy of co-
ordination, through the setting-up of IUT and the closing down of the higher 
technician sections, to facilitate the transition.H 
Although the main forms of short-cycle higher education in France, before 
1966, were centred on the IUT, the science faculties also offered preparatory 
courses leading to the Viplome d' Etudes Superieures Techniques (VEST). The 
technical lycees provided post-Baccalaureat classes for higher technicians 
leading to the Brevet de Technicien Superieur (BTS).12 Thus, the IUT (as 
university institutes) were set up to bridge a serious gap that the earlier 
introduction of the VEST in some science faculties and the Instituts Nationaux 
de Sciences Appliquees (INSA) had not succeeded in filling)3 In contrast to the 
higher technician sections, the IUT would give student status to all persons 
attending their courses. Although they were designed to train technicians for 
the secondary and tertiary sectors, they would give less specialised training 
than the higher technician sections.14 
Overall, the classic problem of the proVision of university-level training for 
higher technicians was the aim of the establishment of the IUT.IS Since the 
production of higher technicians in the secondary and tertiary sectors of the 
economy had not been undertaken by the faculties, the state decided to set up 
the IUTwhich were to be 'parallel to', but 'outside' them. In fact: 
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This "stratification" policy consisted of duplicating the faculties by 
university institutes which were intended to make good their deficiencies. 
It resulted in the gradual emergence of a second university system, parallel 
to but more flexible than the traditional system, and separate from and in 
fact fairly independent of the faculties. 16 
As indicated earlier, the second major theme was the 'harmonisation' version 
of efficiency. The traditional universities were very overcrowded at the time 
when the lUT were created, while the dropout rate among undergraduates 
was very high. This was caused by a marked increase in the number of pupils 
passing the Baccalaureat, which gave automatic entrance to University. 
However, the initial success at entry did not mean that all these bacheliers 
were necessarily suited to degree work, particularly in view of the impersonal 
way that subjects were traditionally taught in French universities and the low 
ratio of lecturers to students. A shorter, more vocationally oriented course -
provided in the new lUT - could well prove more suitable for such people. 
Also, the lUT would fulfil the demand for technical training for middle 
management in all sectors of industryP 
Thus, the lUT like the TEl in Greece were established partly to improve 
technical efficiency in the national economy and partly to deflect from 
university courses people who, despite possession of the Baccalaureat, were 
not considered to be wholly suited to the demands of a French academic 
degree course. IS 
Within the framework of the 1966 reform, the university offerings had been 
divided into three cycles, in order to accommodate both the masses of 
students and to achieve the goal of training researchers. Thus, the old annee 
propedeutique was replaced by the first two-year cycle with a diploma in 
university studies in letters, sciences, economics or law. The second cycle in 
letters and sciences was divided between a licence and a more advanced 
maftrise. At the level of maftrise, the paths to teaching and research were 
separated. Finally, the third cycle was reserved for advanced training in 
research. However, the changes in the first two cycles, by heightening student 
insecurity, probably helped to bring on the "events of May" in 1968.19 
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The events of May 1968 affected the organisation of the French University 
system. The protest by the university students was against the unsatisfactory 
nature of university teaching, the government and the structure of bourgeois 
society in France.2o After this crisis, many new universities were established 
following the splitting of large universities in the major cities.21 
Thus, the reform of the lUT was not merely an 'academic' issue or even just 
an equity and efficiency issue. It was very much a domestic political issue. 
During the summer of 1968, there was a complex issue of what status to give 
to the various categories of 'non-university' institutions from the Grandes 
:feoles to the lUT and in September, the issue came to a head in heated debates 
within the French Cabinet when the draft of the Orientation Act was adopted 
to be submitted to parliament. Edgar Faure (the Minister of Education at that 
time) advocated an extensive application of the law. The version he 
presented to the Cabinet, would, in principle, have permitted bringing the 
Grandes :feoles, which belonged to other ministries, under the Act.22 In the 
end, the Cabinet reached a three-fold compromise: 
the gran des ecoles under ministries other than education were explicitly 
placed beyond the pale of the legislation; institutions within the jurisdiction 
of the education ministry but independent of the universities could be 
individually brought under the act by decree; and finally, the university-
attached institutes and schools, most notably the IUTs and the ENSt would 
continue within the universities, although the applicability of the legislation 
to them was to be limited by government decrees.23 
Thus, the 1968 reform did not involve the Grandes :feoles, but the other end of 
the status hierarchy: the lnstituts Universitaires de Teehnologie. Although, 
formally they were part of the universities, they were planned to be 
administered separately. However, the Loi d' Orientation of 1968 made them 
less independent than was initially envisioned.24 
Indeed, although in 1966 the lUT had been placed formally within the 
universities - as Instituts d' Universite, analogous to the engineering schools 
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(ENS!) and other institutes - and pursued their activities in relative 
independence from their universities, the situation changed after the events of 
May 1968.25 According to their initial statute (Decree of 7th January 1966), the 
rUT were originally set up as university institutes. Yet, the Decree of 20th 
January 1969, which amended this Decree, established them as UER.26 
Thus, the Loi d' Orientation of Edgar Faure in 1968, was a solution to a political 
crisis: it was necessary to pacify discontented elements in the University 
without also antagonising other powerful vested interests.27 Under the 
banner of 'pluri-disciplinarity', the faculties and the intellectual rigidities of 
the old regime were swept away, to be replaced by department-like Unites d' 
Enseignement et de Recherche (UER).28 The Faure Act provided for extensive 
changes in university administrative structures, the most significant of which 
was the formation of universities as substantial administrative entities, in 
place of the traditional faculties.29 
These UER were assembled into self-governing universities with elected 
presidents, under the long-sought principle of 'autonomy'. 'Participation' 
was an arrangement favoured in some form by everybody: the reform 
coalition, students, assistants, and President de Gaulle. Participation was 
supposed to abolish the autocracy of professors and assure that the new 
institutions would be responsive and adaptable to evolving needs. The 
ultimate goal of the new organisation would be functional diversification, 
leaving each university with its distinctive research specialities and curricula. 
In theory, this would contribute to the reconciliation of the imperatives of 
research with the needs of mass higher education.3° 
The Orientation Act of higher education made it possible in theory to 
integrate the two systems (the faculties and university institutes) by 
abolishing and dividing up the faculties. In practice, the two old systems of 
faculties and university institutes could be integrated only gradually. Some 
universities still retained relics of this" double sector". This fact was largely 
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due to the statutes given in 1969 to most of the old university institutes 
converted into UER, first and foremost of which were the IUT.31 
The IUT were not autonomous establishments in relation to the universities. 
The Decree of 20th January 1969 left the possibility open of making the IUT 
public establishments of a scientific and cultural nature attached to the 
universities. The IUT (as UER) were subject to protectionist provisions, which 
gave them a unique position within the universities. Additionally, the 
curricula of the IUT and their corresponding internal structure were laid 
down by Decree of the Ministry of Education. Thus, a priori state control 
continued to exist.32 
Overall, the 1968 Loi d' Orientation aimed to reform only the university system 
and kept the Grandes Ecoles out of its purview.33 Autonomy, 
multidisciplinarity and extended participation were the main issues of the 
reform of that period and they resulted in a patchwork of establishments.34 In 
addition, the major overhaul of the French universities that took place in 1968 
implied virtually no change in the area of quantitative planning.35 In general, 
manpower planning was of limited importance in France, given the 
dominance of open admission to higher education and the consequent 
reliance on private demand.36 Moreover, in addition to the fact that the 
Grandes Ecoles were almost entirely outside the reform process, no numerus 
clausus was adopted in the university sectorP 
Within this very complicated struggle, the issues of equity and efficiency re-
emerged in fresh form and again in a struggle over institutional forms. These 
issues were extremely complex in the national political debate. The 
apparently simple agendas of equity and efficiency became badly tangled in 
major struggles about the definition of the higher education system. 
Although the IUT were established within the UER in order to serve I equity' 
purposes, in the end, the issue of I efficiency' prevailed. This was identified in 
the differentiation between the IUT and the rest of the University. 
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3.2.1 Structural Inheritance: Differentiation Between the Instituts 
Universitaires de Technologie (IUT) and the Rest of the University 
The purpose of this sub-section is to suggest that I efficiency' purposes were 
served by the special status of the IUT within the UER. Within this logic, the 
IUT introduced innovations - in terms of fields of study, qualifications of 
teaching staff, etc. - which stressed their practical orientation. Unlike the 
universities, the IUT would be selective, and with tight state control. The 
innovations were aiming to increase the number of students. However, the 
rUT failed to attract the number of students they wanted and most of their 
graduates saw them as a first step before University studies. 
At the sub-university level, the intra-cabinet compromise permitted the IUT 
to become units of teaching and research within the University, but with a 
special status. The cabinet majority insisted on limiting the potential 
influence of the newly democratised decision-making organs on such units, 
particularly to ensure that they maintained selective admission policies. 
Moreover, the rUT's allotments of capital, and operating and personnel 
budgets, were to come directly from the Ministry. The university budget was 
to be distributed to the regular UER by the council.38 Thus, the IUT's position 
was independent within the universities while the influence of the Ministry, 
especially in finance and instructional programmes, continued to be strong. 
Moreover, the IUT was not a research institution and thus, the allocation of 
research funds was made to the University as part of its research budget.39 
Within this administrative structure, efforts were made by the IUT to 
introduce innovations in order to increase the number of students chOOSing 
short-cycle higher education. The innovations included employing a third of 
the teachers with vocational experience in such areas as industry, 
management, and computer science. The instruction focused strongly on 
practical learning, even on manual work as well as on theoretical instruction; 
provision was made for a lot of practical work and in the second year a period 
in industry was compulsory. Attendance at all classes and practical work was 
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compulsory, and work was done in small groups. Also, the final examination 
was replaced by continuous assessment.40 
Thus, although the lUT had been partly integrated with the universities, their 
pragmatic and vocational orientation as well as their school-like methods 
were quite alien to the university system and in some ways very similar to 
those of the Grandes Ecoles.41 Grading and assessment were continuous 
throughout the year and this was an innovation, which in principle had been 
applied to the universities by the 1968 Orientation Act. Therefore, the 
director of the lUT and the other instructors awarded the DiplOme Universitaire 
de Technologie (DUT) not through a final examination but rather on the basis of 
an overall evaluation at the end of the second year. The lUT were organised 
into subject departments whose curricula were determined nationally, 
although 20% of class time was reserved for adaptations to local 
requirements.42 The staff of the lUT had teaching tasks shared between 
teaching personnel from secondary education (the technical lycees), higher 
education and the relevant professions.43 
Specialisms in the lUT included the applied scientific techniques needed for 
industry, communications, commerce, social work and administration.44 
There were seventeen types of departments, eight serving the tertiary sector 
of the economy and nine serving the secondary or industrial sector. The most 
popular subjects were electronics, mechanics and civil construction.45 The 
courses lasted a minimum of two years and led to the DUT. Each lUT was 
attached to its appropriate local university and holders of the DUT could 
transfer to a university, with exemption from one or two years of the normal 
degree-course.46 Indeed, students who opted for an lUT course would not be 
obliged to stop their training at the end of the short cycle. Various bridges to 
long-cycle higher education would enable some of the students to continue 
their studies in other UER at the second-cycle level.47 
For their part, universities in France, as in other countries, offered degree 
courses in a wide variety of subjects. Some of them could be described as 
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'technological' and all had 'vocational' significance. They were open to 
holders of the Baeealaureat or of a qualification officially recognised as its 
equivalent. Mature students without the Baeealaureat could also enter the 
university through a special entrance examination.48 For the student who 
stayed in the degree course, there were two 'cycles' at undergraduate level 
and a third cycle for those who aspired to a doctorate. Each of these cycles 
represented approximately two years of study. The high drop-out rate for 1st 
and 2nd year undergraduates (about 45%) was also due to the fact that there 
was no selection for entry to French universities provided that the students 
had passed the Baeealaureat in any of its branches. In fact, selection took place 
during the first two years at university since some students failed their 
preliminary examinations, some withdrew from the course and some changed 
courses.49 
In contrast with the rest of the University the rUT were selective. However, 
unlike the universities and the Grandes Beoles, they did not pose the 
Baeealaureat as a formal condition for entry.50 Selectivity was often spurred by 
an active desire on the part of the IUT to maintain high standards and the 
market value of their diplomas as well as to enhance their status relative to 
the rest of the University and the Grandes Beoles. Academic achievement in 
relevant school subjects was the major criterion for admission. Factors such 
as motivation and range and depth of ability often played a role as well. IUT 
departments commonly accepted twice as many applications as there were 
places, and even then empty places remained, a factor which contributed to 
the uncertainty of any attempt to determine the real demand for IUT places or 
to plan their development more comprehensively.51 Overall, the IUT were 
planned to enrol a substantial minority of non-baeheliers, but few in that 
category were admitted (e.g. in 1972 they constituted as little as 5% of the 
student body).52 
In the end, the IUT fell far short of the goal of fully half the total enrolment of 
the first two years of university and roughly 25% of the total number of 
university students. By the autumn of 1972, instead of the projected 
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enrolment of 160,000, the IUT enrolled only 35,000 students, which amounted 
to just 11.8% of enrolments in the first two years of university and 4.8% of the 
total university enrolment.53 
Overall, then, the IUT failed to attract a substantial number of students away 
from long-cycle education and their creation did not alter the curve of 
university expansion. Although they were originally designed as 
vocationally oriented Short Cycle Institutions, the IUT, in fact, became for a 
notable proportion of students a first stage of higher studies.54 
Although the basic objective of the IUT had been to provide terminal training 
in preparation for employment, the most able graduates tended to go on to 
further study - the percentage of these students was higher than the 
percentage the planners had envisaged when the IUT were established. The 
IUT had been diverted from their main aim of providing vocational training. 
Those engaged in further study attended a range of institutions (one third 
were in university departments, and a slightly larger number were in 
engineering schools and comparable institutions}.55 
In the late 1970s, universities accounted for the majority of post-secondary 
enrolments, and within them the distribution among the various disciplines 
was uneven. Arts and human sciences accounted for almost one third of the 
students. Law and economics accounted for 23%, medicine and dentistry for 
19%, science for 18% and pharmacy for 4% respectively. In general, the 
university was criticised for not being vocationally oriented and for turning 
out graduates who after long-cycle studies swelled the ranks of the 
unemployed. This reproach applied particularly to arts and human sciences, 
law and economics.56 
Thus, the place and role of the IUT within the UER was ambiguous. The IUT 
were supposed to broaden higher education studies in the name of relevance 
to the economy, but in practice they used selective criteria, violating the 
original idea of equity. 
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This remarkably complex set of issues, which the French State was struggling 
to define and control, was reflected in the debates of the time. The academics 
were among the major analysts but French industry and business also 
contributed. 
3.2.2 Major Debates 
The purpose of this sub-section is to argue that: 
• Most of the debates among academics promoted the idea of the distinctive 
role of the rUT within the UER. Thus, their proposals served both versions 
of the efficiency project: a response to the economy and the relief of the 
pressure of enrolments on the universities. 
• The economic version of the I efficiency' project was promoted by the 
business world: the rUT were supported as more I efficient' because of their 
practical orientation. Thus, the co-operation of the rUT with the more 
theoretical universities was considered to be undesirable. In contrast, the 
leftist organisations wanted the co-operation. 
• The academic argument on the equity issue was that in comparison to the 
universities, the rUT were creating some social mobility. 
• Finally, the failure of the rUT to attract a considerable number of students 
was attributed to the fact that the University was open while the rUT were 
selective. 
Quermonne for example was optimistic about the rUT. He suggested that the 
old "peaceful co-existence" of the rUT with the other UER might give way to 
active co-operation, heralding the beginning of a process of integration.57 
This implied the promoting of technology to be among the objectives of 
university education and research. 58 
The rUT, according to Quermonne, could exert considerable influence on the 
development of the structures and aims of the interdiSciplinary UER and the 
universities. Their influence had been perceptible and could be seen in the 
external membership of university councils, in the recruitment of associated 
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or fee-paid teachers from industry and in the practice of active and audio-
visual teaching methods. The rUT could also benefit from the university 
tradition of permanent teaching staff, strict scientific method and the link 
between teaching and research. The result would be true symbiosis and the 
rUT would be able to achieve their aims completely.59 
Van de Graaff too argued that the most practical alternative for the rUT 
would be to maintain and strengthen their position within the universities. 
He suggested that the rUT should strive for full status either by maintaining 
their distinctive technological and vocational role, or by simply trying to 
emulate the rest of the University. The more defensive option would be to 
strengthen the rUT's original mission in stressing their role as technological 
institutes.6o Quermonne also claimed that the rUT could retain their specific 
character, with their task being to provide short-cycle courses for higher 
technicians for the secondary and tertiary sectors. He stressed the equity 
argument. The rUT could also add other tasks to this initial activity, the most 
important of which would be further education for adults already in 
employment.61 
Additionally, the rUT students would not find the door to further study 
closed since adequate bridges would enable those with the necessary ability 
to go on to appropriate second-cycle courses. At the same time, the rUT could 
offer one-year courses for students who had begun long cycles but wished to 
change over to work for a DUT (Dipl6me Universitaire de Technologie). The rUT 
themselves could find support in the universities, instead of forming a cluster 
of small establishments subject to the uncertainties of local politics or private 
pressures.62 
However, opponents of the rUT criticised them for their intentions to select 
and for their allegedly narrow orientation to the manpower demands of the 
economy. The leftist organisations of university teachers and students feared 
that the "rUT's pragmatic outlook would constitute a formidable barrier to 
any meaningful co-operation between them and the more theoretically-
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minded university faculties."63 In contrast, proponents of the rUT supported 
their pragmatic, vocational orientation. They hoped that the rUT would 
attract a substantial number of Baccalaureat holders away from the faculties, 
thus reducing the pressure of enrolments. The warmest support for the rUT 
was from industry and commerce, which looked forward to the output of 
middle-level technicians.64 
Later on, the interest groups shifted their position on the rUT. Employers' 
groups, who complained that rUT standards had dropped and that there was 
less emphasis on their practical/vocational aims, sometimes manifested 
hostility to the rUT and their graduates. This was considered to be due to 
theoretical preoccupations resulting from the closer links with the universities 
since 1968. In fact, such views fed on the antagonism which large sectors of 
French business had always felt for the university, which was seen as left 
wing and opposed to free enterprise. On the other hand, critics of the rUT 
from the left argued in exactly the opposite fashion. They supported the rUT 
as providing a vocationally oriented option desired by students, but 
emphasised that they could not remain a dead end. They suggested that the 
rUT's specialisation should be tempered by greater integration with the 
University and the progressive development of more extensive technological 
instruction and research in the University. These divergent views suggested 
that if the rUT were to adapt mainly to local demands for narrow technical 
training, they would in practice have to accept sub-university status.65 
In the end, as Van de Graaff argues, the rUT demonstrated the utility of this 
incrementalist strategy of innovation. Their political and administrative 
position was subtly balanced between the major forces of central and local 
government, employers and trade unions, and traditional academics of the 
right and left. This position enabled them to assert their role effectively and 
to perform functions beyond their primary one of vocational training, such as 
fostering a modest degree of social mobility and academic flexibility in a 
hierarchical and inflexible system.66 
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Van de Graaff highlighted the issues by pointing out that although the 
primary official motivation in founding the IUT was economic, they appeared 
in practice to be providing a distinct channel of upward mobility for a 
markedly higher proportion of lower class youth than any other sector of 
higher education.67 Moreover, though they had their share of institutional 
rivals and political opponents, they were a relatively successful innovation, in 
a society that was notorious for its hostility to innovations.68 In addition, 
students' attitudes reflected a clear willingness to assess their experience in a 
concrete and constructive manner and indeed to view the IUT as smaller 
versions of the Grandes Ecoles.69 
Cibois et al made an approximately similar point by stressing that among the 
Grandes Ecoles, the Universities and the IUT, the least 'democratic' of the three 
were the Grandes Ecoles where father's occupation was a strong indicator of 
admission. University recruitment was more' democratic' than the Ecoles des 
Hautes Etudes Commerciales (and the Grandes Ecoles in general) and IUT 
recruitment was even more' democratic' than the Universities.7° 
In general, as Geiger has suggested, the root problem of the French path to 
mass higher education was that of diversification and orientation and 
University reformers had been struggling with it, since the 1960s. However, 
these efforts had been widely derided as insufficient, or had been identified as 
part of a conspiracy to maintain existing class relations.71 
Finally, Van de Graaff argued that the failure of the IUT to attract the number 
of students they wanted was because as long as the faculties remained open, 
there was no real means apart from persuasion to get students to enter the 
IUT. The fact that the IUT were selective was another factor that served to 
keep their numbers down as well.72 
Thus, by the end of the 1970s, the IUT had failed to attract a considerable 
number of students, who instead preferred the universities. However, the 
IUT proved to be more successful during the 1980s-1990s, when the issue of 
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'efficiency' mostly meant increasing the 'vocational' element of higher 
education to respond to the needs of the 'market'. Overall, the themes of 
equity and efficiency went on dominating the policy agenda during the 
following period. 
3.3 THE 19805-19905: POLITICS, AIMS AND PURPOSES OF THE STATE, 
AND MAJOR HIGHER EDUCATION REFORMS AND LAWS 
• It will be suggested that in the early 1980s, the coming to power of a 
socialist government placed emphasis on democratisation and 
participation. The 'equity' aspect was still quite powerful - there should 
be a dramatic increase of students passing the Baccalaureat, which gave 
automatic entrance to University. However, this was for 'efficiency' 
purposes: the economy needed more and more qualified graduates. 
• Secondly, it will be suggested that the efficiency project had already been 
explicit in the 1984 Guideline Law, which provided for an extension of the 
research base and its linking with industry, regionalisation, autonomy and 
excellence, and 'vocationalisation' of higher education. Themes such as 
regionalisation and vocationalisation were interlinked. Higher education 
would respond to regional development and decentralisation by being 
increasingly 'vocationalised': short-cycle courses (such as the IUT) were 
expanded, and a two-track system within the University (e.g. the DEUST) 
was created. 
• Thirdly and importantly, it will be argued that during the second half of 
the 1980s, the efficiency project was changed in a major way: the state was 
gradually introducing the 'market' as the main framework to which 
higher education should respond. 
• Finally, the efficiency project was becoming even more intense towards 
the end of the 1980s - beginning of the 1990s, with the shortage of 
engineering and business studies graduates. Thus, more 
vocationally /professionally oriented courses were created within higher 
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education and more and more students were accepted. The role of the JUT 
in producing the necessary graduates and in relieving universities from 
large numbers of students was again emphasised. Additionally, the link 
between higher education and the private sector was put forward. 
Higher education, highly politicised, was the arena where the two ideologies 
of dirigisme and liberalism, and of control and competition, were debated.73 
In 1981, the return of the first left-wing coalition in the history of the Fifth 
Republic, brought a government which was publicly committed in higher 
education to the twin slogans of 'democratisation' and 'participation'. At the 
same time, it was committed to extending the research base, reforming 
undergraduate and doctoral level studies, opening the University to its region 
and strengthening links with industry. It was also committed to the 
introduction of broad ranging restructuring of governance and management 
systems at the level of the individual university.74 
All these issues posed fundamental questions to do with the relationship 
between higher education and the state, the links between research and 
teaching, the notion of autonomy, research and industry linkages, and the 
perennial tension between excellence and social equality in access to higher 
education.75 One tentative solution was the 1984 Guideline Law. According 
to this Law, every university should II enhance scientific and cultural 
development of the nation and its citizens, contribute to the employment 
policy, and regional development, help to reduce social and cultural 
inequalities". It should also provide more opportunities for 
vocational/professional studies.76 
Neave has argued that during the 1980s reforms, the rhetorical balance 
between the twin imperatives of efficiency and equality varied. 77 
The issue of massive expansion of the higher education system had been 
visible since the early 1980s. Both Left and Right in France agreed on the need 
for massive expansion in the proportion of the age group reaching the 
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Baccalaureat. Overall, higher education policy in France rested upon the 
conviction that not enough students continued beyond post-secondary 
education, that the country should invest more in higher education, and that a 
sustained effort was required to develop a mass system of higher education?S 
One of the specific factors in the way French higher education functioned was 
the relatively low proportion of students graduating within the two years 
needed to complete first-cycle studies. There was also a marked move by 
students away from continuing study into the second cycle (Maftrise, etc.)?9 
Thus, from 1983, the new political motto in education was that 80% of the 
relevant age group should reach the level of Baccalaureat within the following 
fifteen years. In fact, the 80% goal for the year 2,000 implied that, even if the 
level of Baccalaureat did not open automatic access to universities, some 40-
55% of the age group would be likely to be enrolled in the near future.SO 
With the aim of 80% graduation in the Baccalaureat, the universities would 
have to cope not only with an increasing number of students, but also with a 
far more diverse student body. That was because it was the technological and 
vocational streams in the secondary schools that were expected to produce 
more and more students passing the Baccalaureat.S1 
However, the massive increases in student numbers were occurring at a time 
when there were still major operational problems, such as the high failure rate 
at the end of the first cycle (DEUG). Other problems were estimated to be the 
rigid syllabuses offering an education that was too theoretical and narrow, as 
well as poorly matched with the demands of the job market. As a result, 
many students faced difficulties in finding employment. In addition, there 
was no management system in most universities that would make it possible 
to set clear goals and evaluate the results.S2 
During the 1980s, another dominant issue was that of regional development. 
Overall, since the reforms of 1982 and 1986, France had gradually been 
adapting to the implications of decentralisation. Essentially, the reforms 
88 
involved giving the Regions full administrative power as well as greater 
legitimacy through direct elections to the Regional CouncilS.83 On the 
political level, a range of economic measures often accompanied such a 'rise 
of regional power', at this time overshadowed by a concern about 
unemployment and local development.84 
At national level, regional development had been a constant theme, amongst 
the various political parties. It was backed not only by the Socialist 
administration between 1981 and 1985 but also by the right-wing coalition 
that followed and soon departed. The dimensions to this redefinition of the 
University's mission were: 
first, the need to provide a more solid research base for French industry at 
the regional level; second, to ensure that the need for a trained workforce is 
met by closer liaison at this level; third, to provide facilities for updating the 
skills in local industry; and, finally, to avoid further overcrowding in those 
centres where higher education exists already, it will be necessary to build 
elsewhere.8s 
Indeed, close attention to the French arrangements was justified by another 
rationale, that is, major changes in the relationship between University and 
industry were becoming apparent and as a result, there were changes in the 
institutional location of basic research. In certain instances, the rise of the 
industry-based fundamental research (especially in computer science and 
biotechnology) had led to the development of a research training system 
beyond academe.86 
Within the wider political framework of decentralisation during the mid-
1980s, higher education rapidly became involved in these changes.87 The 
issues of decentralisation and regional development pointed towards the 
need to revise the internal management structures at institutional level to 
permit the individual institutions the flexibility required to meeting the above 
four priorities.88 
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During the same time period, both the French university world and foreign 
observers made the point that much could be done to improve the 'through-
put' efficiency of the university by developing more short course provision.89 
The growing wish to expand short-cycle courses in the university sector was 
parallel to a tendency to create a two-track system within the first cycle. The 
first two years of undergraduate study led to either the Dip16me d' Etudes 
Universitaires Generales (DEUG) or, since 1985, to the Dip16me d' Etudes 
Universitaires Scientifiques et Techniques (DEUST).90 The DEUST tended to be 
more narrowly defined and it led directly to employment in the tertiary or the 
industrial sectors of the economy. Therefore, it was intended for students 
who did not wish to continue beyond the first cycle.91 
Overall, then, higher education was required to provide new skills in order to 
fill the needs of the production sector, and access to higher education 
increased job chances.92 This took place in a fresh context. 
During this period, the suggestion that central government should be more 
'modest' in its scope and open the way for more initiatives to be taken at the 
level of individual organisations was gradually making itself felt and higher 
education was not exempt from this pressure.93 The first area of disagreement 
appeared to be on the precise role that ought to be assumed by central 
administration in shaping, moulding and generally co-ordinating the future 
profile of the higher education system. For the Socialist Party, central 
intervention had always served as a powerful lever for democratising higher 
education.94 
Thus, a study group, set up in October 1986 under the aegis of the ĿŬŨŨWŸŦŤĚde 
France, took the view that as demands made by society, industry and the 
economy assumed ever greater complexity, the type of co-ordination carried 
out by centrally based administration was too rigid and incapable of 
mastering the key issues with any degree of precision. Moreover, the central 
point in the credo of the right-wing pressure group (Group d' Etude pour la 
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Renovation de l' Universite Fram;aise), was a reduction of the role of the state in 
higher education and its replacement by the operation of the market as the 
instrument for shaping that institution.95 
In this area, nothing happened between 1986 and 1988, but new moves were 
made in 1988/1989, aiming to set up contractual agreements widely between 
the state and the universities.96 In addition, the changes made in the Ministry 
of Education in 1988 were significant. The Direction de la Programmation et du 
Diveloppement Universitaire (DPDU) was created, which was made up of four 
sub-departments dealing with building and equipment of campuses, 
programming and contracts. The DPDU was charged especially with 
forecasting and developing new management methods, establishments and 
libraries. The role of the DPDU (Direction de la Programmation et du 
Developpement Universitaire) was also estimated to be about new arrangements 
intended to help in tackling two high-priority needs: 
(i) to give greater autonomy to individual institutions by broadening the 
scope of their contractual relationships with the Ministry, and (ii) to put 
great stress on turning out more PhDs, as the best way of ensuring 
replacement of teachers and researchers reaching retirement age and of 
providing for the expansion of teaching staff needed to cope with increased 
student numbers.97 
Overall, the way higher education developed had implications for the 
secondary and the tertiary sectors of the national economy. The number of 
students following engineering courses had increased far less rapidly than the 
rest of the university population.98 However, an official enquiry, conducted 
in 1989 by the Commission of Enquiry into Higher Education and the state of 
the economy (Haut Comiti Economie Education) reckoned that the outflow of 
graduates from the engineering schools was only half of the country's needs 
(approximately 14,000 per year). In addition, France faced a shortage in 
business studies graduates. There was also a shortfall of some 120,000 people, 
both men and women, needed in the tertiary sector. 99 
The shortage of qualified engineers and technicians (for example in 
mechanics) identified in 1988, also explained why the French engineering 
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industry was not very competitive.100 This shortage threatened to hinder 
economic growth, as international competition became even fiercer. It was 
tackled through a number of measures. These were the creation of the 
lnstituts Universitaires Professionalises (IUP) to provide a vocational course in 
the universities, the establishment of Nouvelles Formations d' lngenieurs (NFl) 
offering a new approach to training engineers, and a 50% increase in the 
numbers of engineers trained by the Grandes tcoles in three years. IOI 
In 1991, new vocationally oriented university courses that were created under 
the title lnstituts Un ivers ita ires Professionalises (IUP) were aiming at training 
'master engineers' in three years. What set them apart from other options 
was that they selected their students not immediately after the Baccalaureat, 
but one year later. Students could apply for an lUP if they wanted to change 
course after a year at an lUT, at university, or in preparing for the entrance 
examinations for the Grandes tcoles. The lUP together with the NFl (the new 
university engineering courses) were running on the basis of alternation 
between work placements and academic courses and lasted a total of five 
years for applicants admitted directly after the Baccalaureat. For those with a 
DUT, BTS or DEUST and a minimum of five years of professional experience, 
the course lasted only two years. I02 
Thus, at the beginning of the 1990s, France was engaged in reviewing the 
structure, duration and content of its courses from undergraduate through to 
research degree level, perhaps more than any other European country.103 
There were several reasons behind this effort such as the need to reduce the 
level of student failure and to come to grips with the growth in the area of 
'professional training' which was likely to take place over the following two 
decades. Other reasons were the need to put in place a diploma structure 
more in keeping with the diversity of abilities and skills that further 
expansion was likely to bring into higher education and finally, the need to 
create a closer symbiosiS between research, the University and industry.Io4 
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Matching the education provided with the demands of the job market meant 
instituting regular contacts with employers, setting up specialist agencies 
dealing with training and employment, as well as finding ways of assessing 
the supply of training and the demand for qualifications. To this end, an 
annual conference on education and employment was established by the 
government and was first held in 1991. The conference offered an 
opportunity of consulting employers' representatives about future needs and 
possible ways of modifying higher education courses in line with each 
sector's requirements. Additionally, a team was established within the 
Ministry of Education to guide and encourage initiatives relating to the 
vocationalisation of higher education. In the universities, careers services 
were going to be established to provide information to students about jobs as 
well as information to employers looking for qualified staff. IDS 
However, vocationalisation and expansion were interlinked. By the early 
1990s, nine out of ten secondary school graduates with the Baccalaureat 
continued into higher education of some sort. The' open' university sector 
was under pressure at initial entry into the 'first cycle' as well as later for the 
second cycle (licence, maftrise). This was due to the fact that most students 
who completed the first cycle successfully by obtaining the DEUG (DiplOme d' 
Etudes Universitaires Generales) intended to pursue their studies in the second 
cycle since the DEUG was not supposed to lead to employment. Student 
numbers in the universities rose by 24% in the second half of the 1980s, and 
they increased particularly sharply in 1989 and 1990.106 At the beginning of 
the 1990s, in the structure of qualifications, all was not well with the first 
cycle. Graduates holding the DEUG were approximately 25,000 in humanities 
and social sciences. 20,000 were in law and economics, and 15,000 in science. 
Additionally, some 22,000 students from the University Institutes of 
Technology obtained a DiplOme Universitaire de Technologie (DUT).107 
In this context, 'vocationalisation' was part of the plan for reorganising higher 
education announced in June 1991. A number of changes took place that 
meant both reorganising the kind of higher education on offer by seeking 
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closer links with employment policies, and also ensuring closer integration of 
higher education (especially the universities) into the economy at the national 
as well as the European level. The partnership with the private sector was 
supposed to cover teaching and research, and firms would be more actively 
involved in the universities.1OS 
The measures taken by the central policy-making and administrative 
authorities related to the following areas: 
increasing the number of places available in higher education, especially the 
technology courses; establishing agencies to co-ordinate university-industry 
collaboration, as well as the committees planning higher education and 
training for the Ministry and university careers/employment services; and 
the introduction of new vocational university courses aimed primarily at 
producing more qualified engineers.109 
The total capacity of the higher education system should increase and the 
distribution of students among the various first-year options should 
change.l1O 
The government hoped to raise the proportion of students entering the first 
year of technology courses (IUT, STS - 'sections de techniciens superieurs', the 
post-Baccalaureat courses for higher level technicians taught in lycees) and the 
'preparatory classes' for those attempting to enter the Grandes tcoles to 50% 
from the current 39%. This was a policy aiming at reducing the pressure on 
the first year of traditional undergraduate courses and the proportion with 
the Baccalaureat taking that route was expected to fall from 52% to 40%. Such 
redistribution would also mean creating new IUT and increasing the numbers 
of places, possibly by a more intensive use of their current capacity.111 
So, although the equity aspect was quite powerful during this period, the 
efficiency project was becoming particularly intense. The role of vocationally 
oriented courses, such as the IUT, within higher education was emphasised. 
These courses were considered to be more relevant to the needs of the market. 
Indeed, the 'efficiency' project had changed in comparison to the previous 
period: there was a shift in concern from the needs of the economy to the 
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market. Associated with this change was the increasing 'vocationalisation' of 
higher education. Other accompanying and anticipated themes were those of 
autonomy and regionalisation. 
Most of the debates by academics addressed the tensions over equity and 
efficiency. Particularly, the academics were critical of the increasing 
vocationalisation of higher education. 
3.3.1 Major Debates 
• The debates offered a re-evaluation of the non-university sector. Some 
analysts supported the expansion of the range of courses. Others argued 
that expansion was much more important than modifying the system in 
the form of introducing more vocationally oriented courses; however, 
'quality' was equally important. In contrast some analysts were against 
the expansion; they supported 'vocationalisation' mainly for 'efficiency' 
purposes, albeit with emphasis on general education. 
For instance, Bienayme suggested that, no doubt, the shortage of engineers in 
the late 1980s should be remedied. Yet, this shortage could not be blamed 
totally on the education system since career prospects available to specialists 
in mechanical engineering were less attractive than finance, electronic 
software or management data-processing.112 The author also argued that: 
Insofar as higher education is increasingly in demand because it offers 
better employment opportunities, the State is going to have to introduce a 
much wider variety into post-secondary education. By addressing itself to 
individuals from different backgrounds and of different abilities, higher 
education will put to the test a new qualitative change. In this context: 
- co-ordination with secondary education will have to be strengthened, 
indeed secured; 
- premier cycle output must be improved; 
- staffing must be diversified and increased; 
- methods of funding must be made more flexible and diversified. ll3 
Neave argued that the development of more short course provision (such as 
the IUT) was not likely to solve the problem that the demands placed on 
higher education for highly qualified manpower from commerce, industry, 
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research and education would exert in the future. Without an expansion of 
the numbers entering higher education, key sectors of the nation's economy 
would be competing with one another (e.g., industry and commerce would be 
bidding for that type of workforce which was also required by the education 
and training systems to the mutual detriment of all parties).114 In short, the 
author continued, it might have been possible to maintain some form of short-
term efficiency by placing heavy emphasis on directing existing student flows 
into areas perceived as crucial for industry. However, in the long run, such a 
policy would be likely to give rise to an even more dysfunctional situation: 
Without quality, policies based solely on equality serve simply to remove 
temporarily large numbers of young people from the labour market. And 
without equality, the resultant 'stream of excellence' is not likely to be 
sufficient to supply all the foreseeable needs of a changing economy. For 
reasons as much pragmatic as ideological, French higher education -
exceptional though it might be in the present climate - stands by the view 
that quality and equality are, like the Republic, if not one then certainly 
indivisible. 115 
From a completely different point of view, Lamoure et al argued that in the 
short run - unless one accepted the risk of causing upheaval in the universities 
- the goal of democratisation of higher education could no longer be set in 
purely quantitative terms (a matter of broadening access so as to increase 
numbers).116 
On the contrary, the democratisation of higher education should involve 
modifying the system as a whole. Thus, the system would deal with a more 
varied public and would satisfy the demand from young people and their 
parents, who expected the reward for continuing in education after the 
Baccalaureat to be the acquisition of a recognised qualification which would 
offer better chances of finding a job.H7 
The reform announced in 1991, the authors argued, was making vocational 
training an integral part of the goals of university education and was in itself 
bringing about changes in the scope of vocationally oriented education. The 
university sector would have many opportunities to forge a variety of links 
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with the private sector, through its contribution to continuing education, its 
joint research contracts with industry and the provision of vocationally 
oriented courses. The implementation of changes would also reinforce the 
modifications and radical shifts which the University needed to undertake in 
order to move away from its traditional role which directs it to offer 
theoretical professional training only for teachers, lawyers, doctors and 
researchers.11s 
In general, all the measures for increasing the vocational courses in higher 
education had the goal of increasing the element of preparation for working 
life in higher education, integrating the education system into the 
government's economic and social policies, and spreading the burden of 
funding among the various partners involved. This range of measures also 
suggested that major changes in higher education were under way. In 
particular, Lamoure et al argued, new forms of university-industry co-
operation that would get away from the traditional relationships, in which the 
universities and the professional schools had clearly defined spheres of 
action, needed to be found. 119 
Finally, Lamoure et al claimed that greater vocationalisation was necessary 
and desirable but on the condition that the public authorities would remain 
guarantors of the general balance between concern with the firms' needs for 
trained manpower (short or medium term) and the potential for conducting 
basic research (the long term). The other condition was that this 
vocationalisation would not be understood merely and narrowly as preparing 
students for employment. Thus, they argued that: 
As we reach the end of the century, technological progress and more 
generally economic development and the international division of labour 
make it impossible to identify and define precisely - in quantitative and 
qualitative terms - the numbers of jobs and types of qualification likely to be 
required in future. Moreover, in order to avoid falling into the trap of 
matching training to jobs, which past experience has shown to be senseless, 
university education - whether vocationally oriented or not - must keep the 
emphasis on general culture and versatility that has allowed it so far more 
or less to satisfy most of society's needs for highly qualified personneP20 
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Overall, during the 1980s-1990s period, the two interrelated issues of 
'efficiency' and 'equity' were still dominant. However, the issue of 
'efficiency' had shifted from 'the economy' to 'the market'. The 
'vocationalisation' of higher education was increasing as a response to 'the 
market', and thus the rUT were promoted. Both themes of expansion and 
vocationalisation were debated. 
3.4 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
To sum up, the rUT were created in the late 1960s to serve efficiency purposes. 
The rUT would train the necessary personnel for the secondary and tertiary 
sectors of the economy, at the same time as relieving universities from large 
numbers of students. The rUT were to remedy the disadvantages of the 
earlier inefficient institutions. They were to be more attractive to students, 
since they belonged to higher education, even more so, after their unique 
position within the universities after the 1968 reform, when the rUT were 
within the newly established self-governing universities, namely the UER. 
Equity purposes had been served since 1966, when the rUT were expected to 
give an answer to the demand for higher education. However, after the 1968 
reform, 'equity' purposes were stronger, especially due to the fact that the 
rUT would be within the UER. The UER addressed the main issues of the 
1968 reform, such as 'autonomy', 'multidisciplinarity' and extended 
'participation'. Overall, the social demand approach to educational planning 
was dominant. 
After the 1968 reform, the role of the rUT within the UER was debatable. For 
efficiency purposes, it was argued that this role should be to have the rUT 
strengthen their distinctive profile, being influenced by but also influencing 
the rest of the University. The rUT had a special status within the UER, in 
terms of admission policies and Ministry influences. The rUT particularly 
stressed their practical and vocational orientation as responding better to the 
economy, particularly local industry demands. The rUT were supported by 
the business world, while leftist organisations were quite critical of them. 
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Finally, the 'equity' issue was highlighted in the arguments about the IUT 
forging a certain degree of social mobility. 
Nevertheless, by the mid-1970s, the IUT had failed to attract the aspired 
number of students, while their students saw them as a first step before 
university study. At the same time, towards the end of this period, 
universities were criticised for turning out more and more unemployed 
graduates. 
Yet, surprisingly, the IUT became more effective vehicles for achieving equity 
and efficiency goals during the next period: the 1980s-1990s. This was 
because of the rise of the 'market' as the main framework shaping the profile 
of the higher education system. The IUT were representing a form of 
'vocationalising' higher education to respond to the needs of the 'market'. In 
fact, the 'efficiency' project had changed in a major way: the concern of the 
state for 'the economy', during the 1960s-1970s, had shifted to the concern for 
'the market', during the 1980s-1990s. 
During the 1980s-1990s, both themes of equity and efficiency were dominant 
in the official rationale. From the early 1980s, the socialist government, which 
came to power, placed emphasis on democratisation and participation. The 
equity aspect was quite powerful, since there should be a dramatic increase of 
students passing the Baccalaureat, thus having automatic entrance to 
University. However, this was for efficiency purposes, since the economy 
needed more and more qualified graduates. 
The efficiency project had become evident in the 1984 Guideline Law, which 
provided for issues such as an extension of the research base and its linking 
with industry, regionalisation, higher education autonomy and excellence, 
and 'vocationalisation' of higher education. The themes of regionalisation 
and vocationalisation were interrelated: the higher education system would 
respond to regional development and decentralisation by being increasingly 
'vocationalised'. Thus, short-cycle courses (such as those offered in the IUT) 
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were expanded. In addition, there were other measures in the rest of the 
higher education system: e.g. a two-track system within the University (e.g. 
the DEUST) was created. 
Associated with the above developments was that particularly during the 
second half of the 1980s, the efficiency project was changed in a major way: 
the state was gradually introducing the 'market' as the main framework to 
which higher education should respond. 'Vocationalisation', especially 
prominent during the early 1990s, meant increasing the utilitarian aspect of 
higher education to respond to the market. 
In this sense, the efficiency project was becoming particularly intense towards 
the end of the 1980s - beginning of the 1990s, when there was a shortage of 
engineering and business studies graduates. More 
vocationally /professionally oriented courses were created within higher 
education and more and more students were accepted. Thus, the issues of 
equity and efficiency were interrelated. The role of the rUT in producing the 
necessary graduates and in relieving universities from large numbers of 
students was again emphasised. Additionally, the link between higher 
education and the private sector was put forward. Finally, there was 
scepticism by contemporary analysts on whether the expansion of higher 
education should be set in simply quantitative terms or whether it should be 
set also with modifying the system as a whole. 
Therefore, social pressures (especially students' protests) for increasing access 
to higher education led to the reforms, which placed the rUT within the UER, 
in the late 1960s. However, the reforms failed, in terms of students' 
preferences, by the end of the 1970s. This was not due to the social 
importance of the University in France. In France the prestigious Grandes 
feaZes were at the top of the status hierarchy in the French higher education 
system. Furthermore, the rUT resembled the Grandes feaZes in that they 
offered more school-like teaching approaches and they were selective. 
However, it was mostly this selective characteristic, which contributed to their 
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failure, in an era dominated by the emphasis on equality and extended 
participation in the higher education system. In addition, the IUT were 
within the University, which remained open, albeit with the possession of the 
Baccalaureat as prerequisite for entry. However, during the second period, the 
1980s-1980s, the market was the reason why these institutions were 
particularly successful. The state and its concern for the economy had been 
replaced by the market, as the framework shaping both higher education and 
student preferences. Even the political agenda of equity purposes was 
subjugated to the principle of efficiency and response to the market. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE (WEST) GERMAN REFORMS 
4.1 INTRODUCTION: PURPOSE AND ARGUMENT 
In this chapter, the higher education reforms - with special reference to the 
non-university sector - in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) are 
described, starting from the late 1960s up to the 1990s. The role of the state and 
its rationale for its policies is identified in the successive reforms and laws and 
these are located within contemporaneous politics. The major debates by 
academics are also identified. The analysis is broken up into two periods: the 
1960s-1970s and the 1980s-1990s. It is in the first period that the differentiation 
between the Fachhochschulen and the universities is located, since it was then the 
Fachhochschulen were created. 
The arguments in this chapter are that during the 1960s-1970s period, the 
interrelated issues of 'equity' and 'efficiency' were dominant in official 
rationales. The creation of the Fachhochschulen was part of the reconstruction 
of higher education as a response to these two priorities. 
• However, the definition of 'equity' was in terms of the expansion of the 
higher education system and social mobility, and in the location of the 
Fachhochschulen in higher education. At the beginning, the social demand 
approach was dominant. Later on, there was emphasis on quantitative and 
structural planning. 
• 'Efficiency' meant providing the right kind of higher education to respond 
to the economy through practical orientation, and relieving the 
overcrowded universities. The differentiation between the Fachhochschulen 
and the universities was thus promoted. 
During the 1980s-1990s, it will be suggested that the efficiency project changed 
in a major way: there was a shift from a concern for 'the economy' to a 
perception of 'the market'. The Fachhochschulen were responding to the market. 
The vocationalisation trend was associated not only with the market, but also 
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with the issues of quality, institutional autonomy, regionalisation and the links 
with industries. 
To expand and test these arguments the reforms of the first period, the 1960s-
1970s, are reviewed. 
4.2 THE 19608-19708: POLITICS, AIMS AND PURPOSES OF THE STATE, 
AND MAJOR HIGHER EDUCATION REFORMS AND LAWS 
This section will address a number of major issues that underlined the rationale 
for the introduction of the Fachhochschulen. 
• First, the issue of I eqUity' was that individual demand for education had to 
be met and therefore the higher education system was expanded. 
However, the social demand approach to educational planning that 
prevailed at the beginning was succeeded by a manpower planning 
approach. 
• Second, the strong governmental role in higher education was part of the 
efficiency project. Higher education was considered to be crucial for 
economic growth and emphasis was placed on a practical orientation. 
However, expansion could not be just extension of the existing institutional 
infrastructure. For the above reasons, the government looked for structural 
models in higher education, which stressed greater educational opportunity 
and practical orientation, particularly important in a political context that 
stressed response of the higher education system to the needs of the FRG, as 
an advanced industrialised country. The other version of the efficiency 
project meant relieving universities from large numbers of students. Thus, 
the former engineering schools and higher vocational schools were 
upgraded to Fachhochschulen in 1971. In relation to the universities, the 
Fachhochschulen would have the advantages of shorter duration, a more 
structured teaching approach, job relevance, responding better to regional 
demands, and alleviate unequal educational opportunity. 
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• Nevertheless, during the same time period, the equity project became 
stronger in the attempts for 'comprehensivisation', realised in the creation 
of the Gesamthochschulen. These were to combine the more practical 
orientation of the Fachhochschulen with the more theoretical orientation of 
the universities. The 1976 reform recognised the Gesamthochschulen as the 
future model for higher education. This reform - partly an outcome of the 
student protests in the late 1960s - emphasised the unity of the higher 
education system as well as its practical/professional competence. In the 
end, 'comprehensivisation' failed partly due to conflicting goals and partly 
because of the nature of the German higher education system, emphasising 
specialisation in spite of the rhetoric about research-orientation. Finally, 
during this period, a numerus clausus was introduced in several fields and 
governmental control decreased. 
In the Federal Republic of Germany, in each decade after World War II, the 
number of students almost doubled. 1 The increase in demand for higher 
education meant that German universities developed into Massenuniversitaten 
(mass universities).2 
Within this framework, the government in the Federal Republic of Germany 
assumed a much stronger role of co-ordination and supervision of the higher 
education system during the 1960s and 1970s than in the 1950s.3 The 
Humboldtian idea of the University had strongly emphasised academic 
freedom and university autonomy.4 However, during the 1960s and 1970s, the 
'balance of power' shifted towards government following three closely 
interlinked changes: 
First, government set up grand planning mechanisms to provide the 
necessary external conditions for higher education by acting strategically and 
with long-term perspectives. Second, the net of laws, decrees and 
administrative supervision became more tightly knit. Third, previously 
disentangled zones of state control and university autonomy were blurred by 
changes of higher education administration (for example the changing 
function of the rectors or presidents) and by the establishment of various 
mechanisms of formal communication and negotiation.s 
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The increase in government power over higher education was due to the 
growing importance of knowledge for economic growth, for social problem 
solving, and for the growing training function of higher education. There was a 
widely shared belief about the necessity and potential for quantitative and 
structural planning.6 
There was also a debate surrounding the Bildungskatastrophe (educational 
catastrophe), that is, the fact that the German education system in general and 
higher education in particular were no longer suitable to cater for the needs of 
an advanced industrialised country like the FRG. This debate led to calls for 
more Praxisorientierung (practical orientation) and greater educational 
opportunity? The major proposals discussed and, to some extent, 
implemented were: 
a. the establishment of a variety of types of institutions, 
b. the establishment of a comprehensive model of higher education, 
c. the introduction of short-cycle courses at universities alongside long courses, 
d. the diversification or hierarchization of universities, 
e. the establishment of a sequential system of courses.S 
Overall, in the post-war period, higher education policy in the Federal Republic 
of Germany had opted for a unitary system. From this period until the 1960s, 
emphasis was placed on blurring the existing institutional differences. After 
the mid-sixties, educational planners and scholars discussed the need to 
restructure higher education, in the face of an increased student population 
(both at institutional level and course patterns). Also, debates at the 
international level influenced the long-standing debate on structural issues 
within the country.9 Thus, the new policies led to a nationwide coordination of 
educational planning, the foundation of new universities with the aim of 
providing a broad local and regional range of higher education institutions. 
From 1970 onwards, the new policies led to a diversification of institutional 
types.1o The strong governmental role was also justified by problems of unit 
costs, changing employment prospects of the spiraling numbers of graduates as 
well as the repercussions of higher education structures on equality of 
opportunity.l1 
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The traditional universities, organised according to the needs of only about 5% 
of the respective age cohorts, turned out to be unable to cope with the 
increasing demand for larger student numbers. Consequently, new forms of 
advanced professional training were established.12 It was within this context 
that the former engineering schools and higher vocational schools were 
upgraded to Fachhochschulen in 1971. In addition, debates about the concept of 
the comprehensive university (Gesamthochschule) took place, and there were 
continuous governmental measures to increase the share of students taking 
relatively short course programmes.13 
The treaty between the German states in 1968 to upgrade the former 
engineering schools, and higher vocational schools, to Fachhochschulen in 1971, 
was a first step taken towards a diversified system. One of the reasons why this 
decision was taken was to raise the standard and reputation of these 
institutions and to ensure the international recognition of their graduates.14 
There were also a number of other reasons why the Lander15 decided to set up 
the Fachhochschulen. The Massenuniversitaten were as a rule supposed to 
provide 4-5 year courses while courses at Fachhochschulen were intended to be 
of shorter duration than university courses in similar fields. The 
Fachhochschulen were expected to adopt a more structured teaching approach in 
contrast to the "take it or leave it" attitude displayed by university teachers 
which was regarded as a major factor contributing to high failure and drop out 
rates and students' propensity to extend their period of studies.16 
University courses in some applied subjects like Business Studies or 
Engineering had been subject to the criticism that their syllabuses were far too 
theoretical in content and lacking in Praxisorientierung (practical orientation). 
The Fachhochschulen were planned to be designed in such a way as to be more 
practice and job relevant. Universities, in admitting students to courses, tended 
to favour applicants usually coming from a specific social stratum. The 
Fachhochschulen were to cater more specifically for students with the Fachhabitur 
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or Fachhochschulreife and they were meant to alleviate inequality of opportunity 
in higher education, especially as they were likely to be more attractive to 
mature students and were intended to make a transfer to university education 
possible at a later stage. Finally, the Fachhochschulen were supposed to be well 
suited to respond to regional demand for study places and for graduates.17 
Moreover, as already pOinted out, since about the mid 1960s the continuous 
increase of the number of students at institutions of higher education was 
expected to lead to a qualitative change in the higher education system of the 
Federal Republic of Germany. It seemed to be impossible to provide study 
opportunities for all students in the same way it had been in the past but 
expansion by lowering standards seemed to be an unacceptable concept. 
Within this context, what became very popular was a model of integration in 
higher education. In each region, the institutions of higher education were to 
be merged into one comprehensive university, the Gesamthochschule.18 
The introduction of the Gesamthochschulen as a model of comprehensive higher 
education was intended to strengthen the equity aspect of the reforms of this 
period. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, there was an agreement upon the 
concept of comprehensive higher education: all universities and Fachhochschulen 
should be institutionally merged into Gesamthochschulen. The major proponents 
of this type of higher education suggested that both students from the academic 
secondary education track and students eligible for vocational colleges should 
attend courses jointly at comprehensive universities.19 These comprehensive 
universities combined the more practice-oriented tasks of Fachhochschulen with 
the more theory-oriented tasks of universities.2o 
Indeed, the tasks of the comprehensive universities were to create a link 
between the research orientation of the universities and the vocational 
orientation of the non-university institutions of higher learning. They were to 
increase considerably the possibilities for transfer between courses of study. 
They were to bring the non-university sector into closer contact with research. 
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They were to utilise higher education resources better and they were to make 
non-university level study more attractive.21 
Two models of the so-called Integrierte Gesamthochschulen were finally realised: 
the "consecutive model" and the "Y-model". In the "consecutive model", both 
groups of students took part in a joint programme up to the first degree which 
was at least equivalent to a vocational college degree although somewhat closer 
to the university programme. Then, the students would continue their studies 
up to the second level (equivalent to the university degree). The "Y-model" 
allowed students to take part in a joint introductory programme of at least one-
year, and then split into short-cycle and long-cycle programmes.22 
The student protests of the late 1960s had actually contributed to the change of 
higher education policies, before the new conceptions had started to become 
effective. Students had criticised the lack of social and political relevance in 
course programmes as well as in teaching and research. They had also 
criticised the bias in favour of "capitalist interests", and had questioned the 
dOminating influence of the professoriate regarding the internal organisation of 
academic life. These protests led to a short but intensive phase of reforms in the 
higher education system, which were accompanied by a series of legal acts and 
organisational changes. The latter included the right of all groups beyond the 
professoriate to represent their interests in the self-governing bodies of the 
institutions.23 
Thus, a Framework Act for Higher Education was debated and finally passed in 
1976. Its aim was to guarantee the basic unity of the higher education system 
and to prescribe a framework for the higher education policies of the Lander. By 
the mid-1970s, a serious economic depression led to a reduction in funds for 
education (including higher education).24 
Government initiatives in higher education had already run into crisis in the 
early 1970s. There was a failure to agree on long-term education goals within 
the Federal-State Commission for Educational Planning. The ability of 
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government to draw up grand plans, to operationalise and to finally reach 
desired goals was open to question. The reform goals, which were formulated 
during the 1970s lost ground. However, this did not immediately diminish 
governmental power over higher education. In contrast, courts and 
government administration became more powerful and the Framework Act for 
Higher Education 1976 was enacted. The Act was seen as a compromise 
between the various concepts under discussion, while from the mid-1970s to the 
mid-1980s a period of sorting out took place.25 
Disappointment over the lack of impact of political programmes and of forward 
planning as well as lack of political consensus led to stagnation and finally, 
from 1975, to a process of rethinking. In this process, governments set more 
modest aims for higher education policy and planning and in most Llinder, the 
ministries in charge of higher education were reorganised again. Higher 
education planning departments, established alongside those of routine 
administration in the late 1960s or early 1970s, were dissolved in most cases by 
the late 1970s.26 
The study reform movement of the 1970s signified a change in quality criteria 
for university studies since the quality of a programme of studies was 
increasingly judged on the basis of the practical professional competence it 
conveyed. The first federal higher education law of 1976 reflected such a 
tendency since it explicitly stated that federal higher education institutions had 
to prepare students for professional practiceP 
In addition, according to the 1976 Framework Act the comprehensive 
university was the preferred future model for higher education. However, the 
reform did not succeed. Not a single comprehensive university was established 
after the enactment of this legislation. Also, not a single comprehensive 
university incorporated a previously established university. Rather, university 
faculty and resources were added to already existing teacher training colleges 
and Fachhochschulen.28 
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The failure of comprehensive universities to become the model of higher 
education was because of a superficial compromise between conflicting goals. 
Some proponents favoured an integrated model, which was a new synthesis 
between the research-oriented university and the vocationally oriented 
Fachhochschulen. Such a model was supposed to reduce institutional and 
programme hierarchy. Other proponents considered comprehensive 
universities as a tool to make short-cycle higher education more stable and 
more attractive. But, proponents of the latter concept soon withdrew their 
support. The reasons were that doubts began to grow about the capability of 
comprehensive universities to take over such aI/cooling out" function, and that 
there was a strong resistance of universities against such a merger.29 
Also, the characteristics of the German higher education system had a 
considerable impact on the structural policy. Higher education in Germany 
placed great emphasis on specialisation and the promotion of specific skills. In 
spite of the rhetoric about research-orientation, universities stressed 
preparation for a career. Other potential educational goals of cultivating the 
personality and fostering non-cognitive socialisation had not been highly 
regarded. Finally, the universities were considered to be more or less equal in 
standard, and higher educational policy aimed at retaining homogeneity of 
institutions.3D 
As a result, as Teichler argues, the expansion of higher education was not that 
easily implemented in Germany. In other countries, expansion had to do with 
the extension of the bottom of the system as well as with a gradual process of 
adjustment to the changing job prospects of graduates. However, in Germany, 
an overall strategy to cope with the changing conditions was more likely to 
occur than a pragmatic and gradual adjustment to the changing conditions. 
Thus, the traditional concepts of higher education led to the preservation of a 
small elitist system, or even to integrated approaches; but not to a pronounced 
institutional hierarchy.31 
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In addition, what also became a very controversial issue because of its dramatic 
effect on the education system was that of numerus clausus. The competition in 
secondary schools had grown to such a degree that it was considered to be 
detrimental to both the educational process and to the development of 
personality. Up to the sixties, successful secondary school students used to 
choose a variety of fields of study. From the mid-sixties until the mid-seventies 
(when the medical as well as other fields introduced a numerus clausus) more 
and more students achieving high grade points turned to numerus clausus fields. 
Moreover, mobility from the one university to another became more and more 
complicated, and there were controversial debates on the issue of manpower 
planning.32 
Within this very complicated struggle, the issues of equity and efficiency re-
emerged in fresh form and again in a struggle over institutional forms. As in 
France, these issues were extremely complex in the national political debate. 
As in France, apparently simple agendas of equity and efficiency became badly 
tangled in major struggles about the definition of the higher education system. 
The failure of the Gesamthochschule to prevail as a model of higher education 
was evidence that the 'efficiency' purposes were stronger than the 'equity' 
ones. The Fachhochschulen expressed a 'hierarchised' higher education system 
to respond to both versions of the efficiency project. The differentiation 
between the Fachhochschulen and the universities was promoted. 
4.2.1 Structural Inheritance: Differentiation Between the Fachhochschulen 
and the Universities 
• In this sub-section, it will be argued that at both federal and state level the 
general intention of higher education policy had been to treat all 
universities or all Fachhochschulen as more or less equal. However, for 
'efficiency' reasons, the differentiation between the Fachhochschulen and the 
universities was promoted. The Fachhochschulen had the advantage of being 
of shorter duration, especially important in view of the long periods of 
study in the German Research University. In contrast to the more 
theoretical universities, the Fachhochschulen stressed a practical orientation, 
123 
which was evident in their mission, admission policies, fields of study, 
qualifications of teaching staff, and curricula. The governance of the 
Fachhochschulen stressed their response to regional needs. For the above 
reasons, the Fachhochschulen were successful both in terms of students' 
preferences and labour market demand. 
All universities or all Fachhochschulen would have the same entrance 
qualifications, the same standards for exams, the same curricula, the same level 
of funding, the same regulations governing appointments and promotions, the 
same salary scales, the same organisational structures, and the same basic 
conditions for research, teaching and studying. Such policies were aiming at 
making higher education institutions more alike, especially in respect to 
quality, but they prevented neither the development of differences nor the 
perpetuation of traditional profiles. What was standing behind this general 
tendency, was the idea of equal chances for all qualified students to attend a 
high-quality university not too far away from their horne as well as of 
broadening access to higher education institutions without creating first-class 
institutions for higher and lower class students.33 
Hochschule was the general term used to describe any institution involved in 
higher education,34 The cornmon objective of all Hochschulen was to cultivate 
and develop science and art through research, teaching and study and thus, 
adhere to the Humboldtian ideals of the unity of Lehre and Forschung (education 
and research).35 At the same time, the Hochschulen were supposed to provide 
practical training for those professions requiring the application of particular 
scientific methods or artistic creativity.36 
Nevertheless, there was a differentiation between the Fachhochschulen and the 
universities. The universities were known as Wissenschaftlichen Hochschulen. 
This was a term usually denoting those institutions of higher education whose 
courses were reckoned to be on a par with those of university standard. The 
Wissenschaftliche Hochschulen accounted for three-quarters of all students in 
higher education and awarded two thirds of the degrees.37 The Fachhochschulen 
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were those higher education institutions remaining outside, and provided 
shorter courses, of between three and four years duration. These courses 
covered fields such as Engineering, Business Administration and Social Work.38 
Clearly, the German Research University system did not provide for any kind 
of internal differentiation. The only differentiation the concept seemed to 
accept was the distinction between Research University and Non-Research 
University, that is, the distinction between the University and the 
Fachhochscule.39 
The two classical functions of German universities - research on the one hand, 
and teaching and studies, on the other - continued to playa central role in the 
functions accorded to higher education in the Federal Republic. The Higher 
Education Framework Act (Hochschulrahmengesetz - HRG) had re-emphasised 
these functions, supplementing them with reference to an explicit connection 
between academic training and professional practice.4o 
Thus, according to their specific functions, the higher education institutions 
should foster and develop the sciences and arts through research, teaching, and 
studies. They should prepare students for occupations requiring the 
application of scientific findings and methods or creative ability in the artistic 
fields. The purpose of research at higher education institutions should be 
gaining scientific knowledge and laying the scientific foundations for furthering 
the advancement of teaching and studies. According to the function of the 
higher education institution concerned, research could cover any scientific field 
as well as the practical application of scientific findings. The purpose of 
teaching and study would be to prepare students for a certain profession, 
imparting to them the particular knowledge, skills and methods required to 
enable them to perform scientific or artistic work and to act responsibly in a 
free, democratic, and social state governed by law.41 
In German universities, there was virtually no separate level of graduate 
education, since clear patterns of course work toward doctoral programmes 
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hardly existed. The duration of most academic programmes was more than six 
years. The same applied to degrees in different fields, including professional 
areas. Those candidates who worked toward a doctorate took part in research 
activities in their departments by means of part-time employment as research 
or teaching assistants.42 
The overwhelming majority of first-degree students were more or less left to 
themselves during the course of their studies and they often had difficulty in 
getting to know their professors or participating in research activities. In 
addition, students had problems of orientation in a system that had little 
curricular organisation, thereby following the Humboldtian principles of 
freedom of teaching and of freedom of learning. A curricular pattern, which 
was disorganised due to overloading courses and programmes with new and 
recent research orientations of professors, had contributed to excessively long 
periods of study. There was neither systematic guidance of undergraduate 
teaching nor clear and purposeful research orientation.43 
With respect to the admission policies, theoretically, the Abitur (the basic 
qualification for entry into higher education)44 allowed students to choose their 
subject and their institution of higher education. However, the high level of 
demand for university places inevitably imposed some constraints on students' 
freedom of choice. In the so-called numerus clausus disciplines (medicine, 
pharmacy, dentistry and veterinary medicine), for a number of years, places 
had to be allocated according to the students' performance in the Abitur. For 
other subjects, the Zentrale Vergabestelle fUr Studienplatze (Central Admissions 
Agency) took steps to ensure a more balanced distribution of student numbers 
than free choice of subject area and university would lead to. In allocating 
university places, allowance was also made for students seeking transfer from 
Fachhochschulen.45 
The Fachabitur was an alternative qualification, which enabled students to seek 
admission to a university or other institution of higher education and it tended 
to be conferred by secondary schools with a more vocational bias. The 
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Fachabitur allowed entry only to specific fields of study. It would entitle a 
student to enroll on university level courses in Commerce/Business 
Studies/Economics, but not in other subject areas.46 The above were also the 
major fields of study in the Fachhochschulen. 
The points system that was used to decide entry to the Fachhochschulen was 
based on the students' achievement in the Abitur or Fachabitur, with credit for 
periods of waiting and other special circumstancesP Entry to the 
Fachhochschulen was predominantly regionally based with many students 
applying to institutions within 50 kilometres of their home. Yet, there were 
cases where students moved further afield in order to follow a particular course 
of study.48 
With respect to the fields of study, there was no such thing as a typical 
Fachhochschule. Fachhochschulen offered highly practice-related courses of a 
scientific or artistic nature.49 The main subject areas that prospective students 
could choose from, if they considered enrolling for a course at a Fachhochschule, 
were the following (listed in descending order of importance): a) Engineering, 
b) Commerce/Economics, c) Social Studies, d) Public Administration, e) 
Industrial Design, f) Agriculture/Nutrition and g) Informatics/Mathematics. 
Engineering courses represented about 50% of the total work covered by the 
Fachhochschule in the FRG.50 
The academic year was composed of two semesters and all courses were 
semester-based. Courses were usually planned to last for seven or eight 
semesters although regulations concerning the total length of studies at a 
Fachhochschule varied in the individual Lander. A typical course consisted of 
four semesters of basic studies, followed by two semesters covering two main 
subjects and then a seventh semester when the special topic was completed 
which, in some cases, could be done in industries.51 In laboratory work, 
students worked in groups of three or four. Examinations played a very 
important role in the assessment of students and all subjects had examinations 
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at the end of the semester. However, marks from coursework did not usually 
contribute to the assessment of students.52 
The practical orientation of the Fachhochschulen was also seen in the 
qualifications of their staff. The teaching staff in Fachhochschulen should be 
academically well qualified, like their counterparts in universities, and they 
normally held doctorates. Although university professors should have attained 
the venia legendi (Habilitation), Fachhochschulen professors did not need be 
habilitiert. However, they should be able to demonstrate that they had had at 
least 5 years' professional experience in their Fachrichtung and not less than 3 
years outside higher education, i.e. as a practicing accountant, economist, 
engineer, etc. There were also different expectations about the balance between 
teaching and research. University teachers were very much expected to carry 
out research; they were in a way obliged to embark on research activity. 
Fachhochschulen professors were encouraged to devote time to research and 
consultancy, but in fact, they were only merely entitled to do research.53 
Finally, the fact that the Fachhochschulen were regional was evident in the 
governance policies. New regulations had established the Fachhochschulen as 
public law entities. They had the right to autonomy within their sphere of 
activity and this gave them the same legal status with that of the universities. 
The Llinder, however, still retained certain rights of decision and supervision 
and the Fachhochschulen were restricted in the courses they could offer.54 The 
Fachhochschulen were headed by a president or a rector and did not have 
governing bodies. The president or rector was answerable to the senator (an 
official of the Land). Any new academic programme had to be the subject of 
consultation with industry and then approved by the senator before being 
offered. Moreover, all member groups in the Fachhochschulen - professors, 
students and other personnel- had representation on decision-making bodies.55 
Thus, in comparing the Fachhochschulen to the universities, there were a number 
of differences. University courses were of longer duration than courses at 
Fachhochschulen. Although a longer period of study did not necessarily suggest 
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a higher standard in the final degree, there was agreement among 
educationalists and employers that the educational attainment level of a 
diploma awarded by a Fachhochschule was not as high as that conferred by a 
university level institution. Teaching staff at universities tended to be 
academically better qualified than lecturers at Fachhochschulen, although the 
latter usually had more practice-related experience. The Fachhochschulen also 
lay greater stress on teaching performance than universities.56 
Universities tended to offer the full range of academic disciplines and were 
entitled to award degrees, doctorates and the venia legendi (Habilitation). 
Fachhochschulen, as non-university level institutions, offered courses in very 
similar disciplines to those courses students could pursue at universities.57 
Nevertheless, the Fachhochschulen offered a more restricted choice of 
Fachrichtungen than Universities.58 
The courses designed by the Fachhochschulen were more praxisorientiert than 
programmes of study, in similar fields on offer by the universities. 59 Course 
programmes at Fachhochschulen were meant to be application oriented while 
course programmes at universities were considered to be research-oriented. 
Fachhochschulen were generally assumed to serve a terminal pre-career function 
and only few advanced courses were provided for those having been granted a 
Fachhochschule degree. Fachhochschule graduates were not entitled to become 
doctoral candidates.6o 
So, the fact that the Fachochschulen were characterised by a disciplinary 
concentration in the fields of engineering, business studies and social work 
partly explained the popularity of the Fachochschulen graduates with industry. 
The success of the Fachochschulen was the larger practical and vocational 
orientation, together with more flexibility in relation to the expectations of the 
labour market and industry.61 
In fact, there were more students wishing to enter the Fachhochschulen than 
places available.62 The emphasis on practical and vocational aspects was 
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attractive to both students and employers. Sometimes, students had to wait 
several years before obtaining a place on the course of their choice and this was 
due to entry restrictions.63 
Finally, after an agreement by the Federal and Lander governments of 1977 to 
maintain the policy of open access to all higher education institutions, student 
numbers continued to rise and higher education institutions were led to a 
process of rethinking their roles and functional contributions to society. 
Through organisational measures and a policy of greater public accountability, 
as well as responsiveness to the expectations of the labour market, the 
Fachhochschulen were in a better position than the universities to demonstrate 
their social relevance and importance.64 
Overall, in contrast to what happened in France during this time period, in 
Germany, the Fachhochschulen were successful in attracting students. That was 
because the practical orientation of the Fachhochschulen was a response to the 
debate about the educational catastrophe, which was strong in German society. 
Furthermore, during the late 1960s, the students themselves had asked for 
greater social relevance in course programmes. The cultural importance of the 
Research University in Germany was still very strong, thus unable to respond 
to the so-called Bildungskatastrophe. Thus, the Fachhochschulen were successful in 
responding to the efficiency project because they were practically oriented and 
because they were regional. However, the equity project was not given that 
much importance, as was also evident from the failure of the Gesamthochschulen, 
which were serving equity purposes even better than the Fachhochschulen. The 
debates among academics concentrated mostly on the relationship between the 
Fachhochschulen and the universities. 
4.2.2 Major Debates 
• The purpose of this sub-section is to describe several debates, mainly by 
academics, during this period. First, there were arguments that the 
Fachochschulen were creating social mobility. Secondly, however, most of 
the debates focussed on the relationship between the Fachochschulen and the 
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universities. Some debates were about blurring the differences, while 
others stressed the distinctive role of the Fachhochschulen. 
As far as the equity issue is concerned, Gellert et al have illustrated that the 
Fachochschulen had been a major vehicle to increase educational opportunities 
for larger proportions of the population, not least by easing the access through 
a slightly less difficult secondary qualification.65 
Nevertheless, the differentiation between the Fachochschulen and the 
universities, for 'efficiency' purposes, was central in the academic debates. 
There were continuous debates focusing on which would be the most 
satisfactory policy to follow on the relationship between the Fachochschulen and 
the universities. One fundamental question was whether the programmes of 
vocational institutions should remain very distinct from university 
programmes, or whether the gap between the two should be narrowed.66 
Politicians and the academic community widely recognised the importance and 
attractiveness and the specific competitive advantages of the Fachochschulen 
within the German higher education system. From this appreciation of the 
Fachochschul sector, two different sets of propositions and claims were derived. 
One set of recommendations and policy statements tended to blur the 
differences between universities and Fachochschulen. In addition, they tended to 
give the Fachochschulen a larger share of the research money available (at least 
for applied research) and the right to award doctoral degrees and finally to 
prolong the standard length of Fachochschul studies in order to converge with 
university standards.67 
The other set of recommendations and policy statements stressed the distinctive 
role of the Fachochschulen, such as their teaching expertise and applied and 
vocationally oriented teaching as well as their more structured curricula. 
According to this view, the Fachochschulen should participate equally in the 
resources for higher education or even deserve a greater share of funds. This 
policy aimed at the extension of the quantitative dimensions of this sector or, at 
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least, at the alleviation of the much heavier teaching burden compared with the 
universities. 68 
The success of the Fachhochschulen, in terms of both individual and labour 
market demands, continued during the next period. During the 1980s-1990s, 
the issues raised were an extension of the issues of the previous period. 
However, new issues came forward, such as efficiency, quality and the 
increasing 'vocationalisation' of higher education to respond to the needs of the 
'market'. Within this context, the Fachhochschulen continued to play an 
important role in the German higher education system. 
4.3 THE 19805-19905: POLITICS, AIMS AND PURPOSES OF THE STATE, 
AND MAJOR HIGHER EDUCATION REFORMS AND LAWS 
• During the 1980s-1990s, the Fachhochschulen were successful in terms of both 
student and employment system demand. Compared to the universities, 
the Fachhochschulen were estimated to be both 'efficient' and 'effective', thus 
contributing to 'quality'. Given the excess of graduates, the debate about 
'equity' diminished. 
• Among the major issues raised were efficiency, competition, differentiation 
and institutional autonomy, and were made explicit in the 1985 Framework 
Act for Higher Education. According to this Act, the Gesamthochschulen 
were no more expected to be the general model for higher education, 
despite their success in reducing inequality of opportunity. The issue of 
'efficiency' prevailed and 'hierarchisation' was promoted. The failure of the 
Gesamthochschulen was partly due to the strong vertical differentiation of the 
German higher education system and partly due to the neo-conservative 
governments' demands on opening higher education to market forces. 
• Indeed, the contact between higher education and industry was getting 
closer, which meant that different forms and content in higher education 
courses and greater flexibility were expected to meet the challenges from the 
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rapid rate of technological progress. Also, the role of the central 
government decreased. 
• During the 1990s, there was no longer a lack of graduates. This intensified 
the call for 'quality', which was related to the issues of 'autonomy', 
'effectiveness' and 'efficiency' of the higher education system. In parallel to 
these themes, the 'vocational' element of higher education was increasing. 
The Fachhochschulen were still more successful than the universities in 
meeting individual and labour market demand. 
• Finally, the unification with the German Democratic Republic (GDR) , 
during the early 1990s, had consequences for the unified higher education 
system, since it reinforced all the above choices. 'Differentiation' as well as 
the concept of the German Research University went on being promoted. 
Because of the previously mentioned organisational features, the 
Fachhochschulen had proved to be a successful competitor with the traditional 
universities since the increase in student numbers had actually been bigger than 
at universities, since the 1960s.69 Also for students, "to study at a Fachhochscule 
instead of enrolling at a university for those having the general Abitur degree 
seemed to be becoming increasingly attractive: in 198750% of the Fachhochscul 
freshmen held the Abitur degree, compared with 36% in 1981 .... "70 
However, whereas 30% of students studied at Fachhochschulen with their shorter 
programmes of study, 70% were at universities in long-term 'scientific' courses 
taking six to seven years for graduation and leading to a degree on a master's 
level. It was generally agreed that this relation (of 30 to 70) was about the 
opposite of what the employment system needed. Moreover, university studies 
with their strong teaching/research nexus were so much more expensive than 
studies at Fachhochschulen (where professors taught more than twice as many 
hours as university professors and most got paid less). The above situation was 
not seen as 'bad quality' in the system as a whole but as the wrong kind of 
quality at too high a price.71 
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Overall, the German higher education institutions went through a difficult 
period during the 1980s as a result of economic problems, which had occurred 
in the wake of the oil-crisis in the second half of the 1970s. The government 
was forced to cut public expenditure and education was a victim. As a result, 
the expansion of the higher education system slowed down.72 
During the 1980s, the stagnation of personnel and material resources took place 
alongside a continuous growth of enrollments as well as a substantial increase 
in the average duration of studies. These were the most obvious indicators that 
various problems of higher education were tending to intensify: higher 
education faced a decline of quality since the available time for research was 
reduced and conditions for study had worsened.73 
The policy of "opening up higher education" was successfut although it 
remained a controversial topic during the 1980s. Regarding the debates on 
quantitative developments, proposals (clearly rested on structural concepts) in 
the 1980s were introduced on how to avoid further substantial increases in the 
number of students without introducing additional restrictions to admissions.74 
In the 1980s, there were a number of modifications envisaged to the higher 
education system in West Germany. These modifications were more efficiency, 
competition and differentiation as well as the introduction of institutional 
autonomy to the system of higher learning. The success of the project was 
dependent on the degree of co-operation of all those involved (the universities 
and Fachhochschulen, the federal and Lander governments, academic and 
research organisations, and the public). However, to a large extent, this success 
was also dependent on the new conservative government's determination not 
to abuse the policy instruments in higher education to enforce its own 
tendencies about restrictive measures in social policy.75 
A competitive and differentiated system of higher education, Gellert argued, 
should show its efficiency not only in the quality of its research and teaching, 
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but also in its normative capacities for social justice and democracy. /I Although 
the results of the policies of higher education may include differences in quality 
and prestige, the policies themselves must not serve particularistic interests, 
either inside or outside the universities."76 
In the revised version of the Framework Act for Higher Education from 1985, 
the Gesamthochschulen were not conceived of any more as the model of the 
future. Rather, the Gesamthochschulen were conceived as a special type of 
university besides the two major types, the University (without such integrated 
components) and the Fachhochschule.77 In considering their original goals, the 
comprehensive universities were successful in reducing inequality of 
opportunity as well as in increasing the permeability of the system. The share 
of students from a blue-collar background finally getting a univerSity-level 
degree was higher than in other universities. What research also indicated was 
that students entering integrated courses with prerequisites other than the 
Abitur were almost as successful as those who had passed the Abitur exam 
were.7s 
However, the reasons that inhibited the Gesamthochschulen from being totally 
successful in achieving their goals were attributable more to factors inherent in 
the nature of the larger society than in the institutions themselves.79 Among the 
powerful factors which frustrated the attempt to bring about 
'comprehensivisation' was that the German higher education system as a whole 
exhibited a pattern of strong vertical differentiation with the universities 
occupying the topmost position in the prestige hierarchy, whereas other 
institutions such as polytechnics were perceived as subordinate. Another factor 
was that Germany, just as Great Britain, was faced with the challenge of 
responding to the demands of neo-conservative governments insisting on 
opening education to market forces. so As Pritchard has suggested, the 
application of a marketing ethos was in contrast to the critical functions of the 
Gesamthochschulen and their emphasis on the search for truth as their primary 
dUty.Sl 
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Moreover, the debate on the issue of 'hierarchisation' of universities focused on 
differences in quality and prestige rather than any genuine diversity of goals, 
that is, it would be more precise to name the goal of these proposals, 
'hierarchisation' rather than 'diversification'.82 In fact, the Federal Republic of 
Germany did not go very far towards the direction of a diversified system. In 
the end, it ended as a mix of comprehensive, elitist, diversified and stratified 
approaches, while the latest policies showed no sign of reaching a consistent 
model of any kind.83 
In addition, although the 1985 Framework Act for Higher Education had 
formulated common tasks for all institutions of higher education, at the same 
time, the Act acknowledged the right of the individual Lander to define 
different tasks for the institutional types. The Act also emphasised the different 
curricular patterns of universities and Fachhochschulen. 84 The 1985 Framework 
Act for Higher Education was revised, strengthening again the pOSition of the 
professors in the self-governing bodies of the higher education institutions, 
restructuring career paths for young academics, and legalising additional 
grounds for temporary contracts.85 
During this period, the government began to urge higher education to become 
more entrepreneurial and more competitive than in the past. The government 
was no longer acting as the major agency defining societal demands to which 
higher education should respond. It rather suggested that the higher education 
institutions should compete for students, take an interest in the employment 
successes of their graduates, in the reputation of their departments, and in 
gaining extra research funds.86 
The contact between higher education and industry was getting closer and 
there was concern on how to keep pace with the rapid rate of technological 
progress. Thus, alternatives to traditional forms of higher education courses as 
well as on innovative and more flexible programmes were considered. Also, 
emphasis was placed on maintaining and improving the quality of the core or 
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basic studies to have equilibrium between the principles of introduction to an 
academic discipline, and the preparation for a job.s7 
Since 1992, the quality debate in German higher education policy was gaining 
momentum. In state ministries and in higher education committees, the quality 
issue was associated with worries about the efficiency and effectiveness of the 
higher education system.ss Since there was no longer a lack of graduates except 
for a very few fields, increasingly, higher education should prove its quality 
and its value to the nation or to society at large.s9 
In July 1992, the Rectors' Conference decided on a 'Concept for the 
Development of Higher Education in Germany', focussing on the improvement 
of the quality of research and teaching. The improvement of the sagging 
student-teacher ratio should be a major responsibility of governments, as the 
main prerequisite of better quality of teaching. The Rectors also charted the 
course for a reform of the system of studies, devolved to the responsibilities of 
the institutions themselves. Deregulation, more institutional autonomy and a 
system of evaluating and monitoring quality and performance were 
particularly stressed.90 In general, during the early 1990s, in German higher 
education policy debates, the issues were clearly quality, performance, 
effectiveness and efficiency.91 
Within this context, there existed an implicit general trend towards a more 
vocationally or professionally oriented conception of advanced learning.92 
According to Gellert et aI, the continuing attractiveness of the Fachhochschulen 
was largely due to their public image of pursuing the right kind of aims and 
purposes in a rapidly changing environment. Thus, the attractiveness of the 
Fachhochschulen in contrast to the University was still gaining ground not only 
in terms of student demand but also with regard to the expectations of the 
labour market. For the 1990s, Gellert et al estimated that the vocationalisation 
of the German higher education system was likely to continue, insofar as the 
process of differentiation continued and ever larger shares of public resources 
went into practically oriented professional training.93 
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At the beginning of the 1990s, the developments described above were 
supplemented by a specific and unique internal process, with the integration of 
the former German Democratic Republic (GDR), including its higher education 
system, into the Federal Republic of Germany. Thus, one could see a dual 
development of seemingly antagonistic forces - of differentiation and 
integration - within the same system.94 
The unification of the two systems formally began in September 1990. Then, in 
the former GDR, the former rules and laws for higher education were replaced 
by a decree for higher education, which for a period of transition (until 31 June 
1991) served as a legal basis for the activities inside higher education. Higher 
education laws should have passed the parliaments of the 'new Lander by 
October 1993. By 1992, it was possible to be seen that the new laws would be 
more or less identical with the existing laws of the Federal Republic and its 
Lander, since all of them were based on the Federal Framework Law for Higher 
Education (HRG) of 1985.95 
Although the reunification of the two systems was a process which affected 
primarily the eastern part of the unified system, it also had consequences for 
the 'bigger part' of the system: 
The GDR had a genuinely centralised, homogeneous and rigidly administered 
system of higher education, which did not differentiate between university 
and non-university sectors. The institutions differed with respect to the 
number of programmes they offered, concerning goals and missions, and 
even in terms of their names, but they required identical entry qualifications 
and conferred the same kind of grades.96 
The Treaty on German Unity (Einheitsvertrag) contained procedures for the 
reorganisation and restructuring of East German society and the 'Science 
Council' (Wissenschaftsrat)97 was mandated to be in charge of reorganising and 
restructuring the higher education system of the former GDR. The Council had 
been commissioned for the provision of the necessary data and information for 
the decisions to be made in all of the 'new Lander'. The creation of democratic 
and efficient institutions of higher education and the care for the people 
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working in these institutions were identified as the most urgent problems.98 
The Science Council also stated that the West German Research system 
(including higher education) should take reunification as a chance to 
restructure and reorganise itself. It also stated that the building of a unified 
research system should be more than just unthinking transfer from West to 
East.99 
Thus, the federal organisation of higher education in the Federal Republic of 
Germany seemed to have a stabilising impact on the status quo with regard to 
(lack of) institutional autonomy as well as external evaluation of higher 
education. Rather than providing new influences, the political and economic 
breakdown in East Germany tended to strengthen existing structures in West 
Germany. The concept of the German Research UniverSity had succeeded in 
surviving.lOO 
As already argued, even before Unification, from policy statements and 
practical reform efforts taken together, there seemed to exist a prevailing 
consensus among politicians and the academic community to maintain and 
promote the German model of the Research University. In this model, teachers 
and researchers as well as basic research and the advancement of knowledge 
would take place under the same roof as teaching.lOl 
So, the importance of the equity aspect was diminished, during this period, 
because no longer was there a need for graduates. The efficiency project was 
dominant. The role of the Fachhochschulen, as an expression of a 'hierarchised' 
higher education system with emphasis on 'vocationalisation' was becoming 
very important. Both versions of 'efficiency' would be so met. The vocational 
aspect of the Fachhochschulen was relevant to the needs of the market. Thus, as 
in the case of France, so in Germany, the 'efficiency' project had changed in 
comparison to the previous period: there was a shift in concern from the needs 
of the economy to the market. Together with increasing 'vocationalisation', 
other accompanying and anticipated themes were those of regionalisation, 
'quality', institutional 'autonomy', 'effectiveness' and 'efficiency'. With 
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unification with the former GDR, the above issues were reinforced: 
differentiation and the German Research University were promoted. A number 
of debates, by several academics, addressed most of the above issues. 
4.3.1 Major Debates 
• There were several debates about the reforms of this period, focusing on the 
issue of 'differentiation': one of the two versions of the efficiency project. In 
particular, there were debates about the balance between research and 
teaching, the transition from elite to mass higher education and the 
changing role of higher education. Within this framework, the role of the 
Fachhochschul sector and its consequences for the university sector was 
considered to be important. It was argued that its role was to protect the 
traditional concepts of unity of teaching and research within the University. 
In this way, the integration of the East German institutions of higher 
education into the overall framework would also be more easily 
accommodated. 
Frackman argued that the concept of the German Research University and the 
so-called 'unity of research and teaching' might imply more than just having 
both activities under one roof. One might consider teaching rather as a 
scientific discourse that includes research results in teaching and involves 
students in research processes. One might also assume a prevailing scientific 
and research-oriented motivation on the part of the students. As a structural 
issue, the teaching function of the German Research UniverSity might have 
been undermined by problems such as student numbers, teaching overload, 
and 'tunneling policies'. Given the growing proportion of the age-group which 
was being prepared for work by higher education institutions a standard 
question would arise: "how would higher education and higher education 
policy meet the challenges of the transition from elite to mass higher 
education?". For the case of Germany, one should look at the conflict or 
tensions between perhaps changing expectations of higher education and the 
concept of the German Research University. Moreover, three aspects of the 
issue would have to be considered. These aspects would be first, the changing 
140 
role of higher education as preparation for employment, second, the shift in the 
motivation of students and their expectations of higher education, and finally, 
the role of the Fachhochschul sector and the consequences of this role for the 
university sector.102 
In the end, as Gellert et al argued, there was a major danger, which the process 
of differentiation and the more vocationally oriented curricular development 
was bringing about for the whole system of higher education in Germany. This 
was that to the extent that not only alternative sectors in higher education but 
also the universities were redefining their tasks and purposes towards 
narrowing professional needs the traditional concepts of unity of teaching and 
research would be jeopardised.103 
On the need for a functionally differentiated higher education system, Gellert et 
al argued that above all, this would mean that the functional separation of 
research-oriented training in universities and the more practical professional 
training (although based on scientific and theoretical knowledge) at 
Fachhochschulen was of vital importance. However, this distinction could only 
be kept alive, if the imminent tendencies of 'academic drift' at Fachhochschulen -
tendencies, which were natural in a system that was so heavily dominated by 
the research paradigm - were kept under control by organisational and 
administrative measures. Above all, those measures would include a positive 
conceptualisation of the teaching function at Fachhochschulen, which would 
enable them to enter a productive competition with the universities. Moreover, 
in a perspective of two clearly separated, functionally viable segments of higher 
education, the integration of the East German institutions of higher education 
into the overall framework could be more easily accommodated. In the end, 
only if a convincing functional alternative to the university sector could be 
offered to other forms of higher education, would institutions like the new 
Fachhochschulen in the Eastern Lander be able to develop a sound and stable 
profile as well as a self-identity.104 
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In short, more efforts had been made on the part of higher education 
institutions to raise research funds from external sources and to play an active 
role in the transfer of knowledge to economy and society. However, these 
efforts had reinforced concern about the role of basic research, the critical 
function of the University as well as the vitality of those disciplines, which were 
not in any position to "sell" their knowledge to society. Institutional patterns of 
the higher education system continued to be under discussion. Many debates 
focussed on the role of the Fachhochschulen (although they were assumed to 
have become a permanent component of the higher education system). 
However, the position of the Fachhochschulen vis-a.-vis the universities remained 
controversial. Some of their representatives expected better status for the 
Fachhochschulen in the near future because of increased permeability between 
the Fachhochschulen and universities, while others suggested the establishment 
of advanced professional programmes in order to underscore career prospects 
within a clearly defined framework.105 
EVidently, during the second period, the Fachhochschulen went on being 
promoted, within the framework of a higher education system urged to be 
more 'vocational' to respond to the needs of the 'market'. During the 1960s-
1970s, the first version of the tension over efficiency was response of the higher 
education system to the needs of a loosely planned economy. In contrast, 
during the 1980s-1990s, the issue of efficiency meant reduction of the role of the 
state and introduction of the 'market', as the main framework shaping the 
future of the higher education system. The concern of the state shifted from 
'the economy' to 'the market'. In addition, in the German context of a 
'hierarchisised' higher education system, the Fachhochschulen were contributing 
to efficiency and effectiveness, as well as quality, thus protecting the notion of 
the German Research University. Furthermore, the theme of 'equity' was 
hardly discussed because there was no longer a lack of graduates. The choices 
pursued during this period were reinforced by the unification of the former 
GDR. Finally, most of the debates stressed the importance of the 
Fachhochschulen in contributing to the' efficiency' project. 
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4.4 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
To sum up, in the Federal Republic of Germany, during the 1960s-1970s, there 
was strong governmental influence over higher education. The higher 
education system was expanded to respond to both individual and labour 
market demands. The creation of the Fachhochschulen in the early 1970s, was an 
expression of the reconstruction of the higher education system to meet these 
two priorities. Also, the Fachhochschulen - as an upgrading of the earlier 
institutions - were expected to relieve the universities from the burden of large 
numbers of students and to alleviate 'inequalities of educational opportunity'. 
So, 'equity' purposes were served by the expansion of the higher education 
system, an increase in social mobility, and in the location of the Fachhochschulen 
within higher education. 'Efficiency' was the provision of the right kind of 
higher education to respond to 'the economy' through practical orientation. 
The other version of 'efficiency' was the relief of the overcrowded universities: 
the unity of the higher education system expressed by the Fachhochschulen's 
belonging to higher education was contributing towards this goal. 
In the same time period, the creation of the Gesamthochschulen was a bold 
attempt for 'integration' and the 1976 reform recognised them as the future 
model for higher education. The 1976 reform - partly an outcome of the 
student protests in the late 1960s - placed emphasis on the unity and the 
practical/professional competence of the higher education system. Although 
the Gesamthochschulen served 'equity' purposes better, these institutions failed. 
This failure was partly due to conflicting goals and partly due to the nature of 
the German higher education system, which emphasised specialisation despite 
its research orientation. The differentiation between the Fachochschulen and the 
universities was promoted, accompanied by debates on what should be the 
relationship between the Fachochschulen and the universities. From the late 
1970s onwards, the Fachhochschulen were established as a stable part of the 
higher education system. At the end of the 1970s, a numerus clausus was 
introduced in several fields and governmental control had started decreasing. 
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Overall, for 'efficiency' purposes, the differentiation between the university and 
the non-university sector was promoted. The Fachhochschulen differed from the 
universities in terms of organisational and functional characteristics, within the 
framework of the 'unity' of higher education - mainly seen in the issue of 
'autonomy' for all institutions of higher education. The practical and 
professional competence of the Fachhochschulen was particularly emphasised, 
seen in their mission, their admission policies, their fields of study, their 
teaching staff, their curricula, and their governance. They particularly stressed 
the shorter duration of studies, the more structured teaching approach, their 
being more practice and job relevant and their response to regional demand. 
They had more links with industries, while the employment system clearly 
needed more and more Fachhochschulen graduates. Thus, the Fachhochschulen 
appeared to be in a better position than the universities to demonstrate their 
relevance to individual and labour market demand. 
The success of the Fachhochschulen was mainly due to their practical orientation. 
The latter had been particularly emphasised in the debate about 'the 
educational catastrophe'. Also, during the late 1960s, the students' protests 
were about greater social relevance in course programmes. The importance of 
the German Research University was very strong and thus unable to respond to 
the Bildungskatastrophe. This role was devolved to the more practically oriented 
Fachhochschulen. 
During the 1980s, the problem of avoiding further substantial increases in the 
number of students without introducing additional restrictions to admissions 
was raised. Thus, the issue of 'equity' was becoming less strong. The 
Fachhochschulen were successful in terms of both social and labour market 
demand. They were considered to be efficient and effective, thus contributing 
to 'quality'. The 1985 Framework Act for Higher Education formulated 
common tasks for all institutions of higher education, but abandoned the idea 
of the Gesamthochschulen - however successful they had been in reducing 
inequality of opportunity - being the future model of higher education. The 
failure of the Gesamthochschulen was in the context of the neo-conservative 
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governments' plan for opening higher education to market forces and in the 
strong vertical differentiation of the German higher education system. 
During the whole of the 1980s-1990s period, the major issues raised were more 
efficiency, competition and differentiation as well as the introduction of 
institutional autonomy in higher education. Another issue raised was' quality', 
related to the fact that no longer was there a lack of graduates. The 
government was urging higher education to become more entrepreneurial and 
more competitive than in the past, while the contact between higher education 
and industry was getting closer. Thus, there was an explicit trend towards 
more 'vocationalisation' in higher education: the Fachhochschulen were 
expressing this trend. In fact, the Fachhochschulen were part of the 
'vocationalisation' of higher education as a response to the market. 
The theme of efficiency was quite prominent, during the second period. 
However, compared to the previous period (the 1960s-1970s), the tension over 
'efficiency' had changed in a major way. From the emphasis placed on the 
quantitative and structural planning and the concern on the needs of a loosely 
planned 'economy' (as was the case during the 1960s-1970s), during the 1980s-
1990s, the 'market' was replacing the state in shaping higher education. 
Also, during the 1980s-1990s, the Fachhochschulen proved to be a successful 
innovation and a successful competitor with the universities, with respect to 
both individual and employment demand. The differentiation between the 
Fachhochschulen and the universities went on being promoted. All the issues 
raised during this period, as well as the promotion of the Research University, 
were present also with the integration of the former German Democratic 
Republic, including its higher education system, into the Federal Republic of 
Germany. That the 'differentiation' between the Fachhochschul sector and the 
universities was promoted rested on the idea that the Fachhochschulen could 
protect the traditional concepts of unity of teaching and research within the 
University. 
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In Germany, the Humboltdean principle of the Research University was very 
important. The Humboltdean University determined its relationship to the 
state and to society freely and independently and took the search for truth as its 
main duty. Thus, it was not responding to the demands of the economy. This 
role was successfully played by the Fachhochschulen, and this explains the 
popularity of these institutions in terms of employment, and consequently 
individual, demand. Furthermore, the shorter duration of studies and the more 
structured curricula of the Fachhochschulen were major advantages in view of 
the long periods of study and loose curricula of the universities. 
The Fachhochschulen were successful also because they were regional, a point 
particularly important in view of the Federal government's restricted power as 
compared to the powers of the central governments in Greece and France. The 
fact that the Fachhochschulen were regional also explains their success during the 
second period, with the introduction of the market (especially regional) as the 
main framework to which higher education should respond. 
However, during the 1980s-1990s, the Fachhochschulen were promoted not only 
because they were responding to the needs of the market better than the 
universities, but also because they were seen as protecting, in this way, the 
German notion of the Research University with its free and undistracted search 
for truth. Thus, the cultural importance of the University in Germany was 
massive. The unification with the former German Democratic Republic 
reinforced the emphasis placed on the protection of the Research University. 
This was one more affirmation of the cultural importance of the University in 
Germany, since in the former German Democratic Republic, the tradition of the 
higher education system was that higher education should be geared towards 
the needs of a tightly planned economy. 
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THE SIMILARITIES AND THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN GREECE AND, 
FRANCE AND GERMANY 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter will offer an initial interpretation of the major similarities and 
differences between the Greek, French and German higher education reforms. 
The identification of the similarities and differences stretches across time - the 
Greek reforms took place ten or more years after these of France and Germany. 
In the analysis in this chapter, this difference is simply noted. Its fuller 
significance will be reviewed in Part II. 
At first, this chapter will set out to show the similarities. 
5.2 THE SIMILARITIES 
What is striking is that in an initial 'reading' of the 1980s-1990s Greek reforms, 
these appear to be like the French and German reforms of the 1960s-1970s. In 
all these three countries, the creation of the non-university sector was part of 
the reconstruction of higher education as a response to tensions between 
'equity' and' efficiency'. 
Thus, the first major similarity in the reforms of the non-university sector 
concerned 'equity'. 'Equity' was seen in terms of the expansion of the higher 
education system to respond to strong social demand for higher education and 
social mobility, and the provision of new technological institutions in higher 
education. The social demand approach to educational planning was dominant 
(although Germany later on adopted quantitative and structural planning). 
In Greece, in particular, the equality of educational opportunity argument was 
intensely used and there was a Significant increase in the number of places for 
technolOgical higher education. In addition, in the rest of the higher education 
system, a broader range of programmes was offered compared with the 
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previous period. The upgrading of higher technical education - with the 
introduction of the TEl - was accompanied by statements about the social 
prestige of technical/vocational education and the contribution of the TEl to 
'equality of thought and action'. The 'equity' policies of this period were within 
the framework of the judgement by the government that education should be a 
basic area of activity in the constitution of a state concerned with the well being 
of its citizens. 
The second major similarity concerned 'efficiency'. One version of 'efficiency' 
meant providing the right kind of higher education: the non-university sector 
was expected to respond to the needs of the economy. Thus, emphasis was 
placed on the vocational orientation of the non-university sector and its 
response to local, regional and industrial demands. The practical orientation of 
the institutions of the non-university sector could be seen in their mission 
statements, their teaching approaches, the qualifications of the staff, the 
specialisms on offer, and the requirements for admission. The Greek 
government, in particular, pointed out that employment options should be 
based on the distinction between the theoretically minded university graduates 
and their more practically oriented TEl counterparts. 
The other version of 'efficiency' meant that this new type of higher education 
would relieve the overcrowded universities by absorbing powerful social 
demands for higher education. The non-university sector was expected to be 
more successful than the earlier technical/vocational institutions. The major 
advantage of this new type of higher education - compared to the earlier 
institutions - would be that it would belong to higher education. In France and 
Germany, in particular, other expected advantages of this sector of higher 
education were the shorter duration of studies and a more structured approach 
to teaching. Overall, in all three countries, the unity of the higher education 
system was promoted and was mainly realised in the context of 'autonomy' and 
self-government for all institutions of higher education. Nevertheless, there 
were struggles in all three systems over the differentiation between the non-
university sector of higher education and the universities. 
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5.3 THE DIFFERENCES 
The reforms in Greece during the 1960s-1970s highlighted the importance 
attached to vocational education and the earlier institutions, the KATEE, were 
introduced as a form of post-secondary technical education, not within higher 
education. 
The KATEE were introduced during the dictatorship under the influence of 
international organisations - which stressed the 'efficiency' project. During the 
1960s-1970s, for the case of Greece, this project meant 'modernisation' and 
'economic development'. Within this cultural framing, the education system 
itself was to be modernised and a special emphasis was placed on higher 
technical education within a human capital approach. 
In most of the general Greek educational reforms of this period, the goal of 
equity was also central. This was identified in the expansion of the education 
system and in the increase of education expenditure during the 1960s. Thus, 
the efforts for equality of educational opportunity concentrated on the input 
aspects of educational provision. In the 1970s reforms, the democratisation of 
education was also expected to contribute to the democratisation of Greek 
society, after the experience of a seven-year dictatorship. However, the issue of 
equity did not penetrate all aspects of the education system. For example, there 
was a restriction on the number of students entering the higher education 
system. This situation was reversed during the 1980s-1990s. 
The issues of 'modernisation' and economic development - and the tensions 
over equity - that preoccupied the Greek reforms during the 1960s-1970s went 
on dominating the higher education reform agenda during the 1980s-1990s. 
The dominance of the issues of modernisation and economic development, in 
the Greek reforms of the 1980s, constitutes a major difference with the reforms 
in France and Germany of the 1960s-1970s. These issues were part of the 
tension over efficiency in the case of Greece. In the early 1980s, the introduction 
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of the TEl within higher education was within the context of ideas about the 
modernisation of the higher education system to respond to the economic 
development of the country. 
The government of this period also aimed at the modernisation of the education 
system as part of more general social transformations which would also 
contribute to modernisation and economic development. Such aspirations were 
reinforced by the high esteem education had in Greek society. 
Within the logic of modernisation, 'international experience' was particularly 
stressed and Greece adopted one of the models for higher education suggested 
by UNESCO. 
Apart from the issues of modernisation and economic development in the 
Greek reforms of the early 1980s, emphasis was also placed on one more major 
aim. The TEl were to contribute to the 'self-reliant' and overall development of 
the country, through the creation of an indigenous science and technology 
infrastructure. The new institutions were also expected to co-ordinate their 
objectives with those of the AEl for the creation of 'self-reliant' development. 
The co-ordination was through the special emphasis on the practical and 
applied orientation of the TEl towards productive applications and applied 
research. 
Another difference is that, during the 1960s-1970s, in both France and Germany, 
there were attempts at integration of institutions within higher education. The 
lUT were to be within the UER as part of the University, while in Germany the 
creation of the Gesamthochschulen was a bold attempt at integration. The 
Gesamthochschulen were also expected to serve equity purposes better than the 
Fachochschulen. However, the Gesamthochschulen failed to become a generalised 
model of higher education. In Greece, during the 1980s-1990s, no attempts at 
integration took place. In all these three countries, a sharp distinction between 
the university and the non-university sector prevailed. 
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Another difference arises from the fact that the success of the Fachochschulen 
and the IUT, at least in terms of labour demand, by the end of the 1960s-1970s 
period was not matched by the Greek TEl in the 1980s. In Greece, the economy 
was not really in need of TEl graduates and thus, the theme of equity prevailed. 
In contrast, in both France and Germany, the issues of 'equity' and 'efficiency' 
were interdependent. The economy needed more and more vocationally 
qualified graduates while, at the same time, there was strong social demand for 
higher education, which could not be met by the traditional universities. 
Towards the end of the 1970s, the Fachochschulen had strong links with industry, 
and the employment system needed more and more Fachhochschulen graduates. 
The Fachochschulen were also more competent than the universities in terms of 
both individual and labour market demand. However, in France, by the mid-
1970s, the IUT had failed to attract the number of students they wanted. At the 
same time, towards the end of this period, universities were criticised for 
turning out more and more unemployed graduates. Yet, surprisingly, during 
the 1980s-1990s, the IUT became more successful. This was due to the 
acceptance of the principle that the 'market' should be the main framework for 
shaping the profile of the higher education system: the IUT were actually a way 
of 'vocationalising' higher education to respond to the needs of the market. 
The last difference links with the broader comparative proposition that the 
issue of efficiency that dominated the higher education policies in the 1980s-
1990s in France and Germany was not raised in the Greek policies and debates 
in a major way. 
Thus, in the 1980s-1990s reforms in France and Germany tensions over equity 
and efficiency were still important, though in Germany there was no longer a 
lack of graduates. In both these western European countries, the non-
university sector was responding successfully to the efficiency project. 
Compared to the previous period (the 1960s-1970s), the efficiency project 
changed: the shift to the concept of the market was a move away from a loosely 
planned economy and away from the centrality of the role of the state in 
shaping higher education. 
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Thus, in France and Germany, the non-university sector was promoted to 
respond to the market. Since it was estimated that the non-university sector of 
higher education was responding better than the universities to the market, the 
functional differentiation of the higher education system - that is, the 
distinction between the university and the non-university sector - was 
promoted. Other accompanying themes were quality (in the case of Germany) 
or excellence (in the case of France), institutional autonomy, regionalisation and 
links with industries, and an increase of the student numbers (in the case of 
France). The non-university sector was to relieve universities from large 
numbers of students - as in the previous period - thus contributing to the other 
version of the efficiency project. 
In France, 'vocationalisation' was especially prominent during the early 1990s, 
when more and more qualified engineers and business studies graduates were 
needed. In Germany, the Fachhochschulen proved to be a successful innovation 
and a successful competitor with the universities in terms of both individual 
and employment demand. The failure of the Gesamthochschulen was due to the 
neo-conservative governments' plan for opening higher education to market 
forces and to the strong vertical differentiation of the German higher education 
system. The 'hierarchisation' of the higher education system, which the 
Fachhochschulen were expressing, as well as the promotion of the German 
Research University (with its emphasis on the unity of research and teaching) 
were present also during the integration of the former German Democratic 
Republic (including its higher education system) into the Federal Republic of 
Germany, in the early 1990s. The promotion of the 'differentiation' between the 
Fachhochschul sector and the universities rested on the idea that the 
Fachhochschulen could protect the traditional concepts of unity of teaching and 
research within the University: an addition to the second version of efficiency in 
the case of Germany. 
The themes of vocationalisation and market responsiveness, in France and 
Germany of the 1980s-1990s, were not identified in the Greek context. In the 
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universities, a number of laws succeeded each other with minor modifications 
until the early 1990s, but the initial law (1268/82) dominated. This law had 
introduced a number of innovations such as the abolition of the Chair system. 
The law on the TEl (1404/83) remained virtually unchanged. The initial 1980s 
reforms were not followed by further substantial changes during the rest of the 
1980s-1990s period. What dominated those changes, which did occur, was the 
theme of power and control. In addition, there was no quality assessment 
procedure at the national level for the higher education system, as was the case 
in the other two European countries. Furthermore, the issue of 'modernisation' 
re-entered the scene with the prospect of Greece's joining the European Union 
on equal terms. Towards the end of the 1990s, the Greek policies went on 
promoting the non-university sector of the higher education system, as France 
and Germany. However, this Greek policy choice was in the context of 
increasing unemployment, particularly for TEl graduates. Such a policy mostly 
aimed at the expansion of the higher education system to meet social demand 
and to avoid further increases in the number of Greek students studying 
abroad. 
Finally, in comparing the Greek to the French and German debates, there is 
only one similarity. In all the countries, the academics were stressing the social 
mobility the non-university sector was offering. 
However, a number of differences can be noticed. The Greek debates were 
more critical about the issue of equity, emphasising its weakness in delivery 
and emphasising that it was blurring the issue of 'class'. Furthermore, the 
Greek debates were more politically concerned and pointed to the wider social 
formation in which the reforms were taking place. Starting from the 1960s-
1970s, the debates criticised the international influences in a context of 
dependence, the efforts for modernisation without industrial development, and 
that the predecessors to the TEl were established during the dictatorship. 
During the 1980s-1990s, the academics were arguing that the failure of the 
reforms of this period was due to the nature of the Greek State, and that the 
modernisation efforts were taking place in the context of a dormant labour 
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market. However, most of the debates concerned the education system, in 
generat without specific reference to issues of higher education and the non-
university sector in particular. Nevertheless the point was made that the major 
issues that were dominant in discussions of higher education in other European 
countries were missing in Greek debates. 
In contrast, the academic debates in France and Germany were about higher 
education including the internal aspects of higher education. Specifically, in the 
1960s-1970s, the debates were about the differentiation between the university 
and the non-university sector. In the 1980s-1990s, the differentiation between 
the university and the non-university sector went on dominating the academic 
debates, along with further issues, such as quality; and expansion in the case of 
France, and in the case of Germany protection of the Research University. 
5.4 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
Overall then, this chapter has identified a pattern in the similarities and 
differences. In all three countries the creation of the non-university sector was a 
response to 'equity' and the two versions of 'efficiency'. The particular details 
which emerged in the full analysis in Chapters Two, Three and Four, modify 
the initial suggestion in the Introduction to the thesis that there were startling 
similarities between the countries. 
However, this was partly the point of doing the full analysis with clear 
conceptual apparatuses (the aims and purposes of the state, the politics, etc.) 
within which the description was located within two different time periods. 
The full analysis has modified the simplicity of the opening proposition in 
Chapter One that the pattern of reforms were dramatically alike. 
The major similarities were 'equity' and 'efficiency'. 'Equity' was about the 
expansion of the higher education system to respond to strong social demand 
for higher education, social mobility, and the provision of new technological 
institutions within higher education. The notion of 'efficiency' had a two-fold 
meaning. The first meaning of 'efficiency' was that the non-university sector of 
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higher education would be the right type of higher education to respond 
successfully to the needs of the economy. Within this logic, emphasis was 
placed on the vocational orientation of this new type of higher education 
institutions. The other version of 'efficiency' was that this new type of higher 
education would relieve the overcrowded universities by absorbing powerful 
social demands. The unity of the higher education system was emphasised. 
Indeed, it is also important - in terms of the work of Part II of the thesis - to 
stress identifiable differences which can be summed up from the work of the 
last 150 or so pages. 
The Greek reforms are different in the follOWing ways. First, there was a 
particular emphasis placed on economic development and modernisation. 
Second, there was a special emphasis placed on 'international experience'. 
Third, emphasis was also placed on self-reliant development, through the 
creation of an indigenous science and technology infrastructure. Fourth, in 
Greece, there were no attempts at institutional integration in higher education. 
Fifth, the success of the Fachochschulen and the IUT was not matched by the 
Greek TEl. Finally, the emphasis on the vocationalisation of higher education 
policies as a response to the market, that was evident in the 1980s-1990s French 
and German reforms, was not visible in the Greek policies and debates. 
Why do these patterns of similarities exist - and what explains the difference of 
the Greek case? In other words at this point in the thesis the "problem" which 
is being investigated changes shape. 
The first Part of this thesis (Chapters Two, Three, and Four) has been a form of 
pedagogic description - if not following then at least empathetic to or 
understandable within a Beredayian methodology. 
The "results" of this analysis are the 'similarities' and the 'differences' listed 
above. These "results" are in classical comparative form, as if the task of 
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comparative education is to list similarities and differences between the 
educational systems of different countries. 
And yet the initial unease identified in Chapter One remains: are the 
'similarities' in the patters of reform in the three countries deeply rooted in 
similar contexts? The initial and obvious answer is 'no'. The similarities seem 
unlikely to be deeply rooted. These three countries differ markedly in their 
historical heritage and in their culturat political, social and economic contexts. 
The Greek State only began to take shape a few years after the Greek revolution 
(1821-1929). In modern times, what makes Greece markedly different from 
France and Germany is its socio-economic context: the position of Greece in the 
modern world-system. 
Within this context, the "similarities" and the "differences" between the higher 
education patterns in Greece and the other two European countries, as these 
have been identified in this chapter, will be the starting point of a different 
interpretation in Part II. This new interpretation will go beyond the theme of 
pedagogical description and will take account of the socio-economic context of 
Greece: what the previous analysis neglected. 
Thus, the current Chapter is not simply the end of Part I. From now on, the 
propositions of Chapter Five become the central problematique of the thesis. 
Within Part II, the similarities and the differences will be re-interpreted on the 
basis of a theoretical perspective: 'world systems analysis'. 'World systems 
analysis' has introduced the concept of the 'semi-periphery'. Thus, within Part 
II, the thesis will elaborate a theory of the 'semi-periphery', will view Greece as 
a semi-peripheral society within Southern Europe, and will offer a 
reinterpretation of the non-university sector of higher education in Greece. 
However, the analysis will not be based only on 'world systems' theory. The 
definition of Greece as a European 'semi-periphery' is not simple. It will be 
theoretically explored and thus, within Chapter Six, two theoretical 
perspectives on the concept of the 'semi-periphery' will be elaborated. The first 
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perspective places emphasis on the economic and international dimension. The 
second perspective emphasises the political element. 
In the end, a synthesis of both of them will be suggested: a number of abstract 
propositions for the definition of Greece as a European 'semi-periphery'. The 
suggested synthesis will be applied in Chapter Seven, where Greece will be 
fully presented as a 'European' semi-periphery and mainly as part of the 
southern European semi-peripheral zone. Chapter Eight will offer a re-





ON A THEORY OF THE SEMI-PERIPHERY 
6.1 INTRODUCTION: PURPOSE AND ARGUMENT 
This chapter will explore two theoretical perspectives on the semi-periphery. 
The first perspective is that of Immanuel Wallerstein's world systems analysisl , 
which is primarily economic. (See Appendix Two for more detail on the 
historical context, the theoretical heritage and the methodology of world 
systems analysiS.) The other theoretical perspective is that of Nicos Mouzelis, 
who emphasises the 'political'. 
This chapter will show that both approaches are useful in studying semi-
peripheral societies. Wallerstein's approach points to economic and 
international relations and its neo-Marxist origin permits the study of macro-
historical transformations. However, world systems analYSis neglects, or does 
not sufficiently explain, the special nature of the State in semi-peripheral 
societies. This neglected theme, in the world systems perspective, is treated by 
Mouzelis. He interprets the State as an important actor within semi-peripheral 
societies, within the framework of historical sociology. 
Thus, in the end, the thesis will attempt a synthesis of these two theoretical 
perspectives. This synthesis will be utilised and extended in Chapter Seven of 
the thesis, in its application to a definition of Greece as a European semi-
periphery. 
6.2 THE THEORETICAL UNIVERSE OF WALLERSTEIN'S ŸPÕŎÒMĚ
SYSTEMS ANALYSIS' 
This section will present Wallerstein's definition of capitalism, and his views on 
the dominance of the most advanced capitalist economies in the world-system. 
His theorisation of capitalism - related to the issues of cyclical rhythms and 
secular trends - led to the concept of the semi-periphery. Wallerstein used the 
term "unequal exchange", the idea that 'core-type' activities and 'peripheral-
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type' activities are unequally distributed across the world system, as one of the 
basic features of the semi-periphery. The other feature of the semi-periphery is 
"the role of the state in the process of peripheralisation": the capacity of the 
state to develop external links with core capital. At the end of the section, the 
concept of 'semi-periphery' will be defined according to the perspective of 
world systems analysis. 
6.2.1 On the Definition of Capitalism 
According to world systems analysis, the defining feature of capitalism is the 
nature of competition within it. The most advanced capitalist economies are 
dominant in the world-system. Within this context, development / 
underdevelopment are viewed in the context of the movements of capital, 
determined by the rate of profit, the cyclical rhythms and the secular trends of 
the world capitalist system. 
Wallerstein defines capitalism as: "a system based on competition between free 
producers using free labour with free commodities, 'free' meaning its 
availability for sale and purchase on a market."2 Constraints on such freedoms 
mean that a zone or an enterprise is 'less capitalist'.3 Wallerstein suggests that 
this 'combination' or mixture of the so-called free and the non-free is itself the 
defining feature of capitalism as a historical system.4 In Wallerstein's view, the 
modern world system is marked by the dominance of the world market by the 
most advanced capitalist economies. Therefore, 
systematic explanations of development and underdevelopment (as well as 
attempts to break out of the latter and overcome dependency along socialist 
lines) must be viewed in the context of the movements, and consequences 
thereof, of capital, determined by the rate of profit, the cyclic fluctuations and 
secular tendencies of world capitalism, and the competition among core states 
for control of the world political economy. While these factors are central to 
the development of countries and regions in the world economy, they are, in 
tum, shaped by the contradictory forces endemic to capitalism - principally 
the struggle of classes within states and on a global scale.5 
Wallerstein continues: 
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The cyclical rhythms are the things that more or less seem to repeat 
themselves over time. The secular trends are those processes which are in 
some sense linear .... They go on side by side simultaneously, which is very 
important. ... There has also been a long history of observation that there are 
/I expansions" and /I contractions" in the world economy in one form or 
another.6 
The "cyclical rhythms" and the "secular trends" are linked to a basic 
contradiction of the system, world-system supply and world-system demand. 
The pattern of the cyclical rhythm is related to world effective demand and, at 
any given point, it is at a certain level. The secular trends of the world-system 
are expansion (meaning that more and more producers are producing more and 
more, finally exceeding world effective demand), proletarianisation, 
commodification, mechanisation, and political organisation. Systemic secular 
trends are defined in terms of percentages and that is why they cannot go on 
forever? Finally, to the question of what are the dynamics of the contradictions 
of the system Wallerstein answers: 
The dynamics are that the cyclical rhythms, which are the consequence of the 
structure of capitalism as a system - (Le., anarchic production and socially 
determined demand), as mechanisms to resolve the regular mini-crises that 
this creates, force secular transformations of the system, which are the secular 
trends that are asymptotic and which, when they reach a certain level, make 
the system unfunctional, because it would be impossible at that point to have 
the further continuing of accumulation of capital. You could only cut into the 
effective distribution of the surplus, which would push logically into an 
egalitarian route.8 
The above theorisation on capitalism - with the accompanying and interrelated 
issues of the cyclical rhythms and secular trends - is associated, in Wallerstein's 
view, with the issue of productivity and unequal exchange. Together with the 
role of the state in the process of peripheralisation, productivity and unequal 
exchange constitute the main features of the concept of the semi-periphery. 
6.2.2 Productivity and Unequal Exchange 
World systems analysis uses the term unequal exchange to explain that 'core-
type' and 'peripheral-type' activities are unequally distributed across the 
world-system. Usually, a mixture of core and peripheral activities defines the 
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position of a state in the interstate system: if the vast majority of activities are 
'core' activities, then one may speak of a 'core' state. 
In using the concept of unequal exchange, Wallerstein begins by suggesting that 
if one starts with core and periphery, there should be some kind of related set of 
production processes, which are unequal, that is, between their products there 
is unequal exchange. Moreover, trade within a capitalist world-system is 
inherently unequal, and unequal exchange refers to something over and above 
the fact that there is a transfer of surplus value from a direct producer to 
another person who, by one legal means or another, obtains that surplus.9 
Therefore, Wallerstein, by borrowing Emmanuel's theorisation, explains: 
if there are two pairs of producers and receivers of surplus-value, Emmanuel 
is arguing that the receiver of one pair acquires part of the surplus-value of the 
other pair. This is, of course, not given at the expense of the producer of the 
second pair, because he has already given up his surplus-value, but rather is 
given up at the expense of that receiver. This relationship is what we are 
talking about when we refer to core-periphery ... unequal exchange is over 
and above the simple transfer of surplus-value from the direct producer to the 
person who immediately receives it.1° 
Trade within states (as well as trade between rural and urban areas) is also a 
trade of unequal exchange. The core-periphery relationship actually indicates 
the degree to which surplus-value is unevenly distributed in the direction of the 
core. Moreover, the 1/ degree to which the economic relationship is core-
peripheralised is the degree to which there is an increasingly unequal 
distribution of the surplus value between two different bourgeoisies."ll 
Wallerstein12 indicates that there is a pattern in how unequal exchange relates 
to states, in which core-type activities and peripheral-type activities are 
unequally geographically distributed across the world-system and within 
segments of the world system. There are concentrations of core-like activities 
within particular areas. Since state lines are drawn arbitrarily and are 
constantly redrawn, calculations can be made of the sum of the nature of 
activities within the state boundaries. What will be discovered, if this is done, is 
that areas normally referred to as peripheral areas are areas where the vast 
majority of activity would in fact come into the category of peripheral activity. 
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However, areas having many core activities do not necessarily have core 
activities as the majority of activities. Core states tend to have peripheral 
activities as well.13 
The idea that there is a mixture of I core' and 'peripheral' activities within states 
leads to the definition of the concept of the semi-periphery. 
6.2.3 The Concept of the Semi-Periphery 
The semi-periphery, according to world systems analysis, is a state with a 
roughly even balance of core-type and peripheral-type activities. A semi-
peripheral state also contributes to the stability of the world capitalist system. 
According to Wallerstein, the semi-periphery is not an economic activity since 
an economic activity is a dyadic relationship of unequal exchange between a 
pair of objects that are exchanged in the division of labour.14 Instead, 
Semiperipheral seems to be almost by definition an adjective you apply to 
states as opposed to core and periphery. A semiperipheral state appears to be 
a state which has a roughly even balance of core-like and peripheral-like 
activity. This has, of course, important political consequences. The model of a 
semiperipheral state is the one that exports the peripheral products to core 
countries and core products to peripheral areas of the world-system and does 
both in roughly equivalent degrees.15 
Wallerstein finds the world too complicated to be classified as a bimodal 
system, with cores and peripheries only. Instead, the world is trimodal, with 
cores, semiperipheries and peripheries. There are two reasons that the present 
capitalist system needs a semiperipheral sector. First, a polarised world-system 
can lead to acute disintegration. Second, individual capitalists must be able to 
transfer capital from a declining leading sector to a rising sector in order to 
survive the effects of cyclical shifts in the loci of the leading sectors.16 
In other words, the exploitative processes that operate through the world-
economy always operate in a three-tiered format and the reason is that in any 
situation of inequality, three tiers are more stable than two tiers of 
confrontation. "Those at the top will always manoeuvre for the 'creation' of a 
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three-tier structure whereas those at the bottom will emphasise the two tiers of 
'them and US'."17 
Finally, a semi-peripheral state in the world-system has - according to time and 
place - a different structural content as well as a different social meaning: 
Under certain circumstances it is the expression of "anti-systemic" thrusts. 
But in others it serves primarily to recuperate such thrusts and further to 
stabilize the system. In itself, it is neither good nor bad; it is. But if we want 
to analyze the meaning of political responses to socio-economic realities, we 
cannot afford to dispense with the concept of the semiperipheral state, since it 
is a critical device in the functioning of the capitalist world economy.18 
As already argued, apart from the core - periphery unequal exchange, the other 
distinctive feature of the semi-periphery is the role of the state in the process of 
peripheralisation. The state has a direct and immediate interest in controlling 
the domestic market.19 
6.2.4 The State and its Role in the Process of Peripheralisation 
Wallerstein suggests that peripheralisation, as a process, refers to two things: 
extensive and intensive: 
Intensive refers to the degree to which, once you have a dyadic relationship 
between a core process and peripheral process, it might tilt in a more unequal 
direction. We would call that a deepening of peripheralisation, and surely 
that happens all the time. But extensive refers to the inclusion of a unit, or an 
area which was not previously involved at all, into the functioning world-
economy.20 
Thus, part of the process of peripheralisation is the process of expansion. For 
example, the peripheralisation of India was a transition from being an external 
arena to being a peripheral area within the world capitalist system.21 
According to Wallerstein, a theoretical problem thus arises, which is the way 
lithe process of peripheralisation in relationship to states" is formulated, taking 
into consideration that the states have momentarily and temporarily differential 
amounts of core - peripheral activities located within them. Therefore, they 
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have different kinds of politics (and thus, they might be defined as core, semi-
peripheral, and peripheral states).22 
Arrighi and Drangel (who also belong to the world systems analysis school) 
argue that the competitive struggle among capitalist enterprises has been 
closely interrelated with the formation of states (formally sovereign territorial 
jurisdictions). Within world systems theory, a multiplicity of such states had 
been integral to the formation of the world economy, and almost all commodity 
chains of any importance had traversed their boundaries.23 Moreover, 
As each state has formal jurisdiction over the movement of commodities, 
assets, labor-power, and entrepreneurial energies across and within its 
frontiers, each state can affect to some degree the modalities by which the 
social division of labour operates. By restricting or enhancing the freedom of 
undertaking or entering specific economic activities, states can upgrade some 
activities to core status and downgrade others to peripheral status - they then 
can, that is, affect the very core-peripheral structure of the world-economy .... 
in a capitalist world-economy divided into a multiplicity of state jurisdictions, 
and continuously subject to the endogenous shocks of innovations in 
production functions, the power of each state apparatus to shape core-
peripheral relations is always limited by the power of other states to do the 
same and, above all, by the competitive pressures continuously generated by 
economic innovations.24 
Therefore, states can be involved in a zero-sum game analogous to the one 
played out among capitalist enterprises.25 Capitalist enterprises are not usually 
involved in a single activity. On the contrary, they pool different activities 
within their organisational domains and therefore, a mixture of core and 
peripheral activities characterises them. Each capitalist enterprise is always and 
simultaneously involved in responding to the pressures created by other 
enterprises. This means that it is moving out of (or transforming) the activities 
in which the competitive pressure is high or increasing, and entering activities 
in which the competitive pressure is low or decreasing. This is a process of a 
zero-sum game. Moreover, each capitalist enterprise generates competing 
pressures through innovations.26 
Profit-oriented innovations are the fundamental impulse that generates and 
sustains competitive pressures in a capitalist economy. They are defined as the 
setting up, widening, deepening, and restructuring of commodity chains (the 
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setting up of a new production function). Therefore, innovations include the 
introduction of new methods of production, new commodities, new sources of 
supply, new trade routes and markets, and new forms of organisation. 
Moreover, 
The intrusion of these innovations "incessantly revolutionizes the economic 
structure from within, incessantly destroying the old one, incessantly creating 
a new one" ... In Schumpeter's view, this process of "creative destruction" is 
the essence of capitalismP 
Apart from being the most important immediate source of gains, the intrusion 
of these innovations also indirectly produces - through the process it sets going 
- most of the situations from which windfall gains and losses arise and in which 
speculative operations acquire significant scope. At the same time, it causes 
disequilibria and cutthroat competition. It makes pre-existing productive 
combinations obsolete and inflicts widespread losses.28 
Although states can be involved in a zero-sum game, analogous to the one 
played out among capitalist enterprises, they have radically different ends and 
means, since states are not profit-maximising units. The primary function of 
states is the reproduction of their monopoly of the legitimate use of violence 
over a given territory against challenges from other states and from their own 
subjects.29 States, therefore, pursue legitimacy and use force in such a pursuit. 
They also strive to upgrade (or to prevent the downgrading of) their mix of 
core-peripheral activities. An important ingredient in the struggle for 
legitimacy and power among states and between states and their subjects is 
always their capacity to bring (cumulating) economic command to bear upon 
(non-cumulating) political command. But the difficulty is that economic 
command is largely dependent upon an innovative participation in the world 
division of labour, and capitalist enterprises have progressively become the 
specialised agencies of such participation. Therefore, the problem of upgrading 
a state's mix of core-peripheral activities is largely a problem of being able to 
attract and develop organic links with" core" capital.30 
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Core activities will tend to cluster in a relatively small group of enterprises, 
which is called" core capital". Its obverse is called "peripheral capital" and it is 
the necessarily much larger group of enterprises on whose domain of activities 
the pressure of competition is shifted. However, "The clustering of core and 
peripheral activities into two different groups of enterprises does not in and by 
itself produce a similar polarization of the space of the world-economy into core 
and peripheral zones."31 
For core capital, the main advantage of operating in a core zone is the proximity 
to the large and stable markets afforded by the high rewards that accrue to core 
activities. But the more core capital crowds into a specific core locale, the more 
the disadvantages associated with higher rents and/or wages are likely to 
outstrip the advantages associated with proximity to high revenues. Such 
disadvantages trigger a relocation of core capital toward peripheral locations. 
If factors other than the profit-maximising activities of capitalist enterprises did 
not exist, the polarisation of the space of the world-economy into core and 
peripheral zones would be extremely volatile.32 
Nevertheless, core states have a much greater capability than peripheral states 
to retain or attract core capital. This is due to their capability (and a 
corresponding incapability of peripheral states) first, to control access to the 
most remunerative outlets of all major commodity chains, second, to provide 
the services and infrastructure required by core-like activities, and third, to 
create a political climate favourable to capitalist enterprises. Thus, core states 
control the revenue advantages of core locations and peripheral states control 
the cost advantages of peripheral locations. Yet, peripheral states cannot use 
this control to compete effectively with core states in attracting core capital for 
two main reasons. The first reason is that the cost advantage of peripheral 
locations is far more" dependent" on a free access to the revenue advantages of 
core locations than the latter are dependent on a free access to the former. The 
second reason is that high costs are not an obstacle but an incentive to the 
continuous stream of innovations that is required to reproduce the zone's core 
status.33 
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Moreover, in the environment typical of the peripheral zone (characterised by 
fragmented and discontinuous markets, inefficient infrastructure and services, 
as well as a political climate often unfavourable to capitalist entrepreneurship), 
high costs are powerless in sustaining innovations, while low costs simply 
provide an incentive to organise peripheral activities. Thus, it follows that over 
time, 
core states and core capital tend to develop a symbiotic relationship that 
increases each other's capability to consolidate and reproduce their 
association with predominantly core-like activities. The obverse of this 
tendency is the endemic inability of peripheral states to escape their 
association with predominantly peripheral activities. Taken together, the two 
tendencies imply a stable if not growing polarization of the space of the 
world-economy into a peripheral and a core zone.34 
The above argument also applies to all those states that happen to have a 
jurisdiction over a more or less even mix of core-peripheral activities 
(semiperipheral states). These states are subject to the same polariSing 
tendencies that continuously reproduce the core and peripheral zones of the 
world-economy. However, the more or less even mix of core-peripheral 
activities that fall under the semiperipheral states' jurisdiction, offers them the 
chance to resist peripheralisation by exploiting their revenue advantage vis-a-
vis core states. They may do this in a number of ways, but semiperipheral 
states normally manage to counteract the peripheralising tendencies of the 
world-economy by selectively exploiting them.35 
Thus, the thesis interprets the concept of the semi-periphery, according to 
Wallerstein, as follows. Core-type activities and peripheral-type activities are 
unequally distributed across the world-system, and within state boundaries. A 
semi-peripheral state is a state with a roughly even balance of core-type and 
peripheral-type activities. A semi-peripheral state tries to move towards the 
direction of the core, or at least to prevent its downgrading to having a mix of 
more peripheral than core activities. This is a process dependent upon its 
ability to attract core capital and aims at the avoidance of 'intensive' 
peripheralisation. The capacity of states to upgrade their core-activities is 
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restricted by the capacity of other states to do so: a process of a zero-sum game. 
Finally, semi-peripheral states contribute to the stability of the world-system. 
From the above definition, it becomes evident that although Wallerstein's 
approach is economic, he also considers the role of the state in semi-peripheral 
societies. However, his approach to the role of the state is restricted to the 
international and economic dimension. Wallerstein points to the ability of 
states to attract core capital, which is dependent on the capacity of other states 
to do so. Wallerstein neglects the special nature of the state in a semi-peripheral 
society and how it can be an obstacle to the developmental process. This issue 
is treated by Mouzelis, in his emphasis on the role of the political, that is the 
state, in peripheral capitalism. 
6.3 MOUZELIS' EMPHASIS ON THE ROLE OF THE STATE IN 
PERIPHERAL CAPITALISM 
This section will show that Mouzelis' approach concentrates on the State as an 
actor, and is particularly useful for the study of societies which experienced 
late-modernisation and, unlike the West, had a weak civil society. Mouzelis 
points to Marxism's holism and its usefulness for a macro-comparative 
historical study of social formations. However, Mouzelis does not accept the 
Marxist theory of the capitalist state because it excludes the investigation of 
cases where the holders of the means of domination have the upper hand over 
the holders of the means of production, as happens in the capitalist periphery. 
Thus, Mouzelis calls for a non-reductionist Marxist theory, which is a post-
Marxist approach. This tries to avoid economism without falling into the 
compartmentalisation of the political and economic spheres. 
Mouzelis' emphasis on the State belongs to I grand' historical sociology, within a 
wider trend in sociological theory, followed by other scholars, such as Theda 
Skocpol, Barrington Moore, Michael Mann, and John Ha1l36• For instance, 
Skocpol (a historically oriented sociologist37) advocates lib ringing the State back 
in" to contemporary SOciological thought. She points out that since the mid-
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1970s, an upsurge of interest in "the State" has occurred in comparative social 
science studies, which have considered States as important actors and probed 
how States affect political and social processes through their policies and their 
patterned relationships with social groupS.38 
Like Mouzelis, as will be later argued, Skocpol differentiates this approach from 
the neo-Marxist debates (from the mid-1960s onwards) on alternative 
understandings of the socioeconomic functions performed by the "capitalist 
state". Some of these debates saw the state as an instrument of class rule, others 
saw it as an objective guarantor of production relations or economic 
accumulation, and still others as an arena for political class struggles. The 
society-centered assumptions of the neo-Marxist writers - like Wallerstein on 
The Modern World System39 -led them to argue that states are shaped by classes 
or class struggles and function to preserve and expand modes of production.4o 
Thus, many possible forms of autonomous state action were ruled out, by 
definition.41 Furthermore, 
Neo-Marxist theorists have too often sought to generalize - often in extremely 
abstract ways about features or functions shared by all states within a mode of 
production, a phase of capitalist accumulation, or a position in the world-
capitalist system. This makes it difficult to assign causal weight to variations 
in state structures and activities across nations and short time periods, thereby 
undercutting the usefulness of some Neo-Marxist schemes for comparative 
research.42 
The neo-Marxist's "relative autonomy"43 of the state is not the same as 
Skocpol's "state autonomy". The latter means that states - conceived as 
organisations claiming control over territories and people - may formulate and 
pursue goals that do not simply reflect the demands or interests of social 
groups, classes, or society. Moreover, 
Unless such an independent goal formulation occurs, there is little need to 
talk about states as important actors. Pursuing matters further, one may then 
explore the 1/ capacities" of states to implement official goals, especially over 
the actual or potential opposition of powerful social groups or in the face of 
recalcitrant socioeconomic circumstances.44 
Mouzelis has associated so-called "state autonomy" with the specific case of 
Greece.45 In his theorisation, emphasis is placed on the nature of the State in 
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peripheral societies and on the fact that the State is an important actor 
influencing their developmental process. 
Mouzelis argues that the 'political' obstacles are not those of imperialism or of a 
dominant capitalist class preventing socialist transformation. They do not 
entail, as suggested by Frank's early work46, opting out of the world capitalist 
system, or changing the capitalist relations of production in any given country. 
"Solving the political problem demands changes in the relations of domination, 
changes in the way the State apparatus is organized and controlled."47 
The special emphasiS on the importance on the State in the process of the 
development of societies is within Mouzelis' basic aim to show that the 
sociology of development will have to take into account the fundamental 
importance of the State in late-modern societies. The developmental process of 
these societies was not characterised by those productive processes which, in 
the West, led to the birth and development of social classes, able to function as 
mechanisms of empowerment of civil society.48 Thus, Mouzelis continues: 
(a) that some of the present difficulties experienced by the sociology of 
development can be overcome by a macro comparative historical focus on the 
qualitative differences between the long term development of the capitalist 
centre and periphery, as well as on the strikingly different developmental 
trajectories to be seen within the third world; (b) that Marxism in general, and 
the dependency approach in particular, although more suitable than 
alternative paradigms for such a historical comparative task, present certain 
limitations that can only be dealt with by the creation of new tools for the 
study of the non-economic spheres (particularly the political).49 
Mouzelis suggests that what can revitalise the sociology of development are 
historical investigations, which do not shy away from bold comparisons or 
from looking at longue duree transformations.50 He argues that Marxism 
presents two fundamental advantages over other approaches. Firstly, unlike 
neo-classical economic theory, which views phenomena in a compartmentalised 
manner, Marxism allows a far more holistic examination of social formations.51 
Secondly, Marxism can also suggest useful ways of looking at societies from the 
point of both agency and institutional structure, unlike other paradigms. 
Collective agents in the Marxist paradigm do not operate in an institutional 
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vacuum. They are both producers and products of their social world. Also, the 
notion of relations of production and the Marxist distinction between class 
locations and class practices can operate as an effective bridge between a system 
and an action approach. The Marxist paradigm provides the theoretical means 
for looking at societies both in terms of actors' goals and strategies and in terms 
of systemic wholes and their reproduction requirements. This balanced 
action/ structure holism is indispensable for the study of development.52 
Despite these advantages, Mouzelis argues that Marxism's economic 
reductionism constitutes the major weakness of the Marxian paradigm. Present 
day Marxist theories have put forward two equally unsatisfactory views of the 
economy-polity relationship. According to the first view, political phenomena 
are explained in terms of either the reproductive requirements of capital, or the 
interests and projects of the economically dominant classes. The second view 
stresses the relative 'autonomy' of the political sphere but without using 
specific tools for the study of the political. So, this view continues to be defined 
in class/economic terms. Consequently, what is usually called the Marxist 
theory of the capitalist state is not a theory of the state per se, but "a theory of 
how the state contributes or fails to contribute to the reproduction requirements 
of capitalism".53 In this respect, 
if the state in the capitalist formations is defined as an instrument of the 
economically dominant classes, or as performing the functions of capital, this 
automatically rules out of court the investigation of cases where the holders of 
the means of domination/coercion have the upper hand over the holders of 
the means of production, or cases where state policies hinder rather than 
promote the enlarged reproduction of capitalism. 54 
But, cases of this kind are all too cornmon in the capitalist periphery. In the 
capitalist periphery, civil society in general and classes in particular are weakly 
organised and very often, the reproductive requirements of the polity are quite 
incompatible with those of the economy. Thus, the reproductive requirements 
of the economy often give way to the reproductive requirements of the polity.55 
The Marxist position is that the nature of the dominant classes is highly relevant 
for understanding the malfunctioning of the State in the countries of the 
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parliamentary semi-periphery56. However, Mouzelis holds that although class 
is relevant and the State quite obviously is not classless, the malfunctionings are 
not class-specific. In fact, they continue to operate whatever the class 
composition or the origin of the ruling elites. "In other words, whatever the 
social background of politico-military elites, once in control of the State, they 
tend to promote the interests they perceive as closely associated with their own 
politically dominant position, rather than those of the class they are supposedly 
'representing' ."57 
Therefore, given that Marxist political theory does not take into consideration 
this issue, in many third world countries the role of the State in 'restricting' 
capitalism has hardly been considered. In fact, 
The marked persistence of pre-capitalist or non-capitalist forms has been 
explained at one time or another in terms of the interests of metropolitan 
capital ... in terms of indigenous capital profiting in various ways from the 
persistence of non- capitalist forms ... , or in terms of the nature of pre-
capitalist economies .... What has not been given any serious thought is the 
extent to which at least the internal obstacles to the expanded reproduction of 
capital in the third world are more political than economic.58 
The same neglect has been accorded to the fact that the way in which the Third 
World State is organised and the way it intervenes in the economy more often 
undermines than encourages capitalist expansion. The South East Asian 
countries, however, succeeded in their late-late capitalist development due to 
the atypical structure of their states. In these cases, the State was remarkably 
capable of massive and selective intervention in the economy without 
undermining private initiative.59 
Overall, the weakness of Marxist theory to take seriously into account the polity 
- which may have a dynamic which cannot be derived from the economy, and 
which cannot be properly analysed by the use of economic/ class categories - is 
particularly limiting in the analysis of peripheral capitalism. In peripheral 
capitalism, all too often, struggles over the means of domination and coercion-
rather than struggles over the means of production - are central in 
understanding overall societal transformations.6o 
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Mouzelis concludes by arguing that a non-reductionist Marxist theory of the 
polity is possible if it creates conceptual tools, which: 
(i) try to deal with the non-economic institutional spheres in a way that does 
not build into their very definition (and hence exclude from empirical 
investigations) the type of relationship they are supposed to have with the 
economy; 
(ii) try to avoid economism without falling into the compartmentalisation of 
the political and economic spheres to be found in neo-classical economics and 
in non-Marxist political science, i.e. without abandoning fundamental features 
of the Marxist paradigm such as its holistic, political economy orientation and 
its agency-structure synthesis.61 
In other words, Mouzelis' approach is a post-Marxist theorisation, and is 
different from the kind of post-Marxism that rejects outright everything related 
to Marx. He suggests that insofar as sociological theory is concerned, it is time 
to assess the conceptual tools that Marxism is offering for studying macro-
historical transformations, by using as the main criterion their heuristic utility62 
rather than their contribution to the salvation or damnation of the modern 
world. Thus, his position on Marxism is entirely pragmatic in the 
methodological, heuristic sense. Marxism, from the way it is used by certain 
writers, in their analyses of long-term societal transformations, still provides 
very useful tools for the examination of how whole societies are constituted, 
persist, and change. Still, what Mouzelis advocates, is /I a theoretically worked 
out synthesis of Marx's balanced agency/system holism with Weber's anti-
economistic orientation to the study of political domination."63 
6.4 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION: A SYNTHESIS OF THE TWO 
APPROACHES 
What this chapter has done, so far, is to present two different approaches in 
comparative and historical sociology. The first approach is Wallerstein's world 
systems analysis, which emphasises the economic. The second approach comes 
from Mouzelis and places emphasis on the political, that is, the special role the 
State plays in peripheral capitalism. 
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It was argued that Wallerstein's world systems theory places emphasis on the 
dominance of the most advanced capitalist economies in the world-system. 
Development/underdevelopment are viewed in the context of the movements 
of capital, determined by the rate of profit, the cyclical rhythms and the secular 
trends of world capitalism and unequal exchange. The latter is associated with 
the fact that core-type activities and peripheral-type activities are unequally 
distributed across the world-system, and within state boundaries. 
According to the world systems analysis perspective, a semi-peripheral state is 
a state with a roughly even balance of core-type and peripheral-type activities. 
A semi-peripheral state tries to move towards the direction of the core (by 
attracting core capital), or at least to prevent its downgrading to having a mix of 
more peripheral than core activities, thus avoiding 'intensive' peripheralisation. 
In Wallerstein's theoretical perspective, the state goes on being defined in 
economic and international terms: emphasis is placed on the ability of states to 
attract core capital and the limits placed on this activity by the ability of other 
states so to do also. Wallerstein neglects the nature of the state in a semi-
peripheral society and the way it can be an obstacle to a less dependent 
developmental process. This is treated by Mouzelis' emphasis on the role of the 
political in peripheral capitalism: the State is a crucial actor, within semi-
peripheral societies, which most often hinders their developmental process. In 
Mouzelis' argument, state policies may hinder capitalist expansion. Such cases 
are common in the capitalist periphery, where civil society and classes are 
weakly organised and the reproductive requirements of the polity are often 
quite incompatible with those of the economy. In such cases, the economy 
gives way to the polity. The way the State is organised and intervenes in the 
economy, more often undermines than encourages capitalist expansion. 
Overall, these are both remarkable theories. They are both trying to rethink - in 
the longue duree - some of the major assumptions of Western Social Science, 
including Marxism itself. Both theories offer insight into the structuring of 
international political and economic relations - and the importance of the 
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domestic political configuration of States. However, as indicated, the theories 
tend to pull in different directions, Wallerstein being impressive on the 
economic and the international and Mouzelis being impressive on the political. 
The need for and the possibility for a synthesis have been suggested by Evans et 
al. As they have argued: 
the time has come to move beyond highly speculative theoretical debates 
about whether the "modem state" or the "state in capitalism" has an 
independent impact on the course of social change. Heurestically, at least, it 
is fruitful to assume both that states are potentially autonomous and, 
conversely, that socioeconomic relations influence and limit state structures 
and activities.64 
It is not of course the work of this thesis to provide such a synthesis. This thesis 
is about higher education and higher education comparatively considered. 
Nevertheless - to this purpose - it is possible to abstract from Wallerstein and 
Mouzelis an approximate synthesis of abstract propositions which are 
operationally useful. 
Such a synthesis must meet a number of criteria. It must be biased toward the 
analysis of the semi-periphery, as ultimately what has to be comparatively 
explained is the difference in core and semi-periphery higher education 
patterns in (France and Germany and) Greece. And the synthesis must 
rebalance the economic motifs (of Wallerstein) with the political motifs (of 
Mouzelis). The synthesis must be abstract enough to cover several possible 
cases but be simple enough, operationally, to be applied in the remaining 
chapters of the thesis. Finally, the synthesis must be able to be tested with 
socio-economic and politico-economic descriptions (the work of Chapter Seven) 
and be able to be linked to comparative educational 'similarities and 
differences' (the work of Chapter Eight). 
The contextualised synthesis which is suggested is as follows. It is suggested 
that in terms of international economic relations, core states needed Greece to 
play an intermediate role in the world-system for the stability of the world 
economy, within a zero-sum game rationale: other countries could play the 
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peripheral role that Greece had been playing so far. Thus, the Greek semi-
peripheral state emphasised two major themes: economic development and 
modernisation. In the 1960s, Greece was already playing a semi-peripheral role 
in the world-economy. The idea of 'unequal exchange' - that the semi-
peripheral state is characterised by a mixture of core and peripheral activities -
was seen in the particular emphasis Greece placed on the two major themes: 
economic development and modernisation were seen as necessary for Greece to 
catch up with the core. 
The Greek semi-peripheral state should be characterised by the use of foreign 
capital - invested in the industrial sector - with low investments in 
manufacturing and agriculture. The ability of the state to attract 'core' capital, 
thus upgrading its 'core' activities, may be seen in the establishment of 
multinational firms and in the entrance of foreign capital. Foreign investment 
should be important for the Greek economy, to the extent that this investment 
was concentrated on strategic industrial sectors. The attraction of 'core' capital 
would upgrade Greece's core activities, albeit in a dependent way. One of the 
'peripheral' characteristics of Greece was that national capital was small and 
weak, and directed towards traditional areas of production. Thus, there was a 
dualistic pattern in industry. Other 'peripheral' activities were technological 
transfer, emigration and tourism - all being part of the 'internationalisation' 
process. There was also a shift from agriculture to industry and the services -
accompanied by the subsequent overexpansion of the services sector and an 
overexpansion of the housing sector - as well as an increase of the 'informal' 
economy. 
Agricultural investment was state-financed, while agrarian capital went to the 
towns to be invested in property. The decline in agricultural production as well 
as the so-called transnationalisation process led to a very unbalanced pattern of 
development, with high levels of regional disparities, and the' deformation' of 
regional development. By the early 1980s, the ' outward-looking 
industrialisation' led to the increasing dependency of the economy on imported 
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capital and technology. Greece was in a phase of de-industrialisation, before 
having reached the stage of industrial maturity. 
All the above issues - in terms of international economic relations - were taking 
place in the context of a changing political system. Historically, among the 
major characteristics of the political system had been class domination, strong 
right wing groups, anti-communism, and political co-option rather than mass 
political mobilisation. In the early 1960s, a Centrist Party came to power, which 
was succeeded by a dictatorship (1967-1974). After the dictatorship fell in 1974, 
a Conservative Party came to power, which emphasised democratisation. The 
'socialist-inspired' party that came to power in 1981 advocated socialist 
transformation of the Greek economy (while still supporting private initiative) 
and society, regional development and self-reliance. 
In 1981, a crucial external actor for the Greek economy was the EEC (European 
Economic Community). Membership in the EEC - which had created a 
European doctrine about regional imbalance - meant radical policies of 
industrial restructuring. However, exports to the EEC fell and imports 
increased. The agricultural balance of payments with the EEC showed a 
substantial deficit. Problems in the manufacturing sectors were accentuated. 
This situation continued throughout the 1980s and by the early 1990s, when the 
European Community was creating difficulties for the country in adapting to a 
dynamic, competitive and changing international environment. 
In domestic political terms, the state of the economy and the difficulty of Greece 
in adapting to the European Community (later, European Union) on equal 
terms, during the 1980s-1990s, were due to the nature of the Greek State. The 
State was hindering a kind of development that would not be based on 
attracting foreign capital but on the ability of the country to develop 
indigenously in order to advance its core activities as being part of a strong 
association (the EEC) in the world economy. 
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Historically, while Greece was still a peripheral society in the world economy, 
there had been a relative devaluation of political rule over the economy and the 
State was relegated to the role of supplementing rather than replacing the 
market. The economic functions of the State assisted the development of 
capitalism in Greece after 1922, for the country's inclusion in the world-system. 
The State had played a determining role and had a greater degree of autonomy 
in relation to civil society, due to the relatively weak organisation of capitalists 
and workers. Greece was a 'late-late' industrialising capitalist society with early and 
persistent quasi-parliamentary politics, but state-led industrialisation had 
generated state dependent industrial classes - a semi-peripheral phenomenon. 
Given the Greek State's historical roots to the Ottoman rule, non-state interests 
were despotically controlled from above. Thus, the Greek State acquired 
patrimonial, authoritarian and particularistic features, which resulted in the 
gradual and systematic dominance of the logic of the party over the lOgiC of the 
market. 
Due to the "late-late" industrialisation of Greece, the only chance for the 
integration of the country into the world economy in a more self-reliant way 
would be from the top, that is, from the State. However, the State was unable to 
intervene flexibly for the modernisation of agriculture, its strong linkage with 
industries and the creation of an industrial sector well articulated with the rest 
parts of the economy. 
Thus, the State was an obstacle to the modernisation process and the 
rationalisation of the Greek society, economy and polity. As a result, the State 
apparatus was over-expanded and there was intensity of clientelistic 
characteristics and 'corruption'. In sum, the more the State failed to modernise 
agriculture, the more it acquired characteristics hindering its own and the 
economy's rationalisation. Thus, the rigid, over-politicised and particularistic 
semi-peripheral State contributed to the peripheral status of Greece in the 
world economy and in the European Union. 
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It will be the work of the subsequent chapter to contextualise these points more 




1 The theoretical heritage of world systems analysis is traced back to the neo-
Marxist literature on development and the French Annales school and is 
presented in detail in Appendix Two of this thesis. This Appendix also refers to 
the remaining six common assumptions, which Wallerstein felt uncomfortable 
with (his views on capitalism is one of the seven). These assumptions were on 
'social science disciplines', on 'history and social science', on the 'unit of 
analysis: society versus historical system', on 'progress', on the 'role of the 
revolutions', and finally, on 'science'. [See SO, A. Y., (1990), Social Change and 
Development: Modernization, Dependency, and World-System Theories, Newbury 
Park - London - New Delhi, Sage Publications, pp. 171-180.] 
2 Most liberals and Marxists of the last 150 years or so had regarded the picture 
of 'competitive capitalism' as an accurate description of the capitalist norm 
which had largely reflected an idealised portrait of what was thought to be the 
exemplar of the norm. The norm was England after the 'Industrial Revolution' 
where proletarian workers (essentially landless, toolless urban workers) 
laboured in factories owned by bourgeois entrepreneurs (essentially private 
owners of the capital stock of these factories). The owner purchased the labour-
power of (paid wages to) the workers, who were primarily adult males, and in 
order to survive, had no alternative than to seek wage-work. Although not all 
work situations were like this, both liberals and Marxists had tended to regard 
any situation that varied from this model as less capitalist to the extent that it 
varied. [See WALLERSTEIN, L, (1987), "World-Systems Analysis", in 
GIDDENS, A., & TURNER, J. H., (eds), Social Theory Today, Cambridge - Oxford, 
Polity Press, pp. 318-320.] 
In addition, Wallerstein made a distinction between productive and 
unproductive labour. "The situation of free labourers working for wages in the 
enterprises of free producers is a minority situation in the modern world. This 
is certainly true if our unit of analysis is the world economy." If researchers 
had adopted this new definition of capitalism there would emerge new research 
questions, such as "search for structures that maintain the stability of a 
particular combination as well as the examination of the underlying pressures 
that may transform the combination over time." [See SO, A. Y., (1990), Social 
Change and Development: Modernization, Dependency, and World-System Theories, 
op. cit., p. 179.] 
3 WALLERSTEIN, L, (1987), "World-Systems Analysis", in GIDDENS, A., & 
TURNER, J. H., (eds), Social Theory Today, Cambridge - Oxford, Polity Press, p. 
318. This was essentially the view of Adam Smith, who also thought of the 
capitalist system as the only system consonant with 'human nature'. Karl Marx, 
in characterising the system, put emphasiS on the importance of free labour. 
Although he thought of the capitalist system as neither eternally natural, nor 
desirable, he regarded it as a normal stage in humanity's historical 
development. (See ibid, p. 318.) Laclau summarises a theoretical model in the 
terms of the famous law formulated by Marx: 
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The process of capital accumulation - which is the fundamental motor force of 
the ensemble of the capitalist system - depends on the rate of profit. Now the 
rate of profit is in its turn determined by the rate of surplus-value and the 
organic composition of capitaL A rise in the organic composition of capital is 
a condition for capitalist expansion, since technological progress is what 
permits the reconstitution of the reserve army of labour and the maintenance 
of the low level of wages. But unless a rise in the organic composition of 
capital is linked to a more than proportional increase in the rate of surplus 
value, it will necessarily produce a decline in the rate of profit. This tendency 
is partially compensated by capital movements from industries with a high 
organic composition to those with a low organic composition: from this there 
emerges an average rate of profit which is always higher in value terms than 
the corresponding rate of profit in the technologically more advanced 
industries. Nevertheless, since a growing augmentation in the organic 
composition of the total capital is inherent in capitalist expansion, in the long 
term there can only be a permanent tendency for the rate of profit to decline. 
[See LACLAU, E., (1977), Politics and Ideology in Marxist Theory: Capitalism -
Fascism - Populism, London, Verso, p. 38.] 
The above schema also describes the dominant tendencies at work in a free 
competitive capitalism. In this schema, the key to a sustained process of 
accumulation is the expansion, in any sector of the system, of productive units 
in which either low technology or super-exploitation of labour makes it possible 
to counteract the depressive effect on the rate of profit of the increasing organic 
composition of capital in the dynamic or advanced industries. The enterprises 
in the peripheral areas are in an ideal position to play this role. (See ibid, p. 38.) 
4 WALLERSTEIN, 1., (1987), "World-Systems Analysis", op. cit., p. 320. In 
addition, 
Capitalism as a distinct mode of production is generally described as having 
the essential characteristics of contradictory classes of free labor and free 
capital in the relations of production, and increasing relative surplus value 
expropriation in the forces of production." [See BOSWELL, T. E., (1989), liThe 
Utility of World-System Theory for Explaining Social Revolutions: A 
Comparison of Skocpol and Lenin", in MARTIN, M. T., & KANDAL, T. R., 
(eds), Studies of Development and Change in the Modern World, New York -
Oxford, Oxford University Press, p. 80.] 
However, according to Boswell, Brenner's argument is that Wallerstein 
considers only free capital and commodity exchange expanded to a world level 
as the key characteristics of capitalism. Free labour is not an essential feature of 
capitalism in Wallerstein's theory. This theory has four crucial deficiencies: 
(1) it ignores the role of class struggle in producing free labor and free capital; 
(2) it fails to recognize the necessity of free labor in order for free capital to be 
put to the most profitable use; 
(3) it has no mechanism for requiring technical innovation and increasing 
relative surplus value expropriation (as opposed to absolute surplus value 
expropriation); and, therefore, 
(4) class structure and differential productivity are not seen as determining 
unequal exchange but as being determined by it. (See ibid, p. 80.) 
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5 MARTIN, M. T., & KANDAL, T. R, (1989), "Introduction", in MARTIN, M. T., 
& KANDAL, T. R, (eds), Studies of Development and Change in the Modern World, 
New York - Oxford, Oxford University Press, p. 4. 
6 WALLERSTEIN, 1., (1982), "World-Systems Analysis: Theoretical and 
Interpretative Issues", in HOPKINS, T. K., & WALLERSTEIN, 1., (eds), World-
Systems Analysis: Theory and Methodology, Beverly Hills - London - New Delhi, 
Sage Publications, p. 101. 
7 Ibid, pp. 101-102. In addition, according to Wallerstein, 
Once the question is opened up, there are no simple answers. We discover 
that the proportions of the mixes are uneven, spatially and temporally. We 
may then search for structures that maintain the stability of any particular mix 
of mixes (the cyclical trends again) as well as for underlying pressures that 
may be transforming, over time, the mix of mixes (the secular trends). The 
anomalies now become not exceptions to be explained away but patterns to be 
analysed, so inverting the psychology of the scientific effort. [See 
WALLERSTEIN, I., (1987), "World-Systems Analysis", op. cit., p. 320.] 
8 WALLERSTEIN, 1., (1982), "World-Systems Analysis: Theoretical and 
Interpretative Issues", op. cit., p. 102. 
9 Ibid, p. 92. Moreover, Laclau's criticism of 'world - system' theory is that it 
confuses the two concepts of the capitalist mode of production and 
participation in a world capitalist economic system. "A capitalist economy 
consists of separate spheres of production and exchange. This is the distinction 
that Marx made between the sphere of capital and the sphere of money." In 
fact, the difference with the Smithian economics is that the latter recognises 
only the sphere of exchange. In the Marxist approach, the central dynamic is 
the class struggle (in the sphere of production). In the sphere of production, 
surplus value is expropriated, while in the sphere of exchange, surplus value is 
realised. "The differential rates of exploitation in production create the unequal 
consequences of the exchange of equal values." The capitalist world - system 
can be considered the world sphere of exchange. A variety of capitalist and 
non-capitalist modes of production enter into the world-system, which is 
dominated by capitalist production. The world - system perspective, so 
constructed, has a viable method of analysis, and the debate over production 
versus exchange determination can be put aside. [See BOSWELL, T. E., (1989), 
"The Utility of World-System Theory for Explaining Social Revolutions: A 
Comparison of Skocpol and Lenin", in MARTIN, M. T., & KANDAL, T. R, 
(eds), Studies of Development and Change in the Modern World, New York -
Oxford, Oxford University Press, pp. 81-83.] 
10 WALLERSTEIN, 1., (1982), "World-Systems Analysis: Theoretical and 
Interpretative Issues", op. cit., p. 92. Emmanuel has introduced the concept of 
'unequal exchange'. [For more information, see EMMANUEL, A., (1972), 
Unequal Exchange: a Study of the Imperialism of Trade, New York - London, 
Monthly Review Press.] 
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11 WALLERSTEIN, 1., (1982), "World-Systems Analysis: Theoretical and 
Interpretative Issues", op. cit., p. 93. 
12 In explaining the world-system perspective, Wallerstein begins with the 
terms core and periphery. These two terms are nouns, but they can also be 
adjectives. However, as soon as one thinks of them as adjectives, one wonders 
what nouns the adjectives get attached to. One may talk of core areas or core 
zones, peripheral areas and peripheral zones, core processes and peripheral 
processes, core products and peripheral products. And perhaps one of the most 
important confusions is that one may talk of core states and peripheral states. 
There lies behind this a theoretical problem which one has to wrestle with, and 
to which Wallerstein does not have any easy answers. This theoretical problem 
derives from the lack of total coincidence between the state boundaries and the 
economic processes. If one starts with the framework of a single division of 
labour, within which there are multiple economic processes and multiple states, 
then one has to worry about the lack of total coincidence. There is interaction 
and interrelationship between the core processes and the states in which these 
core processes are located as well as the fact of multiple layers of coreness and 
peripherality. All these get at the fact that there exist sets of dyadic 
relationships, within dyadic relationships and overlapping dyadic 
relationships, which are difficult to sort out in the actual analysis. (See ibid, pp. 
91-92.) 
13 Ibid, p. 93. 
14 Ibid, p. 93. 
15 Ibid, p. 93. 
16 SO, A. Y., (1990), Social Change and Development: Modernization, Dependency, 
and World-System Theories, Newbury Park - London - New Delhi, Sage 
Publications, pp. 180-181. In addition, 
Lenin's insights on revolution can be incorporated into a reconceptualisation 
of the concepts of core, semiperiphery, and periphery in world-system theory. 
This would be an expansion of the theory in order to take economic and 
political dependency as intercausal but relatively autonomous variables in the 
world formation. [See BOSWELL, T. E., (1989), "The Utility of World-System 
Theory for Explaining Social Revolutions: A Comparison of Skocpol and 
Lenin", in MARTIN, M. T., & KANDAL, T. R, (eds), Studies of Development 
and Change in the Modern World, New York - Oxford, Oxford University Press, 
p.88.] 
Lenin characterised the relations between nations according to their political as 
well as economic dependency. His typology consisted of great powers, 
semicolonies and colonies and its hierarchy was based on the degree of 
independence. (See ibid, p. 85.) 
17 TAYLOR, P. J., (1989), Political Geography: World - Economy, Nation - State and 
Locality, New York, Longman Scientific & Technical, p. 10. According to 
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modernisation theory, intermediate positions of states are temporary because 
they are transitional (to modernity). Dependency theory holds that intermediate 
positions are temporary again, but this is because they are residual, that is, the 
polarising tendencies of the world-economy will ultimately pull states in 
intermediate positions toward the centre or toward the periphery. [See 
ARRIGHI, G., & DRANGEL, J., (1986), "The Stratification of the World-
Economy: an Exploration of the Semiperipheral Zone", Review, Vol. X, No. I, p. 
10.] 
The elaborations of dependency theory, according to Arrighi et aI, contain two 
main short-comings. First, they are too narrowly focused on the" dependent" 
or "subordinate" state epitomised by certain Latin American countries. This 
focus leaves out of consideration some of the most significant instances of 
intermediate socio-economic status, such as the USSR. It may also lead 
someone to include among intermediate states countries (such as Canada) 
which have attained core status but present features of "structural 
dependency". Second, they focus on individual states as they come to occupy 
intermediate positions, or as they experience" dependent development". But, 
what is found to be true for individual states may not be true for groups of 
states. Wallerstein's concept of 'semi-periphery' was introduced to avoid these 
shortcomings. Wallerstein follows dependency theory in assuming a world-
economy structured in core-periphery relations. These relations do not link 
national or regional economies (as in dependency theory), but economic 
activities structured in commodity chains that cut across state boundaries. (See 
ibid, p. 11.) Therefore, 
Core activities are those that command a large share of the total surplus 
produced within a commodity chain and peripheral activities are those that 
command little or no such surplus. All states enclose within their boundaries 
both core and peripheral activities. Some (core states) enclose predominantly 
core activities and some (peripheral states) enclose predominantly peripheral 
activities. The legitimacy and stability of this highly unequal and 
polarizing system are buttressed by the existence of semi-peripheral states 
defined as those that enclose within their boundaries a more or less even mix 
of core-peripheral activities. . .. These assumptions hold for groups of states 
(core, semiperipheral, peripheral) not for individual states ... (See ibid, pp. 11-
12.) 
The problem of identifying a semiperipheral zone has no easy solution and, for 
Arrighi et aI, Wallerstein's suggestions are not very helpful. Thus, the authors 
use the term 'semi-periphery' exclusively to refer to a position in relation to the 
world division of labour and never to refer to a position in the interstate system. 
(See ibid, p. 13.) 
The dichotomy core-periphery, through which world-systems theory defines 
the structure of the world-economy, is meant to specify the unequal distribution 
of rewards among the various activities that constitute the single over arching 
division of labour defining and bounding the world-economy. These activities 
are assumed to be integrated in commodity chains that can be analyzed from 
two distinct points of view. The first is that typical of classical economics as 
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well as of its Marxian critique and focuses on the distribution of the total 
product among labour incomes, property incomes, and a residual that can be 
referred to as "pure profit" or entrepreneurial income. The second is that 
typical to world-systems theory and focuses on the distribution of the total 
product not among factors of production, but among the various nodes of 
commodity chain ("economic activities"). Each of these nodes consists of a 
combination of different factors of production. (See ibid, p. 17.) 
Finally, Arrighi et al argue that no particular activity (whether defined in terms 
of its output or of the technique used) is inherently core-like or periphery-like. 
It can become at a particular point in time core-like or periphery-like, but has 
that characteristic for a limited period. Yet, at any given time, there are always 
some products and techniques that are core-like and others that are periphery-
like. (See ibid, p. 18.) 
18 WALLERSTEIN, I., (1985), "The Relevance of the Concept of Semiperiphery 
to Southern Europe", in ARRIGHI, G., (ed), Semiperipheral Development: the 
Politics of Southern Europe in the Twentieth Century, Beverly Hills - London - New 
Delhi, Sage Publications, p. 39. Also, according to Arrighi, 'semi-peripherality' 
not always and everywhere means the same thing: 
Its meaning varies in time and space according to the cycles of the interstate 
system and the trends of the world economy, on the one hand, and to the 
position in the interstate system and the type of state-capital relations a given 
national locale inherits from previous history, on the other. [See ARRIGHI, 
G., (1985), "Introduction", in ARRIGHI, G., (ed), Semiperipheral Development: 
The Politics of Southern Europe in the Twentieth Century, Beverly Hills - London 
- New Delhi, Sage Publications, p. 26.] 
19 SO, A. Y., (1990), Social Change and Development: Modernization, Dependency, 
and World-System Theories, op. cit., p. 18I. 
20 WALLERSTEIN, I., (1982), "World-Systems Analysis: Theoretical and 
Interpretative Issues", op. cit., p. 99. 
21 Ibid, p. 99. 
22 Ibid, p. 94. Apart from the "process of peripheralisation in relationship to 
states", world systems analysis has dealt with a second theoretical problem 
which has to do with the issue of "class struggle or class structure". Wallerstein 
thinks that the one insight that Marx had most clearly and most correctly about 
class relations and capitalism was that there is a process of polarisation, a 
process of creation of two classes. Over historical time there has in fact been an 
increasing polarisation as a consequence of two processes in capitalism: 
proletarianisation and bourgeoisification. "That is the essence of the capital -
labor relationship." Moreover, 
If you take the ideal-type of proletarian, and most Marxists are very Weberian 
in the way they use ideal-types, he is the image of the 1820-1830 English 
factory worker straight from the rural areas, who, one generation back, has 
been pushed off the land, who has no other source of income, who is living in 
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a miserable hovel, who is working 16-18 hours a day, and who is receiving 
through the iron law of wages the minimum wage it takes to reproduce him. 
(See ibid, p. 95.) 
However, according to Wallerstein, a large portion of the workforce of the 
world, are part-life-time proletarian households or incomplete proletarians. 
"The largest bulk of workers do not receive their entire lifetime income from 
the employer. They also receive money from two other possible sources. One 
is the work that they themselves do; for example, the wife cooks." And there is 
also a gift income, e.g. the parent who supports his children. (See ibid, p. 95.) 
If the capitalist world-system is a system of polarisation of classes 
(proletarianisation on the one hand, and bourgeoisification on the other), then 
there are two kinds of politics. There are the politics between these two 
emerging groups, and the politics within those groups. In fact, 95% of the 
conflicts within the world are within classes. Finally, any large-scale battle 
mixes the two. (See ibid, p. 98.) 
23 ARRIGHI, G., & DRANGEL, J., (1986), "The Stratification of the World-
Economy: an Exploration of the Semiperipheral Zone", Review, Vol. X, No.1, p. 
22. 
24 Ibid, pp. 22-23. 
25 Ibid, p. 23. 
26 Ibid, p. 20. 
27 Ibid, pp. 18-19. 
28 Ibid, pp. 18-19. Cassell argues that Schumpeter used this conceptualisation to 
explicate the alternation of long phases of economic "prosperity" and 
"depression", the so-called A- and B- phases: 
By assuming that revolutions in production functions occur in discrete rushes, 
which are separate from each other by spans of comparative quiet, he divided 
the incessant working of the process of creative destruction into two phases -
the phase of revolution proper and the phase of absorption of the results of 
the revolution:" (See ibid, pp. 19-20.) 
Just as Schumpeter assumed that profit-oriented innovations and their effects 
cluster in time, so Arrighi et al assume that they cluster in space. (See ibid, pp. 
19-20.) Moreover, Giddens argued that innovations in coordinating time and 
space have played a major part in the extraordinary leaps in productivity and 
quality that have been witnessed this century. 'Mass' and so called 'lean' 
production (including the 'just in time' method) are cases in point. In addition, 
having the resources to traverse specific time-space paths is of the highest 
consequence, both for the structuration of organisations and for the individual 
actors. [See CASSELL, P., (1993), (ed), The Giddens Reader, London, Macmillan, 
pp.18-19.] 
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29 It may be noted that this proposition offered by the neo-Marxists writers, 
Arrighi and Drangel, draws heavily upon the classical formulation of Max 
Weber on the role of the State. 
30 ARRIGHI, G., & DRANGEL, J., (1986), "The Stratification of the World-
Economy: an Exploration of the Semiperipheral Zone", op. cit., pp. 23-24. 
31 Ibid, p. 21. 
32 Ibid, pp. 21-22. 
33 Ibid, pp. 26. 
34 Ibid, p. 26. 
35 Ibid, pp. 26-27. Arrighi et al continue: 
states are not passive recipients of mixes of core-peripheral activities. 
Although all of them strive to upgrade or at least to prevent the downgrading 
of the mix that falls under their jurisdiction, the capability actually to succeed 
in the endeavor is not equally distributed among all states. It varies 
discontinuously with the weight of core-like activities in the mix that already 
falls under a state jurisdiction. (See ibid, p. 28.) 
36 MOUZELIS, N., (1994), "In Defence of 'Grand' Historical Sociology", The 
British Journal of Sociology, Vol. 45, p. 31. 
37 As Skocpol argues, historical sociological studies have some or all of the 
following characteristics: 
Most basically, they ask questions about social structures or processes 
understood to be concretely situated in time and space. Second, they address 
processes over time, and take temporal sequences seriously in accounting for 
outcomes. Third, most historical sociological analyses attend to the interplay 
of meaningful actions and structural contexts, in order to make sense of the 
unfolding of unintended as well as intended outcomes in individual lives and 
social transformations. Finally, historical sociological studies highlight the 
particular and varying features of specific kinds of social structures and 
patterns of change. [See SKOCPOL, T., (1984), "Sociology's Historical 
Imagination", in SKOCPOL, T., (ed), Vision and Method in Historical Sociology, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, p. 1.] 
Historically oriented sociologists are also interested in social and cultural 
differences along with temporal processes and contexts. They see groups or 
organisations as having chosen, or stumbled into varying paths in the past. 
"Earlier" choices", in turn, both limit and open up alternative possibilities for 
further change,leading toward no predetermined end." (See ibid, pp. 1-2.) 
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38 SKOCPOL, T., (1985), "Bringing the State Back In: Strategies of Analysis in 
Current Research", in EVANS, P. B., RUESCHEMEYER, D., & SKOCPOL, T., 
(eds), Bringing the State Back In, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, p. 3. 
For instance, Theda Skocpol considers "state/society" as the basic unit of 
analysis in explaining social revolutions. Thus, she defines social revolutions as 
"rapid basic transformations of a society's state and class structures", 
accompanied and in part carried through by class - based (especially of 
peasants) revolts from below. Her argument is that revolutionary situations 
developed due to the emergence of politico - military crises of state and class 
domination. Furthermore, transnational relations contributed to the emergence 
of all social - revolutionary crises and invariably helped to shape both 
revolutionary struggles and outcomes. [See KANDAL, T. R, (1989), "Marx and 
Engels on International Relations, Revolution, and Counterrevolution", in 
MARTIN, M. T., & KANDAL, T. R, (eds), Studies of Development and Change in 
the Modern World, New York - Oxford, Oxford University Press, p. 26.] 
39 See SKOCPOL, T., (1985), "Bringing the State Back In: Strategies of Analysis 
in Current Research", op. cit., p. 32. 
40 However, Wallerstein's world - system model neglects the relative autonomy 
of states and state relations and focuses too much on (market) relations of 
exchange, to the exclusion of the relations of production and the conflict of 
classes. [See MARTIN, M. T., & KANDAL, T. R, (1989), "Introduction", op. cit., 
p.9.] 
41 SKOCPOL, T., (1985), "Bringing the State Back In: Strategies of Analysis in 
Current Research", op. cit., p. 5. Overall, Skocpol faults: a) Wallerstein for the 
economic reductionism of his approach to the system of international states, 
and b) classical Marxism for its theoretical reductionism of state structures to 
class relations. Karl Marx had put forward a powerful but abstract and general 
theory of those major changes in history that proceed by social revolutions in 
modes of production, with their transformations of social relations, political and 
legal institutions, structures of perception, culture, forms of consciousness, and 
ideologies. Yet, Marx had left out altogether (except by inference) the trans-
and international contexts of revolutions. [See KANDAL, T. R, (1989), "Marx 
and Engels on International Relations, Revolution, and Counterrevolution", in 
MARTIN, M. T., & KANDAL, T. R, (eds), Studies of Development and Change in 
the Modern World, New York - Oxford, Oxford University Press, p. 27.] 
42 SKOCPOL, T., (1985), "Bringing the State Back In: Strategies of Analysis in 
Current Research", op. cit., p. 5. Wallerstein and Skocpol are different in that 
Wallerstein points to a world-economy approach to states while Skocpol points 
to nation-states. The latter are organisations geared to maintain control of 
home territories and populations and to undertake military competition with 
other states in the international system. For Skocpol, the international system 
"represents an analytically autonomous level of transnational reality -
interdependent in its structure and dynamics with world capitalism, but not 
reducible to it." [See KANDAL, T. R, (1989), "Marx and Engels on 
International Relations, Revolution, and Counterrevolution", in MARTIN, M. 
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T., & KANDAL, T. R, (eds), Studies of Development and Change in the Modern 
World, New York - Oxford, Oxford University Press, p. 26.] Overalt Skocpol 
criticises world - system theory for its economic reductionism and argues that 
the state is relatively autonomous from the economy and capitalist class, for 
organisational as well as structural reasons. "While the state must maintain the 
economic vitality of the nation, and thus the general vitality of capitalists in a 
capitalist economy, it is structurally autonomous from particular capitalists." If 
there is this relative autonomy of the state, then the conception of world 
relations is analogous to the concept of a social formation. The social formation 
contains within it a variety of modes of production, but usually one is 
dominant. "The dominant mode structures the overall character of the 
ensemble of economic, politicat and ideological relations, but the economy, 
state, and ideology are relatively autonomous from the dominant class 
(Althusser, 1971; Poulantzas 1973, 1978)". The "world formation" incorporates 
the concrete manifestations of modes of production, the world market and the 
interstate relations as components of a single world unit of analysiS. 
Wallerstein's theory contains no analysis of the state or relative autonomy of 
state action, while for Skocpot "The concepts of core, semiperiphery, and 
periphery can be reconceptualised to take into account the relative autonomy of 
the state. To be sure, political power and economic power are causally 
interrelated, but one cannot be reduced to the other." [See BOSWELL, T. E., 
(1989), " The Utility of World-System Theory for Explaining Social Revolutions: 
A Comparison of Skocpol and Lenin", in MARTIN, M. T., & KANDAL, T. R, 
(eds), (1989), Studies of Development and Change in the Modern World, New York-
Oxford, Oxford University Press, pp. 83-84.] 
43 According to Skocpot Nicos Poulantzas' Political Power and Social Classes 
(London: New Left Books, 1973) represents an important neo-Marxist theory of 
state autonomy. However, she argues that Poulantzas' approach is very 
frustrating because he simply posits the "relative autonomy of the capitalist 
state" as a necessary feature of the capitalist mode as such: 
Poulantzas insists that the state is "relatively autonomous" regardless of 
varying empirical ties between state organizations and the capitalist class, and 
at the same time he posits that the state must invariably function to stabilize 
the capitalist system as a whole. [See SKOCPOL, T., (1985), "Bringing the 
State Back In: Strategies of Analysis if Current Research", op. cit., pp. 32-33.] 
44 SKOCPOL, T., (1985), "Bringing the State Back In: Strategies of Analysis in 
Current Research", op. cit., p. 9. Overall, Skocpol put forward two alternative 
but complementary analytical strategies about bringing the state back in to a 
prominent place in comparative and historical studies of change, politics, and 
policy making. Thus, one strategy is to view states as organisations through 
which official collectivities may pursue distinctive goals, realising them more or 
less effectively given the available state resources in relation to social settings. 
The other strategy is to view states more as configurations of organisation and 
action that influence the meanings and methods of politics for all groups and 
classes in society. (See ibid, pp. 27-28.) 
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45 Mouzelis' thesis is, as will be later argued, that the main reason for the failure 
of the Greek development plan was the nature of the Greek state. He argues 
that the development of the administrative mechanisms of the state (the 
'political technology') and of the methods of control of these mechanisms (the 
'relations of domination') systematically led to situations where the 'specific' 
dominated over the 'general' and the 'political' dominated over the 'economic'. 
[See MOUZELIS, N., (1993), «IToA1.TIK6 LUCrtlllla Kat EK<ruYXPOVl.O'Il6C;» ("Political 
System and Modernisation"), in TSOUKALIS, L., (ed), H EJJ.lxba aTYfV NŒŮÕŊÍǾŊĦŊOŸĚ
KOlVOTYfra: Yf IIpoKAYf(JYf TYfC; ŅŅŮŬĜŊŠŮŊÍŬXŸȘĴĚ(Greece in the European Community: The 
Challenge of Adaptation), Athens, Papazisis, p. 298.] [For more information on 
the relationship between the 'economic' and the 'political', see MOUZELIS, N. 
P., (1986), Politics in the Semi-Periphery: Early Parliamentarism and Late 
Industrialisation in the Balkans and Latin America, London, Macmillan, pp. 199-
206.] 
46 For more information on Frank's work, see FRANK, A. G., (1975), On 
Capitalist Development, Oxford, Oxford University Press. 
47 MOUZELIS, N., (1994), "The State in Late Development: Historical and 
Comparative Perspectives", in BOOTH, D., (ed), Rethinking Social Development: 
Theory, Research and Practice, Essex, Longman Scientific & Technicat p. 145. 
48 DIAMANTOUROS, N. 1., (1993), «Ta ŸÍĦĻÙWŨŨŨŨŠGWŠĚ 'tOl) EK<ruYXPOV1.(>IlOU» ("The 
Dilemmas of Modernisation"), in TSOUKALIS, L., (ed), H EUaba aTYfV NẂŮÕŊÍŔŠÙĒOŸĚ
KOlVOTYfra: Yf IIpoKAYf(JYf TYfC; ŅŅŮŬĜŊŠŮŊÍŬXŸȘĴĚ (Greece in the European Union: the 
Challenge of Adaptation), Athens, Papazisis, pp. 311-312. The basic reason that 
the importance of the state in the process of development has been downgraded 
in Marxist thought, is the reduction of all the phenomena of social change to the 
key-word of 'class' (to which an absolutely economico-productive context is 
attached). In addition, Mouzelis' realisation about the possibility of different 
reactions of the state leading to different developmental paths rejects the 
evolutionary conception of the developmental process. (See ibid, p. 312.) 
49 MOUZELIS, N., (1988), "Sociology of Development: Reflections on the 
Present Crisis", Sociology, Vol. 22, No. I, February, p. 23. 
50 Ibid, p. 40. Before reaching this conclusion, Mouzelis presents the neo-
Marxists' early critique of evolutionist/modernisation theories which was 
based on two arguments: 
The first of these arguments concerns the well known anti-evolutionist stand 
of that they proceed along a course which, in several fundamental ways, is 
qualitative differences between first and third world development, the 
diffusionist model of modernisation theory must be rejected and replaced by 
a historically oriented, holistic political economy approach; the diffusion of 
capital, technology and culture from the capitalist centre to the periphery 
should not be conceived of as an ahistorical, 'disembodied' process taking 
place in a vacuum. Instead it must be seen as occurring within a concrete, 
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historically evolving context of domination/subordination on both the 
national and intemationallevel. (See ibid, pp. 23-24.) 
51 Ibid, p. 35. 
52 Ibid, pp. 35-36. It is only possible to deal with change and development by 
seriously taking classes into account as relatively autonomous agents, able to 
contribute to both the change and the stability of a social system. One cannot 
solve the problem of transition in a strictly structuralist perspective because it is 
impossible to explain change, the transformation of structures by pointing to 
yet more structures. Marx's changing methodology, in his analysis of primitive 
accumulation, may have had to do more with the nature of problem in hand, 
than with a theoretical failing. For when examining the functioning and 
reproduction of a mode of production with its dominance already established, 
the 'system (structure) - practice' relationship is more crucial. In such a case, 
the 'social machine' seems to function and reproduce itself no matter what are 
the intentions and wishes of those who are at its base. Consequently, it makes 
some sense to speak of 'trends' or even 'tendenciallaws' of the system. [See 
MOUZELIS, N. P., (1978), Modern Greece: Facets of Underdevelopment, London, 
Macmillan, p. 53.] 
However, when examining situations where the old structures and modes of 
production are disintegrating, while the new ones have not yet been 
institutionalised, it does makes more sense to put stronger emphasis on the 
opposite perspective, that is, on the 'practice - structure' relationship. In this 
way, one can see how collective actors, when given greater structural 
indeterminancy (greater 'room for manoeuvre'), have more opportunities to 
shape institutions according to their conflicting interests and ideologies. Thus, 
actors are not so much the puppets of the system as rather its creators. 
Therefore, concepts like choice, strategy, and class struggle are more relevant 
than those of 'laws', over determination, or structural causality: 
This is not to deny, of course, that in all cases a social formation should be 
seen from the point of view of both structures and practices, i.e. it should be 
seen how its institutional structures impose constraints on specific actors, and 
how these actors either accept or try to overcome such constraints. (See ibid, 
p.53.) 
However, the so-called 'practice - structure' relationship found in Mouzelis' 
work is different from Giddens' work on 'structuration theory'. Giddens sees 
'structure' as the medium for 'action'. [See CASSELL, P., (1993), (ed), The 
Giddens Reader, London, Macmillan, pp. 10-13.] In contrast, Mouzelis 
emphasises the distinction between what he calls 'system (structure), and 
'practice'. Indeed, at a later piece of work, Mouzelis uses the concepts of: a) 
subject-object duality and dualism, b) system-social integration, and c) social 
hierarchies, and then, he concentrates on how his four-fold subject-object 
typology can be useful in studying linkages between micro and macro social 
systems and actors, while avoiding both a reductive and reifying treatment of 
the social world. [See MOUZELIS, N. P., (1991), Back to Sociological Theory: the 
Construction of Social Orders, London, Macmillan, pp. 6-7.] On the basis of the 
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first concept, Mouzelis argues that the major difficulty with Giddens' notion of 
duality of structure is that the agency-structure relationship it implies by no 
means exhausts the type of orientations actors can and have vis-a.-vis rules and 
resources. (See ibid, p. 27.) Finally, Mouzelis points out to a recurrent theme in 
all of Giddens' writings: the idea that structures not merely constrain but also 
enable, and that structural sociology has systematically neglected this second 
feature. However, 
Critics have on the whole accepted the usefulness of this point, but have 
noted that, by conflating subject and object and insisting that structure is not 
external to the subject, structuration theory fails to take into account the fact 
the structures create variable degrees of freedom and constraint for individual 
actors. (See ibid, pp. 41-42.) 
53 MOUZELIS, N., (1988), "Sociology of Development: Reflections on the 
Present Crisis", op. cit., pp. 36-37. 
54 Ibid, pp. 37-38. 
55 Ibid, p. 38. 
56 As will be argued, within Chapter Seven of the thesis, 'parliamentary semi-
periphery' is the term Mouzelis uses for referring to Greece, as well as to the 
northern Balkan and the Latin American societies. 
57 MOUZELIS, N., (1994), "The State in Late Development: Historical and 
Comparative Perspectives", op. cit., p. 145. In that sense, Mouzelis argues that 
neither the abolition of the dominant relations of production (as the northern 
Balkan experience has clearly demonstrated) nor a change from a conservative-
upper class to a 'progressive' /working class government (as the rule of 
Papandreou's socialist party in post-dictatorial Greece has shown) will 
necessary lead to state rationalization. The type of state rationalization implies 
both improvements in administrative efficiency as well as the demise of anti-
developmental relations of domination, which is the make-or-break factor for 
all late developers. (See ibid, p. 145.) 
58 MOUZELIS, N., (1988), "Sociology of Development: Reflections on the 
Present Crisis", op. cit., p. 38. 
59 Ibid, p. 38. 
60 Ibid, p. 39. Such a neglect of the political, Mouzelis also argues, explains why 
Wallerstein's work focuses on first rather than third world trajectories. (See 
ibid, p. 39.) 
61 Ibid, p. 40. In conclusion, the key concepts in the field of Marxist-oriented 
SOciology of development theory, such as dependency and dependent 
development, make sense only in a first-third world comparative framework. 
Thus, for clarifying the meaning of the concepts as well as for advancing the 
debate on their logical and theoretical status, one needs to adopt" a historically 
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oriented macro comparative approach, focusing on the major differences as 
well as interconnections between the capitalist trajectories of the centre and the 
periphery." (See ibid, p. 39.) 
62 In theoretical pragmatism, what really matters is heuristic utility: "the ability 
of a conceptual framework satisfactorily to solve methodologically and 
theoretically recalcitrant social-science issues, as well as to assist in the 
empirical investigation of concrete problem areas." Consequently, theoretical 
pragmatism is critical of the philosophical, epistemological turn in the 
contemporary social sciences. [See MOUZELIS, N. P., (1990), Post Marxist 
Alternatives: the Construction of Social Orders, London, Macmillan, p. 3.] 
Mouzelis argues that one of the main tasks of modern sociological theory, as a 
sub-discipline of sociology, would be the construction of conceptual tools 
(Generalities II) designed so as to solve puzzles, raise interesting questions and 
more generally, prepare the ground for the empirical investigation of the 
constitution, reproduction and transformation of social systems (micro, meso, 
and macro). Thus, he excludes from SOciological theory proper any 
'untranslated' philosophical discourses on perennial ontological / 
epistemological issues, as well as attempts to construct general 'laws' 
(Generalities III) or contextless, universal generalisations, which invariably end 
up being wrong and/ or trivial. Moreover, he argues that another major task of 
SOciological theory would be the construction of a set of tools, capable to 
combat both the established compartmentalisation of social-science paradigms 
as well as the postmodern abolition of boundaries between them: 
By maintaining a specific logic and orientation, sociological theory should 
provide a set of conceptual tools that can operate as a theoretical lingua franca, 
as a flexible vocabulary with no foundationalist pretensions, which can help 
sociologists establish bridges between their own and other disciplines as well 
as between competing sociological paradigms. [See MOUZELIS, N., (1996), 
"After Postmodernism: a Reply to Gregor McLennan", Sociology, Vol. 30, No. 
I, p. 134.] 
In other words, sociological theory should not aim at the establishment of a 
kind of monolithic paradigmatic unity. On the contrary, it should strengthen 
the present pluralism by removing the obstacles that hinder the open-ended 
communication between the differentiated subdisciplines or paradigms. 
Boundaries and distinctions should not be rejected. However, SOciological 
theory should make sure that boundaries are not turned into impregnable 
barriers, and distinctions into dichotomic essences. (See ibid, p. 134.) 
63 MOUZELIS, N. P., (1990), Post Marxist Alternatives: the Construction of Social 
Orders, London, Macmillan, pp. 2-3. Skocpol argues that according to Max 
Weber states are compulsory associations, which claim control over territories 
and the people within them. However, the administrative, legal, extractive, and 
coercive organisations are at the core of the states and thus, states should be 
considered as more than the" government". In fact, the above characteristics of 
the states attempt not only to structure relationships between civil society and 
public authority in a polity but also to structure many crucial relationships 
within civil society as well. "These organizations are variably structured in 
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different countries, and they may be embedded in some sort of constitutional-
representative system of parliamentary decision making and electoral contests 
for key executive and legislative posts." [See SKOCPOL, T., (1985), "Bringing 
the State Back In: Strategies of Analysis in Current Research", op. cit., p. 7.] 
64 See EVANS, P. B., RUESCHEMEYER, D., & SKOCPOL, T., (eds), Bringing the 
State Back In, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, p. viii. 
209 
CHAPTER SEVEN 
THE CASE OF GREECE AS A EUROPEAN SEMI-PERIPHERY 
7.1 INTRODUCTION: PURPOSE AND ARGUMENT 
This chapter will present the case of Greece as a European semi-periphery, 
mainly within the Southern European semi-peripheral zone. This presentation 
will be historical and comparative and will be around four major themes. The 
first theme is about the international relations and the type of economic 
development. The second theme is about the nature of the political system. 
The third theme is about the role of Northern Europe and the European 
Economic Community. Finally, the fourth theme is about the State as an 
important actor within Greece as a semi-peripheral society. 
7.2 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND THE TYPE OF ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT 
This chapter will follow the approximate and contextualised synthesis of 
abstract propositions that was indicated at the end of the previous chapter. 
Thus, this section will argue that in terms of international economic relations, in 
the 1960s, Greece - like the other countries of the southern European semi-
peripheral zone - was already a semi-peripheral society in the world system, 
serving some of the interests of core states. Within this context, Greece was 
emphasising economic development and modernisation. During the 1960s-
1970s, foreign capital was invested in strategic industrial sectors, and 
multinational firms were established. National capital was small, weak, and 
orientated towards traditional areas of production. Thus, there was a dual 
industrial sector. 
Apart from the influx of foreign capital, the so-called 'internationalisation' 
process included technological transfer, emigration and tourism. In addition, 
there was a shift from agriculture to industry and the services sector, the latter 
being overexpanded. As a consequence, there was overexpansion of the 
housing sector and an increase of the 'informal' economy. 
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State-financed agricultural production was declining and agrarian capital was 
invested in property in the towns. The pattern of development was very 
unbalanced, characterised by high levels of regional disparities and the 
'deformation' of regional development. By the early 1980s, the 'outward-
looking industrialisation' had led to the increasing dependency of the economy 
on imported capital and technology and Greece was in a phase of de-
industrialisation, before having been industrially mature. 
At first, in locating Greece within the southern European semi-peripheral zone, 
two questions will be asked. Firstly, where do the states of Southern Europe lie 
in terms of mixes of relational links in the multiple commodity chains of the 
world-economy?l Secondly, are there significant differences among semi-
peripheral zones? In each case, the answer must be located in the political 
ideological arena and not in the economic processes: 
The economic processes provide our underlying data. Because of the spatial 
hierarchization inherent in capitalism as a world-system, we get different 
political processes at the state level. If the concept of semiperiphery has any 
utility it lies primarily in isolating a zone of political analysis.2 
Thus, Southern Europe constitutes a distinct region within Europe with 
Portugal, Spain, Greece and Italy sharing a number of common features. These 
countries have their specific 'Mediterranean' features within the European 
whole: 
There is the late development of capitalism in these countries in the 
contemporary period, and, above all, the particular forms it has assumed, 
which were such that until quite recently they were classified among the 
underdeveloped countries of the world. There is also a certain weakness of 
civil society, based as it is on persistent regional imbalances and the survival 
of traditional family and other solidarity networks. Again, there is the recent 
past of fascist or conservative dictatorship and, paradoxically, the relatively 
high profile of the left in the current political system. Finally, there is an 
undeniable cultural originality, the most visible expression of which is the still 
very strong impact of religion.3 
If looked at in terms of its rhythm, the development of capitalism in this region 
was greater than in the more advanced areas of the world. Firstly, it was 
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occurring along with the conservation of 'archaic' structures of production and 
labour - especially in agriculture but also in industry - in both the countryside 
and the towns. Secondly, the development of capitalism was occurring in the 
context of a growing integration of these countries' economies into the world 
capitalist system, and particularly its European pole.4 
However, since 1815 (and until the 1960s), the zone of the southern European 
states had at no point been the locus of the most advanced sectors of world 
production in terms of technology, productive capacity, or focal point of 
accumulation of capital. For most of that time, the governments and capitalist 
strata in the core countries tried to expand the amount of unequal exchange in 
which this zone was involved, that is, to peripheralise still further its economic 
processes to the advantage of these core countries.5 This had taken multiple 
classical forms such as: 
external investments, comparatively lower wage levels for salaried work, use 
of this zone as a labor reserve area, fiscal extraction via indebtedness, 
mechanisms, and technological (and ideological) dependence. Viewed from 
the core, the great need was to restructure production processes in the various 
countries (or to intensify processes already begun in previous centuries) so 
that they performed the role of low-cost producers in the division of labor in 
the world-economy.6 
In order to ensure the optimal flows of the factors of production, "modernised" 
state structures were needed. These structures would have adequate 
bureaucracies and weak political superstructures that could oversee the 
creation of a relevant economic infrastructure, create (where necessary) 
personnel training systems and guarantee conditions of order (against potential 
labour unrest). In the mid-nineteenth century and after, the model for these 
state structures would be the liberal constitutional one. This would have 
defined boundaries and a relatively efficacious state-oriented national culture 
and linguistic unity. Many persons saw direct personal advantage in pursuing 
such a model. However, there was resistance. "Conservative" forces felt that 
they risked being swept away in the reconstruction of the political systems. 
Their political efforts slowed down the pace of peripheralisation. In addition, 
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there were local capitalist strata who envisaged the role of the state as serving 
them against the interests of the core states and strata? 
In Greece, in particular, the capitalist mode of production had dominated after 
1922. What provided some of the basic preconditions for the development of 
capitalism in the Greek social formation were: territorial and population 
growth, the influx of foreign capital, the development of an extensive transport 
system and the creation of a unified internal market, and the establishment of 
an institutional framework facilitating state intervention in the economy.8 
However, 
the manner in which these preconditions were created (the impetus 
originated mainly from the outside and serving foreign diaspora interests) 
presaged the kind of peripheral, underdeveloped capitalism which in fact did 
flourish in the next period - a capitalism radically different from and much 
less autonomous than that of the West.9 
With the Asia Minor disaster (in 1922), in a period of sharpened social conflicts, 
political instability, military intervention in politics and authoritarian 
government (Metaxas' regime 1936), minimal attention was paid to the issues of 
economic and political modernisation. Greece was led into a civil war in the 
late 1940s by both internal conflicts and external political factors. During the 
civil war, the left-wing and radical forces (the major resistance force against the 
German occupation) were destroyed completely. Assisted by the USA, the 
victorious right-wing forces imposed a semi-parliamentary system. "At the 
same time, a set of rules known as parasyntagma (parallel constitution), greatly 
restricted the activities of the left, while anticommunism became an official 
ideology of the ruling political groups."IO 
In all the southern countries, the effects of World War II led to the political, 
economic and military unification of the countries of the West under the aegis 
of the United States. This unification made economic autarky in the framework 
of capitalism impossible. The Soviet Union emerged as a superpower. 
Simultaneously, the expansion of international exchanges and investment 
increasingly led to the establishment of an international division of labour. This 
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came to impose itself on all nations and disrupted the coherence of national 
economies (where they existed).l1 Thus, the United States was quick to 
construct a new order, especially through the European Recovery Programme: 
The ERP consisted of unilateral transfers of the international currency (dollar) 
to European countries, which allowed them to purchase American Exports .... 
European economies were allowed to run trade deficits in order to set the 
American economy and thus the world economy on a growth course.12 
In the era of its hegemony, the U.S. insisted on the end of all economic autarkic 
tendencies, the reopening of the economies of the southern European societies 
to core interests (to the extent they had been closed), and the further 
development of their structured participation in the world-economy's division 
of labour. "This translated itself in terms of economic "development" and 
"modernisation" ."13 
Greece, in particular, during the postwar years, had witnessed rapid rates of 
growth but this growth had not altered either the peripheral character of the 
Greek economy or the peculiar nature of Greek capitalism.14 However, the year 
1953 was a turning point in the postwar development of the Greek economy. 
The Conservative Government, led by Alexander Papagos, introduced policy 
measures, which seriously aimed to promote economic growth and to advance 
industrialisation of the Greek economy. Among these measures was a 
devaluation of the Greek drachma for attracting foreign capital. Moreover, 
In terms of economic philosophy, the government professed strong 
attachment to the principles of liberal economy, free enterprise and a free 
market economy, a philosophy consistent with its anticommunist political 
ideology and the prevalence of American influences.15 
The United States came to be directly involved in the construction of social 
balances in all the southern European countries, by the attempt to influence the 
internal politics of these countries and through the shaping of their economies 
in a capitalist direction. The long-run goal was the prevention of the political 
division of the world economy. "While most of Europe came under the 
program of economic reconstruction and political molding ... American 
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leverage was stronger in the case of Southern Europe, simply because of the 
greater economic needs of the countries involved."16 
In the southern countries, the pace of economic "development" and 
"modernisation was at first slow but became quite rapid by the 1960s. The 
difference with the era before 1914 was that the economic integration of the 
world had deepened considerably. Many more zones could then play the 
peripheral roles that had been assigned to Southern Europe in the nineteenth 
century, from the point of view of the core countries. Part of the problem of the 
core zones was to maintain a sufficient demographic weight in the world 
system. So, the core zones tried to expand the intermediate sectorP 
Suddenly, it became of interest to the core states to have Southern Europe play 
a strong semi-peripheral role in the world economy, especially if they were 
closely linked to the core in both political and ideological terms. For this, there 
were two mechanisms: NATO and the European Economic Community 
(EEC).18 
For the southern European countries, the economic orientation began to shift 
from American influences. They extricated themselves to varying degrees from 
the privileged relationship with the United States and entered into a new one 
with Northern Europe. Through its legislation on labour mobility and trade, 
the EEC gradually became the most important force shaping the economies of 
the southern countries.19 
However, since Greece joined in the EEC in 1981, the thesis will present this 
issue later on in the analysis. What will at this point be explored is the so-called 
'internationalisation' process. 
In Williams' view, the periods of autarky in Spain, Portugal and Greece had 
been important for general recovery. Yet, they were restrictive to growth and 
international agencies (e.g. IMF, O.E.CD.) pressed for the 'opening' of these 
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economies. 'Internationalisation' meant foreign investment and technological 
transfer, emigration and tourism.2o 
The central feature of Southern Europe as a semi-periphery of the world 
economy was the lack of effective local control over the use of resources. 
Decisions were taken in the core and multinationals were established.21 Smaller 
economies, such as Portugal and Greece, were potentially in positions of greater 
dependency since limited internal markets and, perhaps, lack of natural 
resources, were restrictive for their scope for alternative strategies.22 
For the specific case of Greece, national capital was always about short-term 
solutions since this capital was small and mainly orientated towards commerce 
and services. Therefore, foreign capital was the only possible agent of 
industrialisation and establishing the political system.23 
The inability of capitalism in the countries of Southern Europe to ensure 
economic and social reproduction on the basis of internal resources had been 
indicated by the size of these transfer incomes. Their amount, having been 
reduced by the economic crisis, had posed the choice between reducing 
investment or developing exports. Since the 1950s, foreign investment had been 
very important in the economies of Southern Europe. To the extent that foreign 
capital in Southern Europe was concentrated in industrial sectors (often 
strategic ones) and in large firms dominating an environment of small units, its 
influence on the economy was great.24 
In Greece specifically, for the period 1966-1977, investment rates were quite 
high. In the period 1951-1975, 30.6% of total investment (or 43.3% of private 
investment) was absorbed by the housing sector. Only 14.1% of total 
investment were absorbed by the manufacturing sector and 11.3% by 
agriculture (the remainder being in infrastructure, energy and transport). 
Investment in manufacturing, as a percentage of GDP, was the lowest among all 
OECD countries during the 1960-1976 period.25 Consequently, the bulk of 
foreign capital inflow to Greece (1953-1979) was invested in the industrial 
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sector. Foreign capital was concentrated in some of the strategic advanced 
technology sectors such as chemicals, plastics, petroleum products and base 
metals. During the 1960s, multinational firms were the main exporters of 
nontraditional products.26 
Moreover, after 1973, foreign capitat by establishing itself in Greece, had been 
trying to find access to the new markets of the Arab world and Africa. In 
addition, due to the fact that the Greek market was relatively smalt the big 
foreign firms had been export orientated. The transnationalisation process 
within TNCs (Transnational Corporations) had been integrating the Greek 
economy into the internationalised production systemP 
Between 1960 and 1978, the pattern of exports changed radically (the exports of 
industrial goods changed from 3.7% in 1960 to 59.0% in 1978). The Greek 
process of industrialisation had been characterised by an important inflow of 
foreign capital and of technology since there was none to speak of in the 
country.28 
In the southern countries, the low cost of labour was also an important 
precondition for rapid industrialisation.29 In Western Europe, capitalism 
proliferated through new technology and cheap immigrant labour from the 
Mediterranean countries30: 
External, essentially US aid, income from tourism, principally west and north 
European, and remittances from workers who have emigrated to France, 
Germany and the Benelux countries consistently represented a very important 
element in keeping the balance of payments in equilibrium and shoring-up 
the import capacity of the countries of the region.31 
In Greece in particular, apart from the fact that industrial growth was based on 
capital which had to be imported, the labour that was leaving agriculture was 
encouraged to seek employment in Western Europe, principally West 
Germany.32 
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As far as the development of agriculture is concerned, in the southern countries, 
agricultural investment was state-financed, while agrarian capital fled to the 
towns to be invested in property. But, even there, agriculture experienced 
enormous technological and social changes. A trend towards clear-cut 
specialisation had gradually been becoming apparent, aiming at keeping food 
prices low and at developing profitable crops (fruit and vegetables) and meat 
production for the local market.33 Thus, in Southern Europe, agriculture 
continued to be marked by a great heterogeneity of production systems. 
Despite the development agriculture had experienced, it remained the "poor 
relative" of growth.34 
Trade with the EEC was usually in surplus for agricultural products and in 
deficit for industrial products. However, the structure of external trade had 
changed since 1960. Specialisation in primary exports (basically agricultural 
products) had given way to a specialisation in exports of industrial products, 
consumer and intermediate goods. For instance, in the late 1970s, textiles and 
clothing represented almost half the industrial exports of Greece and Portugal. 
Greece's industrial exports were most concentrated on non-durable consumer 
goods and the range of industrial activities was the smallest. In general, the 
structure of industrial production in Southern Europe continued to be 
dominated by intermediate goods industries.35 
Apart from the decline in agricultural production, but with substantial farming 
sectors, another characteristic of the southern countries was the dualistic nature 
of industry - with small and internationally not competitive enterprises 
alongside a few large enterprises.36 
For the specific case of Greece, during this period, 
Greek industrial structure is characterized by fragmentation, with small and 
medium-sized, family-owned units being dominant except in the tobacco and 
chemicals sector .... Alongside this fragmented traditional industrial sector 
there exists a technologically advanced sector based on, or controlled by, 
foreign capital.37 
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Moreover, in Greece, indigenous capital was directed to traditional areas of 
production.38 
In the southern countries, urban economic activity continued to be based on 
small artisan or family units and a large private services sector as well as an 
inflated administration. These particular forms of capitalist development were 
illustrated by the strong expansion of the 'informal economy' (the activity of 
undeclared economic agents or the production of undeclared goods and 
services by officially registered economic agents).39 The development of the 
'informal economy' reflected the conservation or extension of archaic forms of 
production in the towns and countryside, not very favourable to the expression 
of collective solidarities and a modern class-consciousness.4o 
What also accompanied the rise of the informal sector was the existence of a 
large services sector.41 That was because urban industrial development was 
rapid, but not enough to provide jobs for the quantity of manpower released by 
the agricultural sector.42 
Another characteristic of the southern countries was high levels of regional 
disparities. The process of uneven regional development was linked to these 
four countries' dependency status.43 
In Greece, in particular, foreign capital was established as it had been 
established in other countries. For instance, it was established in the region of 
Athens, where infrastructure was available, for the production of consumer and 
durable goods. Its choice for other locations was according to criteria such as 
accessibility to raw materials (bauxite by Pechiney), labour supply and 
incentives (this is the case of those foreign firms, who chose the industrial parts 
of Greece, like Patras and Kavalla) and monopolistic position (the Esso Pappas 
project in Thessalonika or the long discussed but not realised project at Pylos in 
the Peloponnese).44 
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Some foreign firms, profiting from the incentives given by the Greek 
government, had chosen the industrial parks near many urban centres. In fact, 
Greek industry had developed according to the laws governing its integration 
into the international division of labour, in particular undertaking the role 
Western European capital had ascribed to it. All the features of the 
transnationalisation process were present in the Greek case. In general, the 
regional pattern of development did not seem to have been greatly influenced 
by the internationalisation of the Greek productive system through foreign 
capital. Foreign capital established itself mainly where Greek capital had 
created favourable conditions for its valorisation and in this sense, it 
contributed to an increase of regional inequalities. It chose other locations 
outside the two big industrial areas only in very special cases but without 
having any important effect in reducing existing regional inequalities.45 
Thus, the economic strategy pursued since the mid-1950s led to a very 
unbalanced pattern of development and as the OEeD observed, the whole 
growth of the Greek economy took place in Athens and Thessaloniki, and the 
greater part in the area of Athens. Demographic changes were indicative of the 
gravity of the problem caused by this pattern of development, since there was 
an over-concentration in the above two cities.46 
Athens was the most extreme case of urban-industrial concentration, although 
the trend was a general oneP Statistical data from 1974 makes it clear that the 
main regional problems of Greece were: 
(a) over-concentration of population and economic activity in the capital of 
the country (the so-called syndrome of 'hypercephalic Athens'); 
(b) a second industrial centre in the north of the country (the district of 
Thessalonika), which lags behind in relation to the first; 
(c) the maintenance of the mainly agricultural character of the economic 
structure of the rest of the regions and districts; 
(d) great inequality expressed in income and welfare between the inhabitants 
of greater Athens, Thessalonika, some other urban centres on the one hand -
and the inhabitants in the other parts of the country on the other.48 
The so-called" deformation of regional development" meant that some regional 
imbalances had reached a level, which was seen as critical or unacceptable for 
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social, political, environmental, military or even cultural and ecological reasons. 
In Greece, the deformation of regional development lay in the big contradiction 
of concentrating almost 43% of the population and producing almost 50% of 
GNP in the two areas of Greater Athens and Thessaloniki. The 
overconcentration in the two big urban areas created big social and political 
problems: pollution and environmental damage, the high social cost of 
infrastructure, the low quality of life, and internal migration.49 
At the same time, the other regions of the country experienced a steady 
stagnation, remained agricultural and they lacked the necessary human 
potential to develop. Athens was exploiting the rest of the country, in the sense 
that the development of the latter was dependent on conditions created by 
Athens. The pattern of core and periphery adequately explained the relation 
between Athens and Thessaloniki as well as the relation between Athens and 
the rest of the regions. The unrest of the population in the underdeveloped 
regions becoming conscious of being economically and culturally discriminated 
against would be the breaking point in making the situation socially and 
poli tically unacceptable. 50 
In the southern countries, post-war economic development was characterised 
not only by high growth rates, the flourishing of manufactures, the shift from 
agriculture to industry and services, but also by tourism. 51 
For the particular case of Greece, until 1981 the strategy pursued by all 
governments to promote outward looking industrialisation, which resulted in 
increasing the dependency of the economy on imported capital and technology 
and in the establishment of import substitution industries, gave rise to a serious 
balance of payments problem. The economic policy-makers tried to solve these 
problems by encouraging emigration as well as by promoting tourism.52 
Also for the rest of the southern countries, numerous studies had shown that 
external investment rarely had a positive impact on the industrial integration, 
employment, income or technological level of the countries concerned. This 
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situation was in spite of the fact that state policies had systematically 
encouraged the inflow of foreign capitat notably in industry. In contrast, this 
investment had greatly contributed to an imbalance in the balance of 
payments.53 
In Greece, a product of an economic policy of developing tourism and, to a 
lesser extent, shipping was that in the post-junta period (1974-1981), there had 
been an over-expansion of the housing sector, accompanied by parallel 
expansion of the services sector.54 
By the early 1970s, growth in Southern Europe was already slowing down in 
response to the reduced growth of the world economy. Investment fell, 
inflation rose and unemployment increased.55 In Greece, in the early 1980s, the 
economy was in serious structural crisis which manifested itself in perSistently 
high rates of inflation, a widening deficit in the balance of payments, rising 
unemployment and stagnation in productive investment. In 1985, the economic 
predicament was primarily due to structural weaknesses, which were the direct 
result of the economic strategy since the early 1950s.56 
Up to the early 1980s, Greece was in a peculiar phase of de-industrialisation 
before even reaching the stage of industrial maturity. Receipts from tourism, 
emigration and shipping generated consumption patterns, which were not 
commensurate with domestic productive capacities and had the consequent 
effect of increasing imports.57 The industrial and agricultural sectors illustrated 
the structural weaknesses of the economy and the failures of economic strategy. 
Industry contributed 32% of GDP and agriculture contributed only 16%. In 
both the agricultural and industrial sectors, productivity was substantially 
lower than in the EEC as a whole, due to a failure to channel sufficient 
resources into these sectors.58 Finally, small units in industry and agriculture 
increased the level of self - employment in the economy. This was related to the 
so-called 'informal economy', as argued before, which in Greece was estimated 
to have generated a total income equal to 25% of the GDP at factor COSt.59 
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All the previously analysed themes were taking place in the context of a 
changing political system. 
7.3 THE NATURE OF THE POLITICAL SYSTEM 
This section will argue that historically, right wing groups had dominated the 
political system. Since the early 1960s, there were shifts from a Centrist Party, 
to a seven-year dictatorship (1967-1974), to a Conservative Party, to a 'Socialist-
inspired' Party. 
In the southern countries, the actual mode whereby dictatorial regimes were 
established varied considerably. Major characteristics were class domination, 
right wing groups, ruling class, anti-communism, and political co-option rather 
than mass political mobilisation. Economic policies provided a stable context 
for private capital accumulation with state support in the forms of 
protectionism. The dictatorial regimes lacked broad social bases and in the end, 
they contributed to their own downfalls.6o 
However, the "crisis of the dictatorship" produced a new convergence: a 
convergence towards parliamentary regimes and neo-liberal policies.61 
According to Troumbour, Kurth has explained the new configuration of forces 
that allowed the Greek and Italian departure from Iberian patterns of dictatorial 
rule: 
While the u.s. State Department may well have taken a sympathetic view 
towards the renewal of right-authoritarian order if the Communist Party had 
been able to prevail at the ballot box (Italy, 1948) or on the battlefield (Greek 
civil war, 1946-49), parliamentarism in these two countries attained 
hegemony, despite frequent adverse assaults: in Greece during the 1950s, the 
existence of hundreds of political prisoners, Communist and otherwise, the 
continued employment of police and paramilitary repression, and from 1967-
74 the rise of the Colonels who predicated their usurpation on the need for a 
purification and "rebirth" designed to facilitate the eventual restoration of 
democracy; in Italy, the persistence of clientelism and gangrenous growths of 
corruption, and in the 1970s the flourishing of extraparliamentary enterprises 
on both the far right and far left dedicated to tactics of terror.62 
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Indeed, for the specific case of Greece, until the early 1960s, the political system 
of the 1950s with its attachment to the principles of a liberal economy lasted 
virtually unchanged. However, by that time, as a result of the processes of 
economic development, urbanisation and the expansion of educational services, 
a new middle class emerged, which began to press for political participation, 
institutional changes in the balance of power and a wider share in the fruits of 
economic growth. In alliance with the disgruntled sections of the peasantry, 
this class brought to power the Centre Union Party, in 1963. This party began 
to apply a cautious policy of liberalisation.63 
In 1965, the King dismissed the Centre Union (Evo)(Jl(:; K{;vrpov) and installed a 
'puppet' government. By the beginning of 1967, the Centre Union was 
transformed into a more radical political force under the influence of Andreas 
Papandreou. Given the prospect of the Centre Union coming to power, the 
military imposed a dictatorial regime. It has been argued that military 
intervention was a reaction to the modernisation process. Intellectuals and 
students were the most effective resistance to the regime. In July 1974, the 
dictatorship collapsed.64 
The fact that Greece entered the 1970s under an oppressive military dictatorship 
was why, in the 1970s, Greece stressed democratisation of its political system 
whereas in the 1950s and 1960s, it had been preoccupied with economic 
growth.65 The experience of the seven-year military dictatorship made it clear 
that political modernisation was a political necessity as well as the only way to 
accommodate social and economic pressures. The Conservative Party (New 
Democracy) adopted a modernising ideological posture termed 'radical 
liberalism'. This Party remained in power from November 1974 to October 
1981 and it can be said that it contributed to the demilitarisation and 
democratisation of the political system.66 However, the New Democracy Party 
was gradually becoming more conservative in outlook, and had to devote 
considerable energy and resources to foreign policy issuesP 
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Later on, the political-economic convergence in Southern Europe became 
stronger and more clearly defined by the formation of socialist-led 
governments. Yet, that convergence, as Arrighi argues, should be understood 
in very broad terms. The socialist-led or sOcialist-inspired governments of 
Southern Europe had quite different programmes, ideologies, and life 
chances.68 
The social-democratic regimes came of age in Southern Europe at a time when 
the northern European "wind" - with Thatcherism in the United Kingdom and 
the crisis of the Liberal-Social Democratic alliance in West Germany - was being 
weakened, and while Reagan's United States had turned to a more assertive 
foreign policy.69 Moreover, 
the social-democratic wave seemed to show a momentum of its own, which in 
country after country produced Socialist-inspired (Greece), Socialist (Spain), 
or Socialist-led (Portugal and Italy) governments. This momentum can be 
traced to two main factors: the increased social and economic power of labor 
in Southern European national locales and the growing impact of world 
depression on the region.7o 
Arrighi et al have argued that the deepening of the world depression had 
brought a change in the balance of social forces to the fore, by intensifying 
competition within and across national borders. In country after country, 
labour-repressive policies to enhance accumulation had lost their previous 
legitimacy and it was in this context that social-democratic regimes had been 
established in Southern Europe. These social-democratic regimes had a variety 
of programmes with one common denominator: political power to "socialist" 
parties, in exchange for labour acceptance of the imperatives of accumulation in 
a capitalist world economy.71 
In Greece, in particular, in 1974, a new party was established (by Andreas 
Papandreou), the Panhellenic Socialist Movement (P ASOK), which came to 
advocate that Greece needed changes in the parochial (local) structure of its 
socioeconomic system.72 In the election of October 1981, this party came to 
power and advocated radical change in Greece's socio-economic structure as 
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well as in its external relations. It has been argued that this party was a party of 
'rural protest't because of its widespread support among the rural population: 
The Party claims to represent the nonprivileged strata which comprise 
practically the whole Greek population save the economic oligarchy. It is 
indicative that P ASOK does not call itself a party but a 'movement' based on 
Marxist methodology and theorYt whilst resolutely rejecting 'the bureaucratic 
state socialism of the Eastern block'. Seen from this basic ideological posture, 
P ASOK seems more to resemble the Populist Movements of the Third World 
than the socialist or social-democratic parties of Europe. (Mouzelis 1978b)73 
During the stagnation of the world-economYt the realisation that Southern 
Europe was a semiperipheral zone indicated all the ambiguities of its ever-
closer integration into the common market. The dilemmas of P ASOK 
government illustrated the general issue: 
With the combination of the "crisis" plus the intermediate economic role 
Greece had already developed within the world economy - in Greece's case, 
in particular, its role in world transport - the conditions were ripe for the 
coming to power of P ASOK, which offered a quintessential program of the 
partisans of a semiperipheral state: more independence of action vis-a.-vis the 
core, with its correlate, diplomatic openings to the periphery and to the 
U.S.S.R.; vigorous reassertion of national interests vis-a.-vis Turkey; national 
political reconciliation (for example, return of those in exile because of the 
Civil War, and improvements in internal social distribution mechanisms); and 
an expanded higher education system.74 
In the field of foreign policYt at the beginningt P ASOK aimed at the removal of 
American bases from Greek soil; the complete withdrawal of Greece from 
NATO; the withdrawal from the EEC following a referendum; and finally the 
strengthening of Greece's relations with the Balkant Arab and Mediterranean 
countries.75 Howevert in foreign policYt this party had to abandon some of the 
radical theses it advocated while in opposition and it was becoming evident 
that Greece would remain in western networkst including the EEC and 
NAT0.76 
The fundamental principles of P ASOK' s economic policy were socialisation of 
some sectors of the economy while still supporting private initiative in other 
sectors (with special emphasis on 'small and medium sized business concerns' 
as well as the creation of 'agricultural industrial cooperatives of a new kind')J7 
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The economy was in urgent need of structural reforms, and thus, what was 
emphasised was: 
development of some industrial sectors, promotion of regional development 
so as to arrest overconcentration of economic activities around Athens, 
curbing bureaucratic state intervention in the economy and reducing the 
dependency of the economy on imported capital and technology.7S 
This political party was committed to the socialist transformation of the 
economy and had presented a draft five-year plan which provided for such 
reforms as well as for the socialisation (involving worker participation) of key 
sectors of the economy. However, implementation of such a plan appeared to 
be fraught with difficulties in the face of continuing economic stagnation and 
the resistance of well-entrenched interests?9 As already indicated, P ASOK had 
also attached a special importance to decentralisation and regional 
development.so However, as Nikolinakos argues, the Greek regional problem 
could not be solved without far-reaching decentralisation of the governmental 
and administrative apparatus and without a heavy programme of public 
investment in economic and social infrastructure in regions other than Athens 
and Thessaloniki.81 
At the beginning of the 1980s, another change marked Greek politics: the 
accession of Greece to the European Economic Community. It will be argued 
that the EEC (later on, the European Community, and later on, the European 
Union) was one of the most important actors in the country's most recent 
international and economic relations. 
7.4 NORTHERN EUROPE AND THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC 
COMMUNITY 
In terms of international economic relations, this section will argue that the 
European Economic Community (EEC) - which had initially pointed out the 
regional imbalance - was a crucial external actor for Greece. The country 
entered the EEC in 1981, and this meant radical policies of industrial 
restructuring. However, exports to the EEC fell and imports increased. 
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Furthermore, the agricultural balance of payments with the EEC decreased, 
while problems in the manufacturing sectors were stressed. Such a situation 
continued until the 1990s, when the European Community was creating 
difficulties for the adaptation of Greece. 
Historically, the EEC and the Council of Europe, taking economic and political 
standpoints respectively, had created a European doctrine about regional 
imbalance. The 1955 Messina conference (which prepared the way for the EEC 
Treaty of Rome) called for the setting up of a European regional development 
fund. The Treaty of Rome included the removal of regional imbalances as one 
of the overall aims of the EEC, but only in its Preamble. What these political 
moves within the Council of Europe reflected was a concern with provincial 
autonomy and state decentralisation that had been growing in Western Europe 
since the end of the Second World War. In the 1960s, in all EEC countries, the 
concern burst forth in proposals for constitutional reform.82 
Since 1961, the increased co-operation between western European governments 
had emphasised two elements that were present already in national policies. 
First, the pooling of resources by European nations was estimated to lead to 
savings and greater potential all round. Second, there was a publicly expressed 
conviction that Europe was essentially democratic and thus deliberate steps 
should be taken for the just distribution of the new affluence, including a fair 
share for the poorer regions.83 
In the countries of Southern Europe, the continuation of the development 
model - marked by a strong dependence on the United States and major 
regional, social and sectoral imbalances - remained the only alternative choice 
to integration into the EEe. Membership of Europe helped Southern Europe to 
moderate its dependence on the United States and above all, to be part - even as 
a poor relative - of the world economy.84 
However, integration into the Common Market (especially for such countries as 
Greece and Portugal) made it more difficult to maintain traditional specialties 
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(e.g. shoes, clothes, furniture, textiles and spirits) while at the same time it 
created obstacles to the search for new industrial activities. Comparative 
advantage could no longer be based on the price of labour since the semi-
industrialised countries of the Third World were more competitive for labour 
intensive products. Moreover, economic growth - despite its limits - led to the 
reduction of the structural surplus of manpower.85 
Membership of the EEC would make it vital to implement radical policies of 
industrial restructuring, despite the envisaged transitional measures. Yet, in a 
context where technological goods could be freely imported from the more 
advanced EEC countries, it was difficult to see how such restructuring policies 
could develop new and more dynamic branches of activity (especially for 
countries whose economic size was, after all, modest). Therefore, restructuring 
would mean modernisation of existing sectors with a view to improving the 
level of productivity. In addition, integration into the EEC threatened to 
penalise small and medium industrial firms since they would have much more 
difficulty in facing up to international competition. Finally, the experience of 
'community development' augured rather badly for the prospects of reducing 
regional imbalances, not only in the countries of Southern Europe but also 
between these and their more advanced neighbours to the north.86 
The combination of all these factors in the medium term, Yachir has suggested, 
might have the consequence of accentuating the perverse forms (e.g. the 
informal economy) of the development of capitalism in those countries. The 
diversity of structures of production in all sectors of activity as well as the 
informal economy would have both to survive and to spread in order to enable 
the local economy and society to absorb the shock waves caused by abrupt 
exposure to external competitionP 
Greece was late in joining the EEe. The country became a full member of the 
EEC, on the 1st of January 1981, and accepted the so-called acquis 
communautaire, that is the whole body of policies and regulations that the EEC 
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had produced by that time.88 Foreign affairs had been prominent especially in 
Greece, where the dominant policy was the accession to the EEC.89 
During the first two years after the accession, Greece made substantial gains out 
of the Community's budget. In 1981, Greece received 170,000,000 ECUs in 'net 
receipts', while in 1982, it received 630,000,000. The bulk of this money came 
from the Agricultural Fund (FEOGA). A smaller part came from the Regional 
Fund and only a tiny part came from the Social Fund. But, this budgetary gain 
was almost offset by the adverse impact of trade liberalisation on the balance of 
payments. In 1981, Greek exports to the EEC fell by 2.2%, while at the same 
time, imports from EEC countries increased by a staggering 37.5%. 
Consequently, the overall trade deficit with the Community countries doubled 
in 1981 to 2.5 billion dollars, while in the first 10 months of 1982 it reached 4.9 
billion dollars.9o Most pervasive has been the impact of Community 
membership on the agricultural balance of payments: 
In 1981, for the first time, Greece's agricultural balance of payments with the 
EEC showed a substantial deficit. While in 1981 Greece had a surplus of 6.8 
m. drachmas in the agricultural balance of payments with the Community, 
this was turned into a deficit of 10.9 m. drachmas in 1981, the first year of 
accession. Agricultural imports from EEC countries, which in 1980 were 9.5 
percent of total imports, reached 16.6 percent in 1981.91 
Such a dramatic deterioration in the Greek agricultural balance of payments 
was directly related to the operation of the rules of the EEC. These rules forced 
Greece to divert imports of agricultural products from low cost, third world 
countries to high cost, Community countries. At the same time, the more 
efficient Community farmers were enabled to increase exports of a number of 
items (including meat and dairy products), by the opening of the Greek 
market.92 
A number of the manufacturing sectors had shown that they were not prepared 
to face the competition of the most efficient Community manufacturers or to 
adjust smoothly to Community rules. Although Greek industry was not 
uncompetitive, EEC membership had accentuated existing problems. An 
increasing number of manufacturing establishments had already collapsed. The 
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worst affected enterprises were in traditional labour-intensive sectors (shoes, 
clothes, furniture, textiles and spirits). Imports of the above products from EEC 
countries (mainly Italy) increased by 200% in some cases, while exports either 
fell or stagnated. Greece, facing such a deteriorating situation, took drastic 
measures in January 1983. These measures were the devaluation of the 
drachma by 15.5% to improve the competitiveness of exports, and the 
attainment of permission from the Commission to impose import restrictions on 
a number of products. At the same time, the government entered into a 
dialogue with the Commission for a more thorough restructuring of Greece's 
relations with the European Economic Community.93 
The term 'adaptation' - when used in the case of Greece and the European 
Community - implies, as Tsoukalis has argued, a one-way relationship and an 
indirectly unequal one. Greece had entered into a wider space, the basic rules 
of which had been enacted several years before that by the founding members. 
The European adaptation had many dimensions, but the most obvious was the 
economic one.94 The common (or internal) market was central in an effort for a 
combination of the mechanisms of market and state intervention. At the same 
time, the stabilising dimension of the Community's politics went on increasing. 
In the economic sector, the account of the first decade was especially 
disappointing with bad macroeconomic indicators. The pace of economic 
development was low, the productive investments were slowing down, 
inflation was high, and trade deficits were also big. The economic divergence 
of Greece from the other countries which were also members of the European 
Community was increasing, especially during the second half of the 1980s, 
when economic stabilisation was associated with investments in the rest of the 
countries of the Community. The gradual opening of the Greek market to 
European and international competition led to a rapid penetration of foreign 
commodities into the domestic market which only in a limited degree was 
counterbalanced by an equivalent increase in Greek exports.95 
The experience of the early 1990s pointed to the difficulties that the country had 
to face in order to adapt to a dynamic, competitive and continuously changing 
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international environment.96 The rapid decrease of protection and the gradual 
integration of the Greek economy into the European and international division 
of labour imposed conditions of competition. At the same time, the State began 
losing more and more its ability to intervene.97 
The opening of the economy to international competition coincided with the 
failure of the State. This was due to an irrational effort for combination of the 
clientelistic system with expansion of the enterprising and social state. At the 
same time, the economic conditions had already been radically changed. 
Participation to the community system of decision making and the need for 
adaptation of the country to the international politico-economic conditions 
called for a modern and flexible public administration, which Greece did not 
have.98 To a considerable degree, the European adaptation of the country was 
identified with the competitiveness in the economic life and with the 
modernisation of the State. Modernisation meant the strengthening of 
institutions, meritocracy, Itransparency' and stability of the rules that govern 
the function of the economy and the relationship between the citizens and the 
State. Modernisation also meant the strengthening of civil society so that the 
control - exercised upon it by the State and the political parties - would be 
decreased.99 
The nature and specific functioning of the Greek State will be further explored 
in the analysis. 
7.5 THE STATE AS AN ACTOR WITHIN GREECE, AS A SEMI-
PERIPHERAL SOCIETY 
This section will argue that in domestic political terms, the state of the economy 
and the difficulty of Greece in adapting to the European Union (in 1992) were 
due to the nature of the Greek State. 
Historically, while Greece was still a peripheral society, the State was 
supplementing the market, playing a determining role, because of its autonomy 
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in relation to civil society. The latter was weak due to the weak organisation of 
capitalists and workers: State-led industrialisation in Greece, as a 'late-late' 
industrialising capitalist society with early and persistent quasi-parliamentary 
politics, had generated State dependent industrial classes. 
This weakness of civil society was because the Greek State had inherited its 
patrimoniat authoritarian/despotic and particularistic/personalistic features 
from the Ottoman rule. These features had led to the gradual and systematic 
dominance of the logic of the 'party' over the logic of the market. As a result, 
Greece failed to modernise agriculture and create an industrial sector well 
articulated with other parts of the economy: the only way for the integration of 
the country into the world economy in a more self-reliant way. A 'side-effect' 
was the over-expansion of the State apparatus and the intensity of clientelistic 
characteristics and corruption. Consequently, the more the State failed to 
modernise agriculture, the more it acquired characteristics which hindered the 
developmental process. Thus, whenever there was a challenge - i.e. the 
challenge of 1992 - the Greek State functioned in ways that perpetuated the 
semi-peripherality of Greece in the European Union and in the world. Finally, 
the State was active only over clientelism: it was actually reinforcing 
clientelism. The State appeared to be inert with respect to other aspects, i.e. 
cultural and social relations and occupational hierarchies. 
After the Second World War, Greece, like the other southern countries, had 
moved towards a relative devaluation of political rule over the economy. States 
were relegated to the role of supplementing rather than replacing the markepoo 
During the forty-year period, since 1922, with the dominance of the capitalist 
mode of production in the Greek social formation, the economy became 
dominant in relation to the political and ideological spheres. This dominance 
was reflected on the political and ideological levels of the social formation: the 
State acquired very important economic functions.101 
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The pervasive involvement of the State in the Greek economy - in spite of the 
ideological emphasis on the free economy - took the following forms. These 
forms were direct investment in infrastructure, incentives and aids to private 
industry, control of finance to the private sector through the banking system, 
and direct participation in the economy by means of setting up public 
enterprises and utilities. Political clientelism also played a major role in the 
formulation of economic policy decisions. lo2 
In the four southern European countries (namely, Greece, Italy, Spain and 
Portugal), unlike the advanced countries of Northern Europe, the State played a 
much more determining role in that the relatively weak organisation of 
capitalists and workers gave it a greater degree of autonomy in relation to civil 
society. This weakness of civil society was even more marked in Greece, 
Portugal and Turkey, where, the widening of political participation occurred in 
a context marked by a great weakness of the industrial proletariat. 
Modernisation had been achieved on the basis of the transformation of 
traditional networks of clientelism and, sometimes, the intervention of the 
army, and not through the development of powerful political and trade union 
organisations.I03 
It has been argued that Greece can be characterised as a 'late-late' 
industrialising capitalist society with early and persistent quasi-parliamentary 
politics, like the northern Balkan societies as well as the Latin American 
societies.104 The 'late-late' label- extensively used in development theory - aims 
at distinguishing the relatively late European industrialisers, Germany and 
France, from those semi-peripheral societies which only experienced large-scale 
industrialisation in the post-1929 period.IOS 
The Balkan and Latin America's southern-cone countries failed to use the 
resources generated by the export-oriented, nineteenth-century agrarian 
economies in order to modernise their agriculture or to create an industrial 
sector well articulated with the primary and tertiary sectors. The major reason 
for this failure is not to be seen in imperialist exploitation, the 'comprador' 
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nature of these countries' bourgeoisies, the malfunctioning of markets, or the 
lack of entrepreneurial skills and personalities. I06 Instead, it must be seen in the 
structure and functioning of their States: 
Given the late-late character of their industrialization, their only chance of 
integrating their peripheral economies into the world system in a more self-
centred manner was from above. The state would have had to intervene 
flexibly and selectively - not in order to destroy or supersede private 
initiative, but so as to bolster and direct it towards the modernization of 
agriculture and the creation of strong linkages between the countries' 
industries and their agricultural and mineral resources.107 
In the past, such strategic monitoring of development, the Balkan and Latin 
American States (and consequently, Greece) were unable to provide. Their 
inability to provide it even in the present was due to the persistence of their 
pre-independence patrimonial! despotic legacy, in the post-independence 
period. These States acquired enormous dimensions before the large-scale 
development of capitalist industry. In addition, as has already been indicated, 
the semi-periphery's State-led industrialisation generated State-dependent 
industrial classes. These were unable to check State authoritarianism and the 
particularistic/ clientelistic or populistic tendencies of the major political-
military actors. As a result, the enormous State apparatuses were, and still are, 
controlled by parties of a predominantly clientelistic or populistic character, 
whose interests of self-preservation and expansion systematically hinder the 
expanded reproduction of capitalism or the modernisation of non-economic 
institutional spheres. Thus, there is a prevailing relationship between the 
'economic' and the 'political': wherever there is incompatibility between the 
two spheres, the logic of the latter systematically prevails over that of the 
former. IOS 
It has been suggested - rather dramatically - that "the state m the 
parliamentary semi-periphery resembles a colossus with feet of clay, a 
shapeless monstrosity incapable of reacting and adapting intelligently to a 
rapidly changing international environment."I09 In the past, there were a 
number of challenges. Among them were the need to modernise agriculture in 
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the need for effective import-
235 
substitution industrialisation after the 1929 Depression, or the need for 
intelligent direction of multinational and indigenous capital in the post-war 
conditions of the new international division of labour. However, the rigid, 
over-politicised and particularistic semi-peripheral State contributed to the 
countries' peripheral status in the world economy and polity.l1o 
As far as Greece specifically is concerned, the failure of the Greek development 
plan was due to the nature of the Greek State. From the beginning of the 
nineteenth century, Greece (as part of the Balkan societies) was a subjugated 
part of the patrimonial Ottoman Empire, and as such never experienced the 
absolutist past of western European societies. It acquired its political 
independence in the nineteenth century and immediately set about 
implementing western parliamentary forms of political rule. Although these 
forms were constantly malfunctioning and fragile, the parliamentary 
institutions evinced a surprising degree of resilience, surviving and functioning 
more or less intermittently from the second half of the nineteenth century until 
the 1960s and 1970s. The dictatorial regimes were not necessarily an obstacle to 
the coming to power of parliamentary democracy.111 
The patrimonial type of rule experienced during the pre-independence period 
by Greece (as well as the other Balkan societies) was hostile to the autonomous 
consolidation of corps intermediaires between the ruler and the ruled. The 
Ottoman Empire was not prepared to tolerate any political autonomy of 
merchants or aristocrats vis-a-vis the central authority of the ruler. Whatever 
associations or collective bodies represented, non-State interests were 
despotically controlled from above. The ruler was strong and so were the 
various officials manning the highly particularistic State apparatuses. This 
situation was of course in sharp contrast to the subtle rebalance of power 
between the ruler and the aristocracy, later the bourgeoisie, in western 
European absolutism.112 
The authoritarian and despotic features of the patrimonial State in Greece did 
not disappear once Greece had acquired its political independence. Nor did 
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such features disappear when Greece adopted western parliamentary 
institutions during the second half of the nineteenth century. In fact, the 
nineteenth century parliamentary regimes in this semi-peripheral State were 
based on very restricted popular participation, and on an authoritarian 
particularistic State controlled by a handful of notable families who were able to 
keep the parliamentary system functioning stably by manipulating the 
electorate through legal and illegal means. However, with the fuller integration 
of Greece into the world economy, its restrictive parliamentary regimes began 
to weaken. Processes of market, state and city expansion undermined 
traditional merchantisms of political control and generated new political forces, 
which eventually challenged the oligarchic monopoly of State power.113 
Since the demise of oligarchic parliamentarism occurred in a predOminantly 
pre-industrial context, unlike in several western European countries, the 
opening-up of the political system was not marked by the active participation of 
the industrial classes (particularly by relatively autonomous working-class 
organisations). Instead, the new middle- and lower- class participants and their 
organisations were brought into the political arena In a more 
dependent/vertical manner. This type of vertical political inclusion, which has 
been called incorporative, neither eliminated the particularistic/personalistic 
features of parliamentary politics, nor managed to check the 
authoritarian/ despotic tendencies of the State. When, after the 1929 
Depression, industrial capitalism gained momentum in Greece, its timing and 
structure meant that it did not contribute to the weakening but rather to the 
transformation and reinforcement of these authoritarian structures inherited 
from the pre-independence era.114 Therefore, for Greece as a semi-peripheral 
society, 
both the post-oligarchic broadening of political participation and the 
subsequent acceleration of the industrialisation process contributed, in 
different ways, to a polity with a highly unequal distribution of political 
power between rulers and ruled. This unequal distribution of power and the 
institutional structures associated with it constituted a negative legacy; it 
provided a very inadequate basis for dealing with the staggering problems 
that post-war semi-peripheral societies had to face once their economies were 
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becoming more industrialised and their politics more fully marked by high 
levels of mass participation.llS 
In addition, the logic of the 'party' systematically dominated over the logic of 
the market and other institutional domains as discussed before. Moreover, at 
the economic level, Greece failed to use the resources created from the export 
oriented agricultural economy of the nineteenth century in order to modernise 
its agriculture and create an industrial sector well articulated with the other 
parts of the economy.116 
This failure was due to the structure of the State, which is the most important 
element for the understanding of the reason why some countries with late 
development - although having similar starting points and similar resources -
presented such different achievements in the world economy. Those who were 
more successful had: a) a successful modernisation of agriculture, b) strong 
bonds between the primary and the secondary sectors, c) a relatively 
interventionary and efficient State for the success of a) and b). The failure of the 
efforts for modernisation of the agriculture and its efficient linkage with 
industry usually result in expansion of the State and intensity of clientelistic 
characteristics and 'corruption'. Therefore, the more the State fails to 
modernise agriculture, the more it acquires characteristics which hinder its own 
rationalisation as well as the rationalisation of the economy.117 
The Greek State not only failed to modernise agriculture118, but created an 
evident 'disarticulation' of industry and its relation to agriculture.119 Moreover, 
due to the restricted capability of the Greek industry to absorb labour, the State 
bureaucracy was the main source of occupation for all those who were unable 
to work in agriculture and who did not want to or could not emigrate.120 
Overall, the reasons for this situation should be looked for in the structure and 
the functioning of the Greek State. Due to the "late-late" industrialisation of 
Greece, the only chance for the integration of the Greek economy into the world 
economy in a more self-reliant way would be from the top, that is, from the 
State. This kind of State would be able to intervene in a flexible way and 
238 
selectively not in order to destroy or by-pass private initiative, but in order to 
support it and direct it towards the modernisation of agriculture and the 
creation of strong bonds between agriculture and industry. However, the 
Greek State was and goes on being unable to offer such a strategic guidance. Its 
continued patrimonial! despotic characteristics, its control by parties of 
clientelistic and/ or populistic nature and its size, made it inflexible to respond 
and adapt to a rapidly changing international environment. There had been 
certain needs or challenges. Among them were the necessity of modernisation 
of the agriculture of the country during the end of the nineteenth century and 
the beginning of the twentieth century, the need for industrialisation through 
the substitution of imports during the interwar period, and the challenge of 
1992 (that is the prospect of Greece joining on equal terms in the European 
Union). However, the inflexible, overpoliticised and clientelistic Greek State 
contributed to the perpetuation of the semi-peripheral position of Greece in the 
world and in the European Union.121 
7.6 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
To sum up, Greece followed a similar path to the other countries of the 
southern European semi-peripheral zone. Thus, Greece had a peripheral status 
in the world-economy until the late 1950s - early 1960s. Until then, and after 
1922, the capitalist mode of production had dominated thanks to territorial and 
population growth, the influx of foreign capital, the development of an 
extensive transport system, the creation of an internal market and the state 
intervention in the economy. After the civil war and during the post-war years, 
assisted by the USA, a semi-parliamentary system was created. Thus, since the 
early 1950s, policies were aiming to promote economic growth and to advance 
industrialisation of the Greek economy, by devaluating the Greek drachma for 
attracting foreign capital and by a strong attachment to the principles of liberal 
economy. Economic development and modernisation were emphasised. 
In the 1960s Greece was already playing a semi-peripheral role in the world-
economy. Until 1981, the 'outward-looking industrialisation' led to an 
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increasing dependency of the economy on imported capital and technology and 
in the establishment of import-substitution industries. 
The bulk of foreign capital inflow to Greece (1953-1979) was invested in the 
strategic industrial sector, with low investment in manufacturing and 
agricultural production. Multinational firms, which had been export orientated 
given that the Greek market was small, were the main exporters of non-
traditional products. Foreign capital was the only possible agent of 
industrialisation, and 'transnationalisation' process integrated the Greek 
economy into the internationalised production system. For its part, national 
capital had always pursued short-term solutions because it was small and 
weak. Indigenous capital was directed towards traditional areas of production. 
In this context, Greece exhibited a dualistic pattern of industry. 
The influx of foreign capital was one of the aspects of the so-called 
'internationalisation' process; the other aspects were technological transfer, 
emigration and tourism. The strategy of the entrance of foreign capital and 
technology gave rise to a serious balance of payments problems which was 
solved by the promotion of tourism and emigration. Labour leaving agriculture 
was seeking employment in Western Europe. There was a shift from 
agriculture to industry and the services sector, the latter being overexpanded. 
There was also overexpansion of the housing sector, particularly in the post-
junta period. 
Agricultural investment was state-financed, and agrarian capital was invested 
in property in the towns. The decline in agricultural production as well as the 
so-called transnationalisation process had led to a very unbalanced pattern of 
development, with high levels of regional disparities, and the' deformation' of 
regional development. Foreign capital had established in Athens, where 
infrastructure was available for the production of consumer and durable goods. 
The economic strategy pursued since the mid-1950s led to a very unbalanced 
pattern of development: economic growth took place in Athens and secondly, 
Thessaloniki. By the early 1980s, the 'outward-looking industrialisation' had 
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led to the dependency of the economy on imported capital and technology. 
Greece was in a phase of de-industrialisation, without having been industrially 
mature. 
By the early 1980s, the economy was in serious structural crisis with high rates 
of inflation, a widening deficit in the balance of payments, unemployment and 
stagnant productive investment. In addition, receipts from tourism, emigration 
and shipping had generated consumption patterns, which were not 
corresponding with domestic productive capacities. Consequently, imports 
were increased. The declining industrial and agricultural sectors illustrated the 
structural weaknesses of the economy and increased the level of the 'informal 
economy'. 
The above processes took place within the context of an unstable political 
system. Historically, class domination, strong right wing groups, anti-
communism, and the absence of mass political mobilisation had dominated the 
political system. In 1963, the Centre Union Party came to power to express a 
new middle class, which had emerged as a result of the processes of economic 
development, urbanisation and the expansion of educational services. During 
the 1967-1974 period, Greece was under a dictatorial government. That was 
why in the 1970s, the country emphasised democratisation of the political 
system, whereas in the 1950s and 1960s it was preoccupied with economic 
growth. From 1974 until 1981, a Conservative Party was in power. In 1981, a 
Socialist Party came to power and advocated changes in the Greek economy 
and society. These changes had to do with the socialisation of the key sectors of 
the economy (while still supporting private initiative), promotion of regional 
development, curbing bureaucratic state intervention in the economy, and 
reducing the dependency of the economy on imported capital and technology. 
In 1981, the accession of Greece to the EEC - which had emphasised regional 
development - also had a considerable impact on the Greek economy: it meant 
radical policies of industrial restructuring. However, exports to the EEC fell, 
and imports from EEC countries increased dramatically. The agricultural 
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balance of payments with the EEC also showed a substantial deficit, due to the 
operation of the rules of the EEe. Membership had accentuated existing 
problems in the manufacturing sectors: an increasing number of manufacturing 
establishments collapsed. Thus, imports from other EEC countries increased, 
while exports either fell or stagnated. In 1983, Greek policies devaluated the 
drachma in order to improve the competitiveness of exports, and imposed 
import restrictions on a number of products. However, problems continued 
during the rest of the 1980s. 
By the early 1990s, the country faced difficulties in trying to adapt to the 
European Union. This was mainly due to the nature of the State, with its 
clientelistic system and its expansion. The State was an obstacle to the 
modernisation of Greek society, and to the European 'adaptation' which could 
be through competitiveness in economic life and through the modernisation of 
the State. 
Historically, the State had contributed to the reproduction of the capitalist 
mode of production and had acquired very important economic functions. 
These were direct investment in infrastructure, incentives and aids to private 
industry, control of finance to the private sector through the banking system, 
and direct participation in the economy by means of setting up public 
enterprises and utilities. Furthermore, political clientelism and the weakness of 
civil society played an important role in the expansion of the economic 
functions of the State, and in the over-staffing of state institutions. 
The relative autonomy of the State in relation to civil society was due to the 
latter's weakness and the weak organisation of capitalists and workers: State-
led industrialisation in Greece, as a 'late-late' industrialising capitalist society 
with early and persistent quasi-parliamentary politics, had generated State-
dependent industrial classes. 
This weakness of civil society was traced back to Greece's historical heritage. 
The country, having acquired its political independence in the nineteenth 
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century (until then, it was under the Ottoman rule), immediately set about 
implementing western parliamentary forms of political rule. However, the 
patrimonial type of rule was hostile to the autonomous consolidation of 
merchants or aristocrats vis-a-vis the central authority of the ruler. After Greece 
had acquired its political independence, the authoritarian and despotic features 
of the patrimonial State did not disappear. The nineteenth century western 
parliamentary regimes were based on restricted popular participation, in the 
context of an authoritarian State controlled by a number of notable families 
which were keeping the parliamentary system functioning stably by 
manipulating the electorate through various means. 
When Greece was fully integrated into the world economy - through processes 
of market, state and city expansion - its restrictive parliamentary regimes 
weakened. However, the demise of oligarchic parliamentarism was not marked 
by the active participation of the industrial classes: the new middle- and lower-
classes were brought into the political arena in a dependent way. As a result, 
these classes neither eliminated the particularistic features of parliamentary 
politics, nor did they check the authoritarian tendencies of the State. After the 
1929 Depression, industrial capitalism gained momentum in the country. 
However, the authoritarian structures inherited from the pre-independence era 
continued. The polity was characterised by a highly unequal distribution of 
political power between rulers and ruled, as well as by the logic of the 'party' 
systematically dominating over the logic of the market. 
Therefore, Greece's failure to modernise its agriculture and create an industrial 
sector well articulated with the other parts of the economy was due to the 
structure of its State. Due to this failure, there was expansion of the State 
apparatus which was characterised by clientelistic characteristics and 
'corruption'. The restricted capability of Greek industry to absorb labour 
accentuated state bureaucracy: this was the main source of occupation for those 
who left agriculture and did not emigrate. Thus, the more the State failed to 
modernise agriculture, the more it acquired characteristics hindering its own 
and the economy's rationalisation. Whenever there was a challenge - e.g. the 
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challenge of 1992 - the huge, inflexible, overpoliticised, patrimonial and 
clientelistic Greek State functioned in ways which perpetuated the semi-
peripherality of Greece in the world and in the European Union. 
It is against this lengthy analysis of Greece, as a European semi-periphery, that 
the apparent similarities and differences between the Greek and the French and 
German higher education reforms identified in Chapter Five are re-interpreted 
in the Conclusion to the thesis. 
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The central purpose of this chapter is to re-analyse the Greek, and the French 
and German reforms - identified in Chapter Five - by taking into consideration 
the 'semi-peripherality' of Greece within Europe, as this was analysed in 
Chapters Six and Seven. 
However, before proceeding to this re-analysis, a crucial difference will first be 
considered. This difference concerns the concept of 'time'.1 
As already argued, in both France and Germany the non-university sector was 
established within higher education during the 1960s-1970s period. In contrast, 
in Greece, the non-university sector was established within higher education at 
the beginning of the 1980s. Since the Greek reforms were apparently "lagging 
behind" by ten or more years, the 1980s-1990s Greek reforms were in Chapter 
Five compared to the 1960s-1970s reforms in France and Germany and a 
number of similarities and differences were identified. Thus, the Greek higher 
education reforms were 'behind' in chronological time and what is striking, in 
an initial interpretation of the 1980s-1990s Greek reforms, is that these appeared 
to be like the French and German reforms of the 1960s-1970s. 
Within this chapter, a different aspect of the concept of 'time' can be discussed. 
The concept of 'time' can be taken as sociological rather than as chronological.2 
Sociologically, the concept of the 'semi-periphery' can help to explain the 
chronological lateness of the Greek reforms. And the concept of the semi-
periphery can be used to re-analyse the similarities and differences, identified 
earlier in the two 'time' periods. 'Sociological time' is important in terms of 
when changes in higher education occurred within the context of broader 
economic, social and political factors as well as international pressures and 
foreign influences. 
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In all these three countries, the creation of the non-university sector was part of 
the reconstruction of higher education as a complex response to the tensions 
between 'equity' and 'efficiency'. 
The first major similarity concerned the tension over 'equity'. The goal of 
equity had been central in the Greek context, since the 1960s-1970s reforms: 
there was expansion of the education system and education expenditure was 
increased. However, in the higher education system, the number of entering 
students was restricted. This situation was reversed during the Greek reforms 
of the 1980s-1990s. In the 1980s Greek reforms as well as in the French and 
German reforms of the 1960s-1970s equity was initially interpreted in terms of 
the expansion of the higher education system to respond to strong social 
demand for education as an avenue of social mobility, and in terms of the 
provision of new technological institutions in higher education. 
The political climate in both France and Germany as 'core' countries, during the 
1960s-1970s, was in favour of such reforms. In Germany there were calls for 
greater practical orientation, reinforced by student protests. In France, the 
events of May 1968 resulted in reforms which placed the rUT within UER 
(Unites d' Enseignement et de Recherche). In the early 1980s, in Greece, the 
equality of educational opportunity argument was intensely stressed and there 
was a significant increase of places in higher education, especially in 
technological higher education. Politically, in Greece as a semi-peripheral 
society, the 'equity' policies of this period were within the framework of the 
judgement by the government that education should be a basic area of activity 
in a State concerned with the well-being of its citizens. (These policies were also 
reinforced by the high esteem in which education was held among the Greeks.) 
Such emphasis on equity took place within a special political climate, typical of 
the semi-peripheral countries of Southern Europe: the coming to power of 
socialist governments. In Greece, a socialist-inspired government carne to 
power in 1981, and placed emphasis on equality at all levels of social life, in 
parallel to the lines of the socialist transformation of the Greek economy which 
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(while still supporting private initiative) stressed regional development and 
self-reliance. 
The Greek reforms of the 1970s should also be noted in political context: the 
predecessors to the TEl were introduced during the dictatorship. Again, this 
political climate in Greece was characteristic of the countries of the southern 
European semi-peripheral zone: they all experienced the rise of dictatorial 
governments. Historically, among the characteristics of the political system in 
the southern countries had been class domination, strong right wing groups, 
anti-communism, and political co-option rather than mass political 
mobilisation. In Greece, the experience of a seven-year dictatorship (1967-1974) 
was also the reason why during the 1970s Greek education reforms, the 
democratisation of education was also expected to contribute to the 
democratisation of the Greek society. Democratisation was a general theme 
emphasised by the Conservative Party, which came to power in 1974. 
The second major similarity concerned efficiency in both core and semi-
peripheral countries. 
The first version of efficiency meant providing the right kind of higher 
education, for example in the non-university sector, to respond to the needs of 
the economy. Thus, in all three countries emphasis was placed on the practical 
orientation of the non-university sector and its response to local demands. 
The second version of efficiency, in all three countries, meant that this new type 
of higher education would relieve the overcrowded universities by dealing with 
the strong social demand for higher education. The major advantage of this 
new type of higher education - compared to the earlier institutions - would be 
that it would belong to higher education. The unity of the higher education 
system was promoted - to be realised in the context of 'autonomy' and self-
government for all higher education institutions - with a differentiation 
between the more theoretical universities and the more practically oriented 
non-university sector. 
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The tensions over equity and efficiency were interrelated in France and 
Germany, as core countries. The economy needed more and more vocationally 
qualified graduates while at the same time there was an increasing demand for 
higher education, which could not be met by the traditional universities. Thus, 
the non-university sector was part of the project of the expansion of higher 
education to meet the above priorities. 
In the North Western European countries, the expansion of higher education 
was made possible by sound and flourishing economies. From the 1960s, these 
societies had high rates of economic growth and improvements in their overall 
standard of living. Rates of inflation and unemployment remained at a low 
level and steadily growing gross national products and trade surpluses enabled 
national governments to support the rapid growth of tertiary education.3 
Furthermore, during the 1960s-1970s, in North Western Europe, there were a 
number of basic factors that propelled the expansion. These were the 
development of science, the need for qualified labour for economic growth, the 
close relationship between education and opportunity, and the increased 
wealth of society which permitted higher education to stress cultural 
enrichment or to be treated as a 'consumer good'.4 
Overall, in both France and Germany, as core countries, it was expansion that 
affected the structures of higher education.5 Not only in France and Germany, 
but also in other North Western European countries, several models were 
elaborated, such as the "multipurpose" modet the "specialised" modet and the 
"binary" model. 6 
Thus, in the course of the 1960s and early 1970s, in North Western European 
countries, the mission conferred upon higher education had three main 
elements. First, to raise the general level of education amongst the population 
(the state investment in human capital). Second, to act as a vehicle for 
broadening equality of opportunity. Third, higher education was cast as an 
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extension of the welfare state7, by bringing forward talent, irrespective of social 
origin.8 
Thus, in France and Germany as core countries, the initiatives for the expansion 
of higher education were underlined by human capital theory. The themes of 
economic development and social justice acted as an ideology for mass higher 
education9 in North Western Europe but within the frame of human capital 
theory. It was within this theory that the equality of educational opportunity 
argument was used: that the most efficient path to the national development of 
any society lay in the improvement of its human resources. Whether 
educational investment was worthwhile became a question for economists. 
Education was not to be viewed simply as a form of consumption but rather as 
a productive investment. Society would gain from the impact of the improved 
quality of the labour force upon productivity, no matter how these gains would 
be distributed.Io Thus, for human capital theorists, social inequality was 
considered to be bad because it would lead to a loss of talent. The theory 
suggested that reforms had to be made, aiming at social equality, so that the 
potentials of individuals for specialisation would not be 10st.11 
The influence of human capital theory could be seen in the two arguments 
being used to sustain the expansion of higher education. The first argument 
was that of "social justice": removing artificial barriers in the educational 
system would create true equality in educational opportunity. This, in turn, 
would lead to the democratisation of access in higher education as well as to the 
preferred occupations for which education provided a preparation. The second 
argument was that of "economic development": it depicted higher education as 
a productive investment, which would contribute directly to economic growth 
(social return from the creation of human capital). The emphasis was often 
placed on technological advance and the need for a workforce which could 
adapt to changing conditions.12 The arguments of "social justice" and 
"economic development" frame the themes of 'equity' and 'efficiency', as these 
were interpreted in the case of France and Germany. In contrast, in Greece, the 
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notion of economic development had a different meaning, compared to the 
other two European countries which were already economically developed. 
For Greece, the concept of efficiency meant the contribution of the education 
system to 'economic development' and 'modernisation' within the context of 
the semi-peripherality of Greece in the early 1960s: economic development and 
modernisation were seen as necessary for Greece to catch up with the core. 
Within this context, from the 1960s-1970s special emphasis was placed on post-
secondary technical/vocational education. This was promoted as part of the 
modernisation of the education system to contribute to the goals of economic 
development and modernisation - also within a human capital approach. 
Furthermore, the promotion of post-secondary technical/vocational education 
came from outside of Greece through the influence and intervention of 
international organisations (OEeD and the World Bank), within their own logic 
of economic development and modernisation. The predecessors of the TEl were 
introduced by these same agencies. This can be understood through one aspect 
of the 'semi-peripherality' of Greece: the use of foreign capitat which was 
concentrated on the strategic industrial sector, in the 1960s and 1970s. The 
ability of the State to attract 'core' capital in order to upgrade its 'core' activities 
- albeit in a dependent way - was seen in the establishment of multinational 
firms and in the entrance of foreign capital. This so-called 'internationalisation' 
process, which included foreign investment and technological transfer during 
the 1960s-1970s, was the reason why, at the beginning of the 1980s, with 
political change in Greece, the 'socialist inspired' government called for a less 
dependent, that is, a 'self-reliant' development. 
This shift was an important reaction for higher education. The 1980s Greek 
higher education reforms stressed 'self-reliant development' which would be 
achieved through the creation of an indigenous science and technology 
infrastructure. For this, a special emphasis was placed on the practical and 
applied orientation of the TEl: these would be oriented towards productive 
applications and applied research. The TEl were also expected to co-ordinate 
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their objectives with those of the AEI towards the goal of 'self-reliant' 
development. 
Thus, in contrast to France and Germany, where the respective technological 
institutions were responding to the needs of the economy, Greek higher 
education was expanded, and the TEl were promoted - but not to serve the 
needs of the existing economy. The introduction of the TEl, in the early 1980s, 
was the provision of 'mass' higher education that took place within the context 
of Greece as a semi-peripheral society during that period. 
The existing economy of Greece was characterised by foreign capital 
concentrated on the industrial sector, with low investment in manufacturing 
and agriculture. National capital was small, weak, and directed towards 
traditional areas of production. There was a dualistic pattern in industry. The 
economy was characterised by technological transfer, emigration and tourism. 
There was also a shift from agriculture to industry and the services -
accompanied by the subsequent overexpansion of the services sector and an 
overexpansion of the housing sector - as well as an increase of the 'informal' 
economy. Agricultural investment was state-financed, while agrarian capital 
was invested in property in the towns. The decline in agricultural production 
as well as the transnational investment process led to a very unbalanced pattern 
of development, with high levels of regional disparities, and the 'deformation' 
of regional development. By the early 1980s, 'outward-looking 
industrialisation' had led to the increasing dependency of the economy on 
imported capital and technology. Greece was in a phase of de-industrialisation, 
before having reached industrial maturity. 
The introduction of the new technological institutions within higher education 
was irrelevant to this economy - unlike the articulation of the new higher 
education institutions in France and Germany with their economies. 
Nevertheless, within this context, the official themes of 'modernisation' and 
economic development went on dominating the Greek higher education reform 
agenda during the 1980s-1990s. In the early 1980s, the introduction of the TEl 
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within higher education was part of the modernisation of the education system 
to respond to the expected modernisation and economic development of the 
country, to compete on equal terms in the EEe. In 1981, accession to the EEC 
(European Economic Community) - a crucial external actor for the Greek 
society - had created a European doctrine about regional imbalance and this 
also brought radical policies of industrial restructuring. 
Thus, the special emphasis on 'international experience' in the case of Greece 
can be understood through the expected need for modernisation and the hope 
of joining on equal terms in the EEe. The Greek government stressed the 
experience of other countries and adopted an international model of higher 
education suggested by UNESCO. Not only should the economy be 
restructured and modernised, but also higher education should be modernised 
for an 'external' reason - joining the EEe. However, the actual economic 
situation - as distinct from the expected economic situation - was that in the 
1980s exports to the EEC fell and imports increased, while the agricultural 
balance of payments with the EEC showed a substantial deficit. Problems in 
the manufacturing sectors were accentuated. By the early 1990s, Greece was 
facing difficulties in adapting to the European Community (later, the European 
Union) on equal terms. 
These problems were largely due to the nature of the Greek State. The 
patrimonial, authoritarian and particularistic features of the Greek State -
inherited from Ottoman rule - resulted in the gradual and then systematic 
dominance of the logic of political party over the logic of the market. This was 
due to the weakness of civil society in Greece, where state-led industrialisation 
had generated state-dependent industrial classes - a semi-peripheral 
phenomenon. This weakness of civil society has continued: Greek civil society 
has not challenged the State which is not disturbing cultural and social relations 
or occupational hierarchies. On the contrary, the State is reinforcing clientelism. 
Thus, the State was hindering a pattern of development that would not be 
based on attracting foreign capital but on the ability of the country to develop 
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indigenously in order to advance its core activities as part of a strong 
association (the EEe) in the world economy. Due to the "late-late" 
industrialisation of Greece, the only chance for the integration of the country 
into the world economy in a more self-reliant way would be from the State. 
However, the State was unable to intervene flexibly for the modernisation of 
agriculture, nor was it able to create strong linkages with industry, nor to create 
an industrial sector well articulated with the rest of the economy. The State 
apparatus was over-expanded and had clientelistic characteristics. The more 
the State failed to modernise agriculture, the more it acquired characteristics 
hindering its own and the economy's rationalisation.13 
Within this context, the success of the Fachochschulen and the lUT - at least in 
terms of labour demand by the end of the 1960s-1970s period - was not matched 
by the Greek TEl in the 1980s-1990s. The TEl did not respond to the economy 
nor did they resolve the interrelationship between equity and efficiency, as 
these were interpreted in the North Western European context. Instead, the TEl 
responded to concerns over equity, in terms of the expansion of the higher 
education system to satisfy social demand, and the relief of the overcrowded 
universities. The non-university sector was actually functioning as a 
'breakwater' for the very strong social demand for higher education, an 
exceptional Greek phenomenon. 
Furthermore, it should be noted that the stress on higher education to meet 
goals, such as 'self-reliant' economic development and modernisation, 
concealed the broader changes that should have been introduced in Greek 
society. Education was charged with changing society towards self-reliant 
development and modernisation - but in the absence of major structural 
changes in the economy and with the State continuing to be an obstacle to the 
developmental process. 
Within this context, the introduction of the TEl, and the stress on the 
importance of 'science and technology' for self-reliant development was a 
dramatic strategy. It was judged that it was crucial that science and technology 
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should not be imported but should be produced within the country. It has been 
argued that in both developing and developed nations, science and technology 
are used as economic goods for the improvement and sustenance of national 
economies.14 The Greek government, by emphasising the production of science 
and technology within the country, wanted to lessen the dependency of the 
country on imported science and technology, a characteristic of semi-peripheral 
countries. This dramatic contribution was to be through the TEl's special 
orientation towards applied research, in contrast to the more theoretical 
universities which were to pursue pure research. 
However, seeing the relation of different institutions of higher education on the 
basis of different responsibilities in the productive sector is of no significance in 
the context of Greece as a semi-peripheral society. As indicated, the Greek State 
never succeeded in modernising agriculture and creating an industrial sector 
well articulated with the other parts of the economy. Nor in Greece were there 
many political possibilities for the integration of higher education institutions, 
as in the other two European countries during the 1960s-1970s. In France, the 
IUT were within the University (as part of the UER), while the 
Gesamthochschulen in Germany were an attempt at integration. The 
Gesamthochschulen also served equity purposes better than the Fachochschulen. 
In the end, the Gesamthochschulen failed to prevail as a model of higher 
education partly due to the neo-conservative governments' plan for opening 
higher education to market forces and partly due to the strong vertical 
differentiation of the German higher education system. The point here is that 
attempts at 'integration', in these two countries, promoted the idea of the unity 
of the higher education system better than in the case of Greece, where no 
integration of any sort took place. The University continued to dominate -
implicitly devaluing technological higher education. 
Partly as a consequence of this cultural pattern and partly as a consequence of 
the 'semi-peripherality' of Greece the issue of 'efficiency' that dominated the 
higher education policies in France and Germany in the 1980s-1990s was not 
made visible in Greek policies and debates. The major laws introduced at the 
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beginning of the 1980s - Law 1268/82 on the universities and Law 1404/83 on 
the TEl - did not undergo any substantial changes in the rest of the 1980s and in 
the 1990s. Issues that had appeared in the higher education systems of the 
other two European countries, like those of quality control, did not appear in 
the context of Greece. 
Efficiency for France and Germany, during the 1980s-1990s, meant the 
promotion of the non-university sector as part of the 'vocationalisation' of 
higher education to respond to the needs of the 'market'. In both France and 
Germany, as 'core' countries, the non-university sector of higher education 
was successful in terms of both individual and employment demand. 
Furthermore, since it was estimated that the non-university sector of higher 
education was responding better than the universities to the market, the 
functional differentiation of the higher education system - that is, the 
distinction between the university and the non-university sector - was 
promoted. Other accompanying themes to the issue of 'vocationalisation' as a 
response to the 'market' were quality (in the case of Germany) or excellence (in 
the case of France), institutional autonomy, regionalisation and links with 
industries, and an increase of the student numbers (in the case of France). The 
non-university sector was also to relieve universities from large numbers of 
students - as in the previous period - thus contributing to the second version 
of the efficiency project. In the Federal Republic of Germany, in particular, the 
promotion of the 'differentiation' between the Fachhochschul sector and the 
universities (even after the unification with the former German Democratic 
Republic) aimed at the protection of the German Research University. This last 
issue was a contribution to the second version of efficiency, in the case of 
Germany. 
However, in both France and Germany, as 'core' countries, the issue of 
efficiency had changed. There was a shift to the concept of the market, during 
the 1980s-1990s, away from a loosely planned economy and away from the 
centrality of the role of the state in shaping higher education, as was the case 
during the 1960s-1970s. 
269 
This promotion, during the 1980s-1990s, of the non-university sector - as part of 
the 'vocationalisation' of higher education to respond to the market - in both 
France and Germany as 'core' countries, can be explained through what has 
been described as the 'evaluative state'. 
The 'evaluative state' emerged rapidly during the 1980s, because of structural 
change in the economy and in demography, and because of a shift in political 
and social principles.15 The' evaluative state' made students and individuals 
more sensitive to 'the market', thus devolving the responsibility of preparing 
for such change on the individual. Those who did not make such adjustment 
would suffer the penalties of their wrong decision. The 'evaluative state' had 
also an indirect strategy, which involved a wide-ranging social mobilisation in 
order to meet the challenge of technological change, as well as to insert the 
necessary organisational rationality into those institutions central to the social 
adjustment that consolidates such change. Some interpreted this as the 
'privatisation' of higher education and others gave this same phenomenon a 
more concrete expression by identifying new models of higher education.16 
In Greece, as a semi-peripheral society, the policies used in the western 
European context - and in France and Germany specifically - did not become 
visible. In the 'semi-peripherality' of Greece one could not really talk about 'the 
market'. Even though in the early 1990s the aspiration of Greece to adapt to the 
European Union on equal terms made the pressure for modernisation even 
stronger and there is evidence that the promotion and expansion of the non-
university sector was already under way, there were no explicit statements 
about the 'vocationalisation' of higher education as a response to the 'market'. In 
fact, in Greece as a semi-peripheral society, policies of promotion and 
expansion of the non-university sector aimed mostly at responding to strong 
social demand and at avoiding the exodus of the large number of Greek 
students to study abroad. The official policies had already argued so. Yet, such 
policy choices were in the context of increasing unemployment, particularly for 
TEl graduates, in the 'semi-peripheral' economy of Greece. 
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Furthermore, it should be noted that in the western European context of the 
1980s-1990s the 'vocationalisation' of higher education to respond to the market 
was underlined by a neo-liberal theory of the state. The state was seen as the 
"invisible hand" of the market, which means that its proper role is to provide a 
legal framework in which the market can best maximise "benefits" to 
mankind.17 This neo-liberal theory of the state fits with human capital theory, 
which explains many aspects of individual behaviour in a labour market where 
education is important in allocating jobs and income.18 
Within both the neo-liberal theory of the state and human capital theory the 
state is limited to providing education in response to price changes for educated 
labour. Individual investors and their families - the driving force behind the 
demand for education - respond to market forces, which influence the wages of 
more or less highly schooled labour. So, the "good" state provides the 
education demanded by such market forces. In this way, the state's role in 
providing education is assessed solely in terms of its meeting changing market 
conditions. 19 Thus in late-modern educational systems of core countries, the 
project of education becomes the provision of services by the market to 
consumers who have the right to choose education, while the State frames a 
system which permits diversity, choice, freedom and consumer rationality. 
Persons build skill packages oriented towards the 'market' and towards higher 
education admission.2o 
This kind of discourse is affecting the higher education patterns in North 
Western European countries, as core societies, in the 1990s. The rationale of the 
vocationalisation of higher education to respond to the needs of the market fits 
well with these countries' political economies. However, Greece is different: it 
is still characterised by a semi-peripheral economy and by a semi-peripheral 
State which is changing rather slowly. Policies stressing the promotion of the 
non-university sector as an expression of the 'vocationalisation' of higher 
education to respond to the needs of the market fit badly with the present 
economic, social and political context of Greece as a European semi-periphery. 
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It is probably the case, on the basis of the analysis in this thesis, that policies for 
the improvement of technological higher education in Greece should be 
indigenously generated. 
This research has been in some ways inductive. As I have already argued, in 
the first instance my major aim was to interpret and analyse the higher 
education policy in Greece but my wish was to look at the issue comparatively. 
This led me to wide reading and, as a consequence, to the identification of some 
similarities in the higher education reform patterns of these three European 
countries. However, I found these similarities that I had identified puzzling -
knowing the Greek socio-economic context. I started studying the sociological 
literature to understand better the status of Greece in the world-economy. 
Thus, I approached Greece as a European 'semi-periphery' through two 
theoretical perspectives: initially Wallerstein's 'world systems analysis' and 
then Mouzelis' emphasis on the role of the State as an actor within 'semi-
peripheral' societies. 
At the turning point in my research, these two different tasks (the empirical 
investigation and the theoretical framework) were informing each other. My 
work was not simply inductive; it underwent a parallel process of 
induction/ deduction. That is, in the middle of the writing process I was 
thinking about which aspects of Greece - as a 'semi-peripheral' society - could 
explain the similarities and which aspects could explain the differences in the 
reform patterns of higher education. 
The initial choice of world systems analysis was because its neo-Marxist origin 
could permit the study of Greece in its macro-historical transformation, as has 
already been demonstrated. This was particularly useful because the 
description and analysis in the first part of the thesis was set up also in 
historical perspective. Thus, the similarities and the differences in the higher 
education reform patterns could be analysed on the basis of the status of Greece 
in the world-economy at the particular moment in time that certain policies 
were introduced. 
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This same topic could have been approached otherwise. For instance, it could 
have been set up with the theoretical framework at the beginning for the 
establishment of a two-fold conceptual apparatus which would define certain 
characteristics of France and Germany as 'core' societies, and certain 
characteristics of Greece as a 'semi-peripheral' society. This two-fold 
conceptual apparatus could then have been directly used for the analysis and 
interpretation of the higher education reform patterns in these three countries. 
That is, the higher education reform patterns in Greece as a 'semi-peripheral' 
society could have been re-interpreted against the higher education reform 
patterns of two 'core' countries within Europe. The question of an ultimate 
convergence or divergence in the higher education patterns of 'core' and/or 
'semi-periphery' would be raised. 
The question of convergence or divergence in the higher education patterns of 
'semi-peripheral' societies can be raised - but here it would perhaps be 
interesting to ask in future research: do the higher education patterns in other 
semi-peripheral societies correspond with the Greek case? Is the Greek pattern 
similar to Portugal, or Spain, or Italy? Are there patterns of convergence in the 
higher education systems of semi-peripheral societies? Can "my" theory of 
'semi-peripheral' societies explain the possibility of a convergence? And if 
there is divergence, is world systems theory still useful as an analytical tool, or 
should other theoretical perspectives be considered? 
These are all questions to be answered in possible future research concerning 
the higher education patterns in semi-peripheral societies. This research could 
use the theoretical framework of this thesis for the definitions of Greece, 
Portugal, Spain, or Italy as 'semi-peripheral' societies. Then, on the basis of the 
theory of 'semi-peripheral' societies the higher education reforms patterns in 
these countries would be analysed. 
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So, the first distinction is that of the modern and the primitive, and how this 
links up with neo-evolutionist modernisation theories of development. (See 
ibid, p. 215.) According to social evolutionism, primitive societies have a low 
degree of social differentiation, while modern societies are characterised by a 
high degree of differentiation, not only on the level of social structure, but also 
on the cultural level. (See ibid, p. 216.) The so-called modernisation theorists of 
development - influenced by the functionalism and neo-evolutionism of Talcott 
Parsons - tried to analyse third-world development from the social 
differentiation point of view: 
So modernization theories, which were quite fashionable in the 1950s and 
1960s, argue that as soon as third-world countries are integrated into the 
world system, they begin more or less to follow the same developmental 
trajectory as Western societies did a hundred years ago. Thereafter, sooner or 
later the diffusion of Western capital, technology and culture would bridge 
the gap between agrarian and industrial societies, and all "modernizing 
societies" would move up the evolutionary ladder going through the same 
stages of development as Europe did in the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries. (See ibid, p. 217.) 
The second distinction is between the modern and the traditionat and is related 
to a debate on the uniqueness of industrial societies in relation to pre-industrial 
ones. (See ibid, p. 215.) In this approach, modernisation is associated with 
democratisation not only in the political but also in the economic and cultural 
spheres. (See ibid, pp. 218-219.) In general, according to this approach, 
modernisation is the passage from pre-industrial to the industrial society: 
The process itself entails the gradual disappearance of self-contained, 
traditional communities, the transformation of "subjects" into "citizens" and, 
more generally, the mobilization and inclusion of the majority of the 
population into the "imagined national community" - i.e., into the broader 
economic, political, and cultural arenas that we usually call the nation-state. 
(See ibid, pp. 217-218.) 
The third distinction is that between early and late modernisation or 
development and is associated with neo-Marxist dependency theories. (See 
ibid, p. 215.) Greece (as well as several other Balkan, Latin American, and 
Asian countries) was a country that entered the development race a century or 
so later than the nations of Western Europe. In these latecomers, the nation-
state took a form different from that of the West. The "modern" did not 
manage to become dominant and did not succeed in peripheralising the 
"traditional". Instead, the modern and the traditional coexisted side by side. 
Thus, in late modernisation, the articulation of the "modern" and the 
"traditional" tended to lead to: I/(a) a more disarticulated capitalist economy, 
(b) a more authoritarian polity, (c) and a more formalistic/ disorientating 
culture." (See ibid, pp. 219-220.) 
The fourth distinction is that between successful and unsuccessful late 
modernisation. This distinction is linked with theories that transcend the 
contradictions and over generalisations of both neo-evolutionist and neo-
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Marxist approaches to development. (See ibid, p. 215.) Within this perspective, 
the objective is the construction of more context-bound and context-sensitive 
theories, that seriously take into account the historical and cultural milieus of 
these countries' development; that is, the fact that there are a variety of 
developmental trajectories within the so-called 'third world'. (See ibid, p. 220.) 
For instance, a number of countries with late-industrialisation (such as Norway, 
Finland, New Zealand, even South Korea and Taiwan) managed to become part 
of the developed or "first" world in the following ways. Firstly, they 
successfully modernised their agriculture. This resulted in increased 
productivity and in a certain rural egalitarianism capable of engendering an 
important home market for industrial goods. Secondly, they succeeded strong 
links between agriculture and industry, and the creation of an industrial sector, 
which also became competitive in the world market in certain limited areas. 
Thirdly, the State apparatus was playing a key role in agriculture's 
modernisation and in its effective articulation with industry - a State apparatus, 
which intervened in the economy not in order to suffocate private capital but in 
order to assist and direct it. (See ibid, pp. 220-221.) 
Finally, the fifth distinction is that of the "modern" and the "postmodern", 
which is relevant for studying present-day social structures in Greece. (See 
ibid, pp. 215-216.) If one of the meanings of modernity entails the notion of 
differentiation, one of the meanings of postmodernity entails the notion of de-
differentiation on the levels of both social structure and culture. Also, if the 
idea of "modern" entails the destruction of traditional localisms via social 
mobilisation and the creation of all powerful nation-states, the idea of the 
"postmodern" entails the quite opposite process, that is, the revival of localism 
and its articulation with global forces in such a way that it bypasses the nation-
state. (See ibid, pp. 222-223.) Moreover, 
Relating now the distinction "modern/postmodern" to theoretical debates, 
one can point to arguments that try to assess the relevance of this distinction 
to contemporary societies on the shift from Taylorism or Fordism to flexible 
specialization (on the economic level); from working class organizations to the 
rise of the so-called new social movements (on the political level); and from 
the technocratic optimism of the Enlightenment to the present relativism, 
reflexivity, and radical antifoundationalism (on the cultural level). (See ibid, 
p.223.) 
Whether one calls the above state of affairs postmodernity or late modernity, in 
Greece, the obvious indicators of a postmodern trend are: a) the by-passing of 
state control by local-global banking networks (on the economic level), b) the 
growing disenchantment with class parties and trade unions (on the political 
level), and c) the striking depoliticisation of the younger generation, its 
orientation to individualistic consumerism and its return to the Orthodox faith 
(on the cultural level). (See ibid, p. 223.) 
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society in which activities of science and technology are conducted. In 
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the role of 'science' and 'technology' has a special impact on developing 
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A DESCRIPTION OF THE GREEK HIGHER EDUCATION SYSTEM 
Higher education in Greece includes the AEl and the TEl. The higher education 
system in Greece will be presented in the Tables that follow. These Tables, 
which have been presented by Kladis et aI, offer the arrangement (order) of the 
Departments - and the corresponding degrees they provide - in the 18 "Highest 
Educational Institutions" (Avwrara EK7lXu&vruai Ibpvj.1ara) which are the 
Universities and University Level Establishments, and the 12 "Technological 
Educational Institutions" (Tc}CVoAoYlKa EK7raz&VTlKa Ibpvj.1ara). The regional 
development of the Departments is also provided. The Tables also include the 
SELETE (School for Teachers of Technical and Vocational Education) and the 
Higher School of Rhodes.1 
The Departments and the corresponding degrees of the Greek AEl (Highest 
Educational Institutions) have been put into groups of 16 units of cognitive 
areas, in accordance with the system of grouping already used in the EEC. The 
co-ordination of the relevant activities and the necessary correspondences of the 
cognitive areas among the various countries within the framework of 
ERASMUS programme are based on this system. The grouping of the 
Departments and the corresponding degrees of the Greek TEl (Technological 
Educational Institutions) have been done on the basis of the arrangement of the 
Departments in the Schools of the TEl existing by 1993.2 
In the following Tables, some General Departments which began functioning in 
1993 have not been included. These Departments are in the Technical 
University of Athens, in the Poly technical School of the University of 
Thessaloniki, in the Poly technical School of the University of Patras, in the 
Technical University of Crete and in the School of Humanities of the University 
of Thessaly. Also, the General Department of Justice that had already been 
functioning in the Panteion University of Social and Political Sciences is not 
included. The elements included in the Tables that follow are brought up to 
date according to the changes made until the end of October 1992.3 
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The 'map' of higher education in Greece, includes the following elements: 
- All the Departments functioning during the academic year 1992-93. These 
Departments are marked with a circle (0). 
- All the Departments that had been founded with the publication of the 
relevant Presidential Decree and which, during the academic year 1992-93, had 
not started functioning yet. These Departments are marked with an X. 
- The Branches of the already existing Departments are marked with a second 
relevant symbol in the same position.4 
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ENDNOTES 
1 KLADIS, D., & PANOUSIS, Y., (1993), 0 ÔĬȚĦŴŸĚIIJt.aimo yza T17 ÒÍÌÚÍŸĚ Kal 
A£lTOvpyia nov A.E.! ĜĬÍŔÕŊŸĚØŮÌÍŔÌÍŔÕŨŸŤÍİO£Ěj1£ TO v. 2083/92) [Law for the Structure 
and Function of A.E.I. (as tranformed with Law 2083/92)], Athens - Komotini, 
Sakkoulas, p. 239. 
2 Ibid, p. 239. 
3 Ibid, p. 240. 
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· 05.00 GRAPHIC ARTS AND FINE ARTS STUDIES 
05.01 Graphic Arts 0 
05.02 Graphic Arts Technology 0 
05.03 Decorative Arts 0 
05.04 Photography 0 
05.05 Works of Art and Relic Conservation 0 
06.00 TECHNOLOGICAL APPLICATIONS 
06.01 Civil Engineering Superstructure Works 0 0 0 0 
06.02 Civil Engineering Substructure Works 0 0 0 0 0 
06.03 Topography 0 
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APPENDIX TWO 
HISTORICAL CONTEXT, THEORETICAL HERITAGE AND 
METHODOLOGY OF WORLD SYSTEMS ANALYSIS 
Within this Appendix, the theoretical universe of World Systems Analysis will 
be presented under three broad themes: the historical context, the theoretical 
heritage and the methodology. 
2.1 HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF WORLD SYSTEMS ANALYSIS 
During the 1950s, the modernisation school was dominant in the field of 
development. In the 1960s, the dominant school was the neo-Marxist 
dependency school. The failure of modernisation programmes in Latin America 
in the 1960s led to the neo-Marxist dependency school which was highly critical 
of the modernisation schoot attacking it as a rationalisation of imperialism) 
The terms "core - periphery" first began to be applied extensively to the 
operations of the world-economy in the context of a criticism in the 1960s of 
existing dominant views concerning the economic growth or "development" of 
nation-states. The critics, the first group who came mostly from Latin America, 
objected to the main thrust of the literature on "development": 
This develop mentalist literature sought to analyze the sequence of descriptive 
characteristics of those sovereign states that were then relatively 
industrialized and prosperous in order to create a model that could in effect 
be copied by less industrialized and less prosperous sovereign states.2 
The critics claimed that the various states were not separate, independent entities 
to be conceived as being in various "stages" of parallel processes of 
"development". Rather, they were part of a single ongoing system: a "world-
system". The categories of "developed" and "underdeveloped" were simply the 
descriptive terms applied to the poles of a unified, centrifugal process of overall 
development. The new terms of "core" and "periphery" were to be seen as 
relational terms and they were implicitly the pluses and minuses of a zero-sum 
concept. The point of Andre Gunder Frank's celebrated phase, "the 
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development of underdevelopment" was: "The more one zone became "core-
like/' the more another became "peripheral."3 
During the 1970s, these contrasting perspectives in the field of development co-
existed. However, by the mid-1970s the ideological battle between the previous 
two schools began to subside.4 The debate on Third World development became 
less ideological and emotional. A group of radical researchers led by Immanuel 
Wallerstein found that there were "many new activities in the capitalist world 
economy that could not be explained within the confines of the dependency 
perspective." These new activities were: a) the economic growth of East Asian 
countries that could not be portrayed as "dependent development", b) the crisis 
among the socialist states and c) the crisis in U.s. capitalism.5 
Thus, world sytems analysis emerged as a distinctive theory in the field of the 
sociology of development. 
2.2 THEORETICAL HERITAGE OF WORLD SYSTEMS ANALYSIS 
Wallerstein's world system perspective stems from the neo-Marxist literature on 
development and the French Annales school. Terms such as unequal exchange, 
core-periphery exploitation and the world market come from the neo-Marxist 
literature on development. Concepts used by Frank, Dos Antos, and Amin 
criticise both the modernisation school and the Marxist developmentalist 
perspective.6 In 1967, Gunder Frank stated that "for the new states it is not a 
matter of 'catching up' but rather one of changing the whole process of their 
development. "7 
At a later stage, Wallerstein had fully developed his world-system perspective 
and moved beyond the domain of the neo-Marxist dependency school. This shift 
is explained by the strong influence of Fernand Braudel and the French Annales 
School on Wallerstein's conception of the world-system. The French Annales 
school arose as a protest against the overspecialisation of social science 
disciplines within conventional academic boundaries. Through the works of its 
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long-time leader, Fernand Braudel, this school advanced the following 
arguments. First, Braudel sought to develop "total" or "global" history: instead 
of subordinating history to other disciplines, he considered history as an all-
embracing and catholic discipline. Second, Braudel argued for the synthesis of 
history and social sciences through an emphasis on the long-term: la longue duree 
is a historical process in which all change is slow, a history of constant repetition, 
even recurring cycles. Third, Braudel was instrumental in shifting the centre of 
concern in historical discourse from the histories of periods to problem-oriented 
history. As Wallerstein pointed out, Braudel was willing to ask 'big' questions, 
such as "What is capitalism?".8 
Moreover, the theoretical heritage of world systems analysis is closely 
interrelated with its methodology. 
2.3 METHODOLOGY OF WORLD SYSTEMS ANALYSIS 
According to Wallerstein, 'world - systems analysis' is not a theory about the 
social world, or about part of it. Rather this kind of analysis is a protest against 
the ways in which social scientific inquiry was structured at its inception in the 
middle of the nineteenth century. World-systems analysis offered a critique of 
social scientific inquiry, as it was being practised worldwide, which had come to 
be a set of often-unquestioned and a priori assumptions. The effect was that this 
mode of inquiry was closing off rather than opening up many of the most 
important or most interesting research questions: 
In wearing the blinkers which the nineteenth century constructed, we are 
unable to perform the social task we wish to perform and that the rest of the 
world wishes us to perform, which is to present rationally the real historical 
alternatives that lie before us. World-systems analysis was born as moral, and 
in its broadest sense, political, protest. However, it is on the basis of scientific 
claims, that is, on the basis of claims related to the possibilities of systematic 
knowledge about social reality, that world-systems analysis challenges the 
prevailing mode of inquiry.9 
Part of the methodology of World Systems Analysis concerns the definition of 
capitalism which is presented within Chapter Six, where the thesis introduces 
the concept of the 'semiperiphery'. Apart from "Capitalism", Wallerstein also 
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felt uncomfortable with six other common assumptions: "On Social Science 
Disciplines", "On History and Social Science", "On the Unit of Analysis: Society 
versus Historical System", "On the Role of the Revolutions", "On Science" and 
"On Progress". 
2.3.1 On Social Science Disciplines 
As So points out, Wallerstein rejects the artificial disciplinary boundaries among 
the various social scientific disciplines. The social science divisions derived from 
the dominant liberal ideology of the 19th century that the state (politics) and the 
market (economics) were analytically separate domains. For Wallerstein, "as the 
real world evolved, the contact line between 'primitive' and 'civilized', 'political' 
and 'economic', blurred."lo The argument of world-systems analysis is 
straightforward: 
The three presumed arenas of collective human action - the economic, the 
political and the social or sociocultural - are not autonomous arenas of social 
action. They do not have separate 'logics' .... We are arguing that there is a 
single 'set of rules' or a single 'set of constraints' within which these various 
structures operate. l1 
This point of view underlined the debate about the unity of history and social 
science. 
2.3.2 On History and Social Science 
Wallerstein questions the "neat division" of intellectual labour with historical 
analysis focusing on particular sequences while social scientific analYSis 
examines universal generalisations.12 
"World - systems analysis offers the heuristic value of the via media between 
trans-historical generalizations and particularistic narrations."13 The optimal 
method is to pursue analysis within systemic frameworks. The systemic 
frameworks are long enough in time and large enough in space to contain 
governing 'logics' which' determine' the largest part of sequential reality, while 
simultaneously recognising and taking into account that these systemic 
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frameworks have beginnings and ends and therefore, they are not to be 
conceived of as 'eternal' phenomena. This implies that at every instant both the 
framework (the 'cyclical rhythms' of the system, which are described 
conceptually) and the patterns of internal transformation (the 'secular trends' of 
the system which are described sequentially) that will eventually bring about the 
demise of the system are to be looked at. Therefore, the task is singular. There is 
neither historian nor social scientist. There is only a historical social scientist 
who analyses the general laws of particular systems and the particular sequences 
through which these systems have gone. 14 
The above argument is related to Wallerstein's theoretical position about the unit 
of analysis being the historical system. 
2.3.3 On the Unit of Analysis: Society Versus Historical System 
During the 19th century, the concept of "society" was opposite to that of "state". 
Wallerstein questions the treatment of society / state as unit of analysis. For him, 
the basic unit of analysiS is the historical system and emphasis is placed on the 
unity of historical social science.IS Wallerstein argues that world-systems 
analysis makes the unit of analysis a subject of debate: 
Where and when do the entities within which social life occurs exist? It 
substitutes for the term 'society' the term 'historical system'. Of course, this is 
a mere semantic substitution. But it rids us of the central connotation that 
'society' has acquired, its link to 'state', and therefore of the presupposition 
about the 'where' and 'when'. Furthermore, 'historical system' as a term 
underlines the unity of historical social science. The entity is simultaneously 
systemic and historical.16 
According to world-systems analysis, the capitalist world-economy is a 
particular historical system: if one wants to ascertain the mode of functioning of 
this concrete system, the optimal way is to look at the historical evolution of this 
system.I7 
Historical systems can be classified into three major types of entity. These 
entities are defined by their mode of production, which according to Wallerstein 
is the organisation of the material basis of a society. There are three modes of 
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production, associated with types of entity or systems of change. The first mode 
of production is the 'mini-system': the original mode of production based upon 
very limited specialisation of tasks. The second mode of production is 'the 
world-empire': "a large group of agricultural producers whose technology is 
advanced enough to generate a surplus of production beyond their immediate 
needs. filS The third mode of production is the 'world-economy': 
the entity based upon the capitalist mode of production. The criterion for 
production is profitability and the basic drive of the system is accumulation of 
the surplus as capital. ... Competition between different units of production is 
ultimately controlled by the cold hand of the market.19 
Wallerstein discusses two things about the varieties of historical systems: one 
concerns the link of 'logic' and form and the other concerns the history of the 
coexistence of forms. In terms of form, he takes as the defining boundaries of a 
historical system those within which the system and the people within it are 
regularly reproduced by means of some kind of ongoing division of labour. 
Empirically, there have been three such modes: 
The 'mini-systems', so-called because they are small in space and probably 
relatively brief in time (a life-span of about six generations), are highly 
homogeneous in terms of cultural and governing structures. The basic logic is 
one of 'reciprocity' in exchanges. The 'world empires' are vast political 
structures (at least at the apex of the process of expansion and contradiction 
which seems to be their fate) and encompass a wide variety of 'cultural' 
patterns. The basic logic of the system is the extraction of tribute from 
otherwise locally self-administered direct producers (mostly rural) that is 
passed upward to the centre and redistributed to a thin but crucial network of 
officials. The 'world economies' are vast uneven chains of integrated 
production structures dissected by multiple political structures. The basic 
logic is that the accumulated surplus is distributed unequally in favour of 
those able to achieve various kinds of temporary monopolies in the market 
networks. This is a 'capitalist' logic.20 
In addition, revolutions had a role to play in the methodological debate. 
2.3.4 On the Role of Revolutions 
Wallerstein argues that: "The end of the eighteenth and the beginning of the 
nineteenth century represent a crucial turning-point in the history of the world, 
in that the capitalists finally achieved state-societal power in the key areas. fl21 
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The Industrial Revolution in England and the French Revolution were crucial in 
the development of social scientific theory.22 
The theory of degrees of capitalism assumed that a mismatch between 
'economic' dominance and state-societal power is possible and can be overcome. 
Both revolutions represent the overcoming of this mismatch. The Industrial 
Revolution in England highlights the political arena (transformation of the pre-
capitalist ancien regime into a capitalist state) and the French Revolution 
highlights the fruits of such a transformation. World-systems analysis calls for 
an evaluation of the centrality of these purportedly key' events' (namely, the two 
revolutions) in terms of the long duree of the historical system within which they 
occurred. According to Wallerstein: 
If the unit of analysis of the modem world-system is the capitalist world-
economy (and this remains an 'if), then we will need to ask whether the 
received categorical distinctions - agriculture and industry, landowner and 
industrialist - do or do not represent a leitmotiv around which the historical 
development centred.23 
Moreover, Wallerstein assumes that: 
The continued development of the capitalist world-economy has involved the 
unceasing ascension of the ideology of national economic development as the 
primordial collective task, the definition of such a development in terms of 
national economic growth, and the corresponding virtual "axiom ... that the 
route to affluence lies by way of an industrial revolution."24 
Wallerstein claims that a central thesis of his work is that "cumulative, self 
sustaining change in the form of the endless search for accumulation has been 
the leitmotiv of the capitalist world-economy ever since its genesis in the 
sixteenth century."2S 
The Industrial Revolution in Great Britain 
The factors that made the processes of mechanisation and 
"liberation" /proletarianisation occur "for the first time" in Great Britain were 
the following : a) increased demand, b) availability of capital! c) demographic 
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factors, d) agricultural "revolution", e) a preexisting development of land-tenure 
patterns and f) a presumed attitude of mind.26 
Wallerstein cites Landes' argument that the capital improves through ""the 
quality of the inputs", that is, "the higher productivity of new technology and 
the superior skills and knowledge of both entrepreneurs and workers."" 
Wallerstein claims that this is true, but: 
always true of a phase of expansion in the world-economy that the leading 
industries are high-profit industries precisely because of higher productivity 
which translates into lower costs, and is made possible by a temporary market 
monopoly of "skills and knowledge". The question remains whether there 
was anything very special about this period.27 
Wallerstein's basic argument is that industrial revolution in Britain was 
revolutionary from the point of view that it marked the creation of the factory as 
the framework for the organisation of work in industry. The major concern of 
the entrepreneurs was not dispensing with their workers but expanding their 
output.28 
The French Revolution 
The French Revolution marked neither basic economic nor basic political 
transformation. Rather, in terms of the capitalist world-economy, this revolution 
represented the moment when the ideological superstructure finally caught up 
with the economic base. It was neither the cause of the transition nor the 
moment of its occurrence, but its consequence.29 
For Wallerstein, the ideology of the French Revolution also reflected the 
structural endpoint of the capitalist process and the final bourgeoisification of 
the upper classes. All advantage would be derived from current position in the 
economic structure rather than from past position. This revolution also 
represented the first of the anti systemic revolutions of the capitalist world-
economy. In this respect this revolution was partly successful. The myth that it 
represented was an anti-bourgeois myth and not a bourgeois one. Ultimately, 
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the bourgeois revolution served the same function as the concept of the 
industrial revolution: it was a prerequisite to an "industrial revolution".3o 
Apart from the role of the revolutions, the methodological debate had 
consequences also about the way Wallerstein conceived science. 
2.3.5 On Science 
According to Wallerstein, "Science is the search for the rules which summarize 
most succintly why everything is the way it is and how things happen."31 
Modern science has come strongly on the deterministic side of the equation, on 
the side of linearity and concision. In the name of this tradition, nomothetic 
social science asserted itself. Its methodology was that of the natural sciences: 
"systematic and precise empirical inquiry, then induction leading to theories."32 
However, for Wallerstein: 
historical social science must start with the abstract and move in the direction 
of the concrete, ending with a coherent interpretation of the processes of 
particular historical systems that accounts plausibly for how they followed a 
particular concrete historical path. The determinate is not the simple but the 
complex, indeed the hyper-complex. And of course no concrete situation is 
more complex than the long moments of transition when the simpler 
constraints collapse .... World-systems analysis is not a paradigm of historical 
social science. It is a call for a debate about the paradigm.33 
Finally, Wallerstein's debate on methodology influenced the way he viewed 
progress. 
2.3.6 On Progress 
Evolutionary theorists and Marxist develop mentalists had put emphasis on the 
progressive human history.34 Yet, for Wallerstein, "World-systems analysis 
wants to remove the idea of progress from the status of a trajectory and open it 
up as an analytical variable."35 Therefore, Wallerstein suggests: 
We are now however living in the long moment of transition wherein the 
contradictions of the capitalist world-economy have made it impossible to 
continue to adjust its machinery ... World-systems analysis is a call for the 
construction of a historical social science that feels comfortable with the 
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uncertainties of transition, that contributes to the transformation of the world 
by illuminating the choices without appealing to the crutch of a belief in the 
inevitable triumph of good.36 
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World-System Theories, op. cit., p. 169. 
5 Ibid, pp. 169-170. 
6 Ibid, pp. 171-172. Additionally, world systems analysis provides a framework, 
essential to an understanding of educational developments and reforms that are 
simultaneously sweeping many countries of the world: 
linking educational events to the workings of an international economic order, 
helps explain why expansion and reform, in so many cases, have failed to effect 
structural change in education or society, and, indeed, why externally induced 
educational innovations may contribute to perpetuation of existing 
stratification systems within and between countries. [See ARNOVE, R. P., 
(1982), "Comparative Education and World Systems", in ALTBACH, P. G., 
ARNOVE, R. P., & KELLY, G. P., (eds), Comparative Education, New York, 
Macmillan, p. 463.] 
The three key concepts of world systems analysis are: 1. economic and cultural 
dependency, 2. centre and periphery and 3. the convergence or divergence in the 
international order. Its basic framework of analysis comes from the dependency 
theory, which has mainly to do with the hegemony of metropolitan countries 
over peripheral countries. (See ibid, p. 454.) 
Yet, there are differences between dependency theory and world system 
theories. The unit of analysis for the dependency perspective is the nation-state, 
while for the world-system perspective it is the world-system. For the first, the 
methodology is structural - historical (boom and bust of nation-states) while for 
the latter, it has to do with the historical dynamics of the world-system (cyclical 
rhythms and secular trends). For the dependency perspective, the theoretical 
structure is bimodal (core - periphery) while for the world - system perspective, 
it is trimodal (core - semiperiphery - periphery). The direction of development 
is, for the first, deterministic (dependency is generally harmful), while for the 
second, there is a possibility of upward and downward mobility in the world -
economy. For the first, the research focus is on the periphery while for the latter 
it is on the periphery as well as on the core, the semiperiphery, and the world -
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economy. [See SO, A. Y., (1990), Social Change and Development: Modernization, 
Dependency, and World System Theories, op. cit., p. 95.] 
The origin of the dependency theory is the orthodox Marxist-Leninist 
perspective on development. This theory focuses upon the relationships 
between, as well as within, societies in regards to social, cultural, economic and 
political structures. Development and underdevelopment as relational concepts 
between and within societies are inversely related. The term dependency 
emphasises the causal relationship between the development of central or 
metropole societies and the underdevelopment of peripheral or satellite societies 
as an historical and at least indirectly an intentional process. [See FAGERLIND, 
I. & SAHA, L., (1989), Education and National Development: a Comparative 
Perspective, Oxford, Pergamon Press, p. 22.] Furthermore, 
The intellectual origins of dependency theory can be traced to Marx. It was 
Marx's concern with the exploitation by the bourgeois of the proletariat which 
led the American economist Paul Baran, in his work The Political Economy of 
Growth (1957), to see underdevelopment in the poor countries as caused by 
capitalism in the Western world. A further contribution to the intellectual 
origins of dependency came from Lenin's concept of imperialism, which 
dependency theorists used to describe the process whereby capitalism 
dominates and exploits the poor countries. (See ibid, p. 22.) 
According to this theory, the world can be divided in the core and the peripheral 
countries which are seen as part of a global system dominated by a capitalist 
economic network: 
The mode of articulation of the underdeveloped economies with the world 
economic system may result in a transfer of resources from the periphery to 
the centre and/or this articulation may give rise to various 'blocking 
mechanisms' which hold back or 'distort' the economies of the periphery, 
thereby preventing an allocation of resources which will produce economic 
growth (Roxborough, 1976:118) (See ibid, p. 23.) 
The transfer of resources can occur in various ways, such as colonial or neo-
colonial relationships, or the operations of multinational corporations. 
Dependency theory, as an alternative to theories of capitalist development, 
rejects the progressive and linear view of development and stresses the 
importance on factors external to society. The condition of the less developed 
regions and countries of the world is seen to be caused by the activities of the 
rich countries. It is not necessary that the rich country physically dominates the 
poor. "It is enough that the leaders or the elite of the poor countries hold 
attitudes, values and interests consistent with those in the rich countries./I (See 
ibid, p. 23.) 
There were several criticisms of the dependency theory. One of these was that at 
least in its early formulation, dependency theory focussed too heavily on factors 
external to societies and neglected the internal structures of underdevelopment. 
In the theory, there was also a confusion concerning the two concepts of the 
'I capitalist mode of productionll and Ilparticipation in a world capitalist 
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economic system". Foreign investment, trade and aid to a given country 
contributes to economic growth in the short run. Within this context, it makes 
more sense to speak of dependent development rather than the development of 
underdevelopment. Dependency theorists failed to take into account that some 
dependent nations succeeded to become rich, while others remained poor. The 
participation of non - capitalist countries, such as the Soviet Union, in the 
development of the poor countries and the extent to which it promoted its own 
form of dependency and underdevelopment in them were also not explained. 
The failure of the dependency theory to provide a viable strategy for 
development without creating some degree of dependency in the poor country 
has been one of its most serious difficulties. "To sever trade relations, to refuse 
international aid or to nationalize multinational companies are simplistic 
policies, which are not likely to eliminate dependency or promote economic 
growth." In the present-day world condition, the goals of complete self-
sufficiency and autonomy by a nation are umealistic. The important question is 
what kind of development should be pursued in any given context and the 
dependency theorists have given few guidelines in this regard. In the end, 
dependency theorists have not explained how the national elite of a poor 
country (seen as collaborators with the elites of rich countries in the dependency 
process) can be made to ignore their own interests in favour of those of society as 
a whole. (See ibid, pp. 24-25.) 
The framework of analysis of the dependency theory is also related to 
Wallerstein's concepts concerning convergence and divergence in the global 
system. According to these concepts, 
the world market and society produce convergence by subjecting all societies 
to the same force; they produce divergence by creating different roles for 
different societies in the world stratification system. ... Participation in the 
world system represents for peripheral countries an opportunity for access to 
valued resources (technology, capitat and skill) as well as the likelihood of 
economic subjugation by stronger nations. [See ARNOVE, R. F., (1982), 
"Comparative Education and World Systems", in ALTBACH, P. G., ARNOVE, 
R. F., & KELLY, G. P., (eds), Comparative Education, New York, Macmillan, p. 
454.] 
Within such a framework, international aid networks and their programmes can 
be seen as a series of educational panaceas such as comprehensive high schools, 
open universities and non-formal education. "Through these reforms, 
previously isolated or excluded individuals can be mobilized for multiple 
purposes: national building, the opening of national markets, the fulfilment of 
economic plans." (See ibid, pp. 456-457.) Consequently, questions arise from 
this approach which have to do with whether programmes in technical-
vocational education (promoted by the World Bank and USAID) coincide with 
the employment demands of multinationals. They also have to do with the 
extent to which the programmes of the donor agencies support elite education as 
against mass education, or notions that social issues are scientifically managed 
and that social change comes only from higher-credentialed people at the top. 
(See ibid, pp. 462-463.) 
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Most of the neo-Marxist theories of development focus upon selected, 
problematic aspects of Marx's original theory. For instance, Marx never 
extended his idea of colonialism to include the notion of underdevelopment. 
Also, the 'mode of production' (production as a material process and as a social 
one) as one of the most imortant concepts in Marxist analysis is debatable 
particularly on the nature of various modes of production, the transition 
between them and the possibility of two modes coexisting in the same society 
(e.g. the theory of the 'dual economy'). Moreover, 
The abscence of a crystallized class structure in many less developed societies 
has made the application of Marxist concepts problematic for development 
theory and strategies. Mao Zedong recognised this difficulty and incorporated 
different types of the agricultural population into the Marxist class structure 
(Mao Zedong, 1967). On the basis of this extension of orthodox Marxism, 
Mao's revolutionary program for socialist development in China has been 
influential in many third world countries today. [See FAGERLIND, 1., & 
SAHA, L., (1989), Education and National Development: a Comparative Perspective, 
op. cit., pp. 21-22.] 
7 TAYLOR, P. J., (1989), Political Geography: World-Economy, Nation-State and 
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